È disponibile in open access il mio ultimo articolo sull’islam italiano, pubblicato su Contemporary Islam:
Allievi, S. European Islam and the Italian case. Tendencies and specificities. Cont Islam (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-025-00596-x — qui il PDF: Contemporary Islam 2025 Italian Islam
Conférence: Violences et radicalismes au coeur de l’Islam contemporain, Inauguration du cycle “Hors le murs”, organisé par l’Université Internationale de Rabat, à la Bibliothèque Nationale du Royaume du Maroc, à Rabat. Avec Jean-Noel Ferrié (Sciences-Po, Rabat), Stefano Allievi (Université de Padoue), Mohamed Sghir Janjar (Fondation Abdul-Aziz), Farid El Asri (Sciences-Po, Rabat). (ici)
Rabat, 19 Janvier 2016
IMAMS IN WESTERN EUROPE
Authority, Training and Institutional Challenges
Rome, November 5-7, 2014
LUISS Guido Carli University and John Cabot University, Rome, Italy
Stefano Allievi
Keynote Speech
“Precarious Reality, Distorted visibility: Mosques, Imams and Preachers in Italy”
CURRICULUM VITAE
Stefano Allievi
Home Address:
Mobile:
stefano.allievi@unipd.it
Continua a leggere
Oxford Islamic Studies online, July 2014
http://www.resetdoc.org/story/00000021955/format/html
M. van Bruinessen, S. Allievi, translation of Producing Islamic Knowledge
Stefano Allievi, University of Padua
Muslim communities all over Europe sighed with relief when they heard that the Norwegian massacre had not been carried out by one of their own. If that had been the case, the price to pay would have been a terrible one. Many non-Muslims also breathed their own sigh at not having to confirm their prejudice against Muslims. This reaction is disquieting in its triviality and automatism. The press in Muslim-majority countries is pointing out these inconsistancies, asking “Why is this not called Christian terrorism?” “Why are we not creating a plot theory?”
The massacres in Oslo and on the island of Utoya, carried out on July 22nd by lone killer Anders Behring Breivik, provide us with food for thought, while we wait for further facts to emerge on the case.
At the initial unfolding of the events, many Europeans believed the attack was of Islamic origin. This automatic reaction warrants reflection. As Europol data confirms every year, the attacks carried out and the acts of violence perpetrated by Islamic fanatics in Europe are a tiny percentage of the total attacks, bombs, massacres and murders that occur each year. For example, according to the 2010 report, there were 294 terrorist attacks in Europe (significantly fewer than in 2008 when in turn there were fewer than in 2007), of which 237 were carried out by separatists, 40 by the extreme left, 4 by the extreme right and 2 single issue attacks (linked to a specific local cause), 10 non-specific and only 1 (in Italy) of Islamic origin. In spite of this there were 587 arrests on terrorism charges during that same year, of which 413 were separatists, 29 were extreme left militants, 22 extreme right wing militants and 2 were single issue terrorists, 11 unspecified and 110 Islamists. There were 408 people sentenced for terrorist crimes , of which 268 were separatists, 39 extreme left militants, 1 extreme right militant, 11 unspecified and 89 Islamists [1]. This data can be interpreted in various ways. One could consider the discrepancy between the number of arrests and imprisonments of Islamists and the number of attacks carried out by Islamists, as a sign of effective prevention. This greater vigilance concerning this kind of terrorism has had a real effect, with a number of attacks in various countries prevented in locations where there would have been high numbers of victims, such as airports and other public places. One the other hand, one could see this data as the mark of selective attention and greater nervousness regarding Islamist terrorism, and perhaps an underestimation of other kinds of terrorism, such as from the extreme right.
This data cannot be blamed exclusively on the media, although the media is a phenomenal amplifier and sound box for the European fear of Islamism. These numbers should also make us seriously reflect, not only on the presence of Islam in Europe, but also on what it means to be European, and on our attitude toward Islam and Muslims [2]. Biases against Muslims in Europe can be traced back to a long campaign that precedes 9/11 and that has proved to be very effective and pervasive. The Northern League’s campaign against mosques in Italy began in 2000 [3], and even before that, Islamophobia was constructed by the Front National in France and by other political players in various countries [4]. Therefore, some prejudices are not so much a reaction to Islamic violence in the West, but rather something far more profound and ancient.
We seem unable to abandon this Pavlovian reflex in spite of frequently being proved wrong. In fact the news all too often reports on the risk of Islamic attacks that then never take place during great events, such as the Olympic Games, the G8, the Jubilee, and so on. There are occasional confirmations, but our automatic reaction never results in a debate, reflection or demands for a self-critical analysis. Shouting ‘Islamic wolf’ has enabled successful careers in journalism, the security forces, the judicial sector and, of course, in politics. Private, let alone public, apologies to Muslims for mistakes are very rare. And yet, this phenomenon has damaged the lives of thousands of Muslims, who then become the occasional victims, if not of violence, certainly of rejection, controversy and ordinary daily harassment at school, at work and on the streets.
Muslim communities all over Europe sighed with relief when they heard that the Norwegian massacre had not been carried out by one of their own. If that had been the case, the price to pay would have been a terrible one. Many non-Muslims also breathed their own sigh at not having to confirm their prejudice against Muslims. This reaction is disquieting in its triviality and automatism. The press in Muslim-majority countries is pointing out these inconsistancies, asking “Why is this not called Christian terrorism?” “Why are we not creating a plot theory?” These are questions that should be asked throughout the West as well.
We must also reflect upon Europe’s internal violence, which has been emerging in recent years. Fear of an Islamic danger has produced a crowded web of large and small political parties, groups, websites, newspapers, writers and intellectuals, competing in the easy and productive Islamophobia market at so much per kilo. This is the hornet’s nest in which the Oslo assassin dipped his hands and then drafted his extremely personal opinions and his tragic conclusions. It is no coincidence that many of these references are quoted in his memorial, and it is significant that the xenophobic and islamophobic ravings he published are filled with recurrent themes that are actually widespread among the mainstream media and extremist viewpoints in Europe. These references consist of buzzwords, quotes and even specific linguistic similarities, such as calling Europe ‘Eurabia’, a neologism invented by Bat Ye’or but brought to success by Oriana Fallaci, who was also quoted by Breivik[5].
It is obvious that it would be neither correct nor intelligent to blame on his intellectual references the responsibility and consequences of Breivik’s actions. This, as always, would be a very slippery slope. One cannot, however, ignore that on this subject there have been bad teachers (yes, precisely in the sense used in other times and other political circles for Toni Negri and others) and terrible practitioners. Some of these voices have been provided with disproportionate and uncontested space in the public debate and the media, permitted to use language that other cases would not be allowed[6]. In many political speeches, in too many newspaper articles and even in statements from religious leaders, if one replaced the word ‘Muslim’ with the word ‘Jew’, these same statements would be considered simply unutterable. The rise in xenophobic and Islamophobic political parties all over Europe proves that this is not just a question of style. There are too many misunderstandings, too many shortcuts, too much superficiality and too many mistakes. There is too little internal debate and, of course, a number of unacceptable acts of violence. But the time has come for everyone to seriously reflect on where all this is leading us.
—————————
[1] For those wishing to research the matter personally, the link so little used by journalists and self-appointed experts on Islam, is: http://www.europol.europa.eu/content/publication/te-sat-2010-eu-terrorism-situation-trend-report-671 (see in particular pages 10 and 11 as the in-depth analyses on Islamic terrorism, especially the one mentioned above from page 18 onwards).
[2] See S. Allievi, Le trappole dell’immaginario. Islam e occidente, Forum, 2007.
[3] Italian Islam’s ‘Black September’ was in 2000, when the anti-Muslim kulturkampf became apparent in various circles, such as with the publication and favourable reception and disseminating of an essay by political analyst Giovanni Sartori, entitled Pluralism, multiculturalism and foreigners, filled with inaccuracies, inconsistencies and blunders, but extremely successful. Then there was the pastoral letter from the then Cardinal of Bologna Giacomo Biffi, equally widely broadcast and debated in Catholic circles, resulting in a peculiar Catholic form of Islamophobia until then silent. And of course there was the Northern League’s political campaign, which started with the case involving the mosque in Lodi and that has never ended. On the contrary, it is in constant evolution (on the Italian case see my books Islam italiano, Einaudi, 2003, and I musulmani e la società italiana, Franco Angeli, 2009).
[4] V. Geisser, La nouvelle islamophobie, La Découverte, 2003; M. Massari, Islamofobia. La paura e l’islam, Laterza, 2006; C. Allen, Islamophobia, Ashgate, 2010.
[5] See G. Bosetti, Cattiva maestra. La rabbia di Oriana Fallaci e il suo contagio, Marsilio, 2005, and S. Allievi, Ragioni senza forza, forze senza ragione, Emi, 2004, and also Niente di personale signora Fallaci. Una trilogia alternativa, Aliberti, 2006.
[6] The case involving the Northern League’s MEP Borghezio, is paradigmatic but anything but unique. Only on this one occasion was he good-naturedly suspended by the party for three months for having made the unutterable statement that he agreed totally with the reasons and motivations, albeit not the methods, that inspired the Oslo assassin. The aforementioned Member of the European Parliament is a professional statement-maker on this subject (he effectively does practically nothing else), and is elected on the basis of these reasons. He is hero of the Northern League’s base, celebrated in Pontida, and has never been invited to use more moderate language, let alone more serious arguments.
http://www.resetdoc.org/story/00000021694
Stefano Allievi says Islam has become a European fact despite its symbolic overload
Islam has become the second religion in Europe in terms of the number of followers, thus making Europe not an enemy, but an opportunity: it is the European part of the Muslim ummah. But, in recent years, European societies seems to consider Islam more a threat than an advantage. The problems European countries face is, then, to make these two tendencies meet, because both are true: the fact that millions of Muslims find in Europe a land of opportunity, and the fact that millions of Europeans, for good or bad reasons, fear Islam. Inevitably this process will pass through some kind of conflicts, some of which, particularly on symbolic terms, we have already seen in European societies, which shows that cultural conflicts are becoming the contemporary form of social conflict.
The Muslim presence in Europe constitutes, in fact, a dramatic cultural change for Western European societies, particularly for the countries that only a generation ago were still exporting labour force. Furthermore, considering the tumultuous history of relations between the Islamic world and Europe, especially across the Mediterranean, the presence of Islam in Europe represents a historic watershed. If in the past one could talk of Islam and the West, now, one can speak of Islam in the West, and eventually through the role of second and third generation of immigrants and converts, of an Islam of Europe, if not yet of a European Islam.
Islam is no longer a transitory phenomenon whose presence is only temporary and can eventually be sent back ‘home’. Nowadays, a population of about 20 million people that can be considered ‘culturally’ Muslim lives in western Europe, with no intention to go back. Among this population it is already difficult, now, and it will be even more difficult (and, in the end, a simple nonsense) in the future, to distinguish between the Muslims ‘of origin’, the ‘mixed’ populations, like the so-called second generations culturally grown up ‘between two cultures’, but also those coming from a situation of mixed marriage and the ‘autochthonous’ Muslims (which include the converts to Islam, but also naturalised people). This presence have to be considered, in perspective, the new Muslim population of Europe: European Muslims, not Muslims in Europe.
The future of this presence depends on many different factors and tendencies. But, what is absolutely clear is that between economic integration and political refusal, between tolerance and Islamophobia, between social mixing and mediatic hysteria and between demographic change and symbolic threats, Islam will find its place in Europe, because Muslims will do it too, and they are already doing it.
Minarets, mosques, but also veils and burqas, or other conflictual issues related to the presence of Islam in Europe (included on principles: from the Rushdie affair to the Danish cartoons controversy) will reveal at a certain point as being false problems. The real problem is greater than all this: it is the relationship of Europe with Islam, on one hand; and the relationship that the Muslims have with Europe and the West, on the other.
If the conflictual issues are the symptom, the illness is the Western imaginary of Islam, which, like the Islamic imaginary of the West, appears more conflictual in the recent past. If Europe wants to solve these conflicts, it has to pass through them, making the reasons of the sentiments and behaviours of significant parts of society, the fears that move them, the drives that they contain, emerge. And, Muslims in Europe need to enter into these discussions, even when put in unpleasant forms.
It will be necessary to discard the idea of Islamic ‘exceptionalism’, the presumption that Muslims are always different, that they need unique and peculiar instruments. The European approach must remain firmly anchored to the universalism that characterises the European juridical construction: to the principle that the law is the same for all, that rights are personal and inviolable, that it is not possible to do away with the principle of the universality of the law, which is at the foundation of the idea of the West, the justification of its history and its legitimate pride.
Reflection on these themes must leave the short term, the agitation of the present – a horizon that for the political entrepreneurs of fear rarely goes beyond the next elections – and enter in the perspective of the middle and long term, shifting from elections to generations. Because the new generations (second and third, and tomorrow fourth) of Muslims are already in Europe and are different from those that preceded them, from their immigrant fathers and mothers; but in the same way the new generations of Europeans are no longer people who have seen Muslims arrive from somewhere, but persons who have always been side by side with them from their birth: in the neighbourhood as at school or at work.
If policies and politics change rapidly, institutions are a guarantee of coherence and duration, or at least slower and more meditated change than that which drives social and political forces. And, despite everything, they are more solid than they seem: and, they work in the direction of integration, universalisation, the extension of rights and their consolidation, not in the direction of cultural opposition and social conflict. This process is also taking place on the religious level. There is a common religious grammar that ends up by comprehending and recognising the religious needs of others and their meaning: praying, also in the community, fasting, having clothing codes, an idea of modesty, specific gender and sexual roles, the sense of pure and impure… In this there is the possibility of obtaining recognition and building alliances, and constructing relations of trust and confidence. But, for this Muslims need also to understand that the idea of reciprocity, so often evoked off the point (as when a Moroccan immigrant group which wants to set up a prayer room is crushed by the reply that in Saudi Arabia you could never build a Christian church), has instead a profound and socially significant meaning, when it asks to mutually share the pain of an injustice, of a discrimination, of a religiously motivated act of violence, wherever it may take place, in Europe or in Muslim countries towards Christians or Jews.
Islam – rightly or wrongly (other diversities are often much more ‘other’) – has recently become the most extreme example of alterity and of the changes that alterity brings to European societies. These changes do not only come from Islam and Muslims. However, Islam, because of its symbolic overload and the problematic history that joins it to Europe, because of the striking and formidable aspect of some of its contemporary manifestations (among which obviously the emergence of transnational Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism), but also because of the significant statistical dimension of its presence, is inevitably at the centre of the political and social debate in Europe. And it will be there for a long time. As we have stated in the beginning, Islam has become the second religion, or the first of the non-Christian minorities, in all European countries. So, it will be impossible from now on to understand Europe without taking into consideration its Muslim component; but at the same time it will be impossible to understand Islam without taking into consideration its European and Western component. Islam has become a European fact and its internal component. And Europe an internal fact of Islam. It is not something that is going to happen in the future. It has already happened. We have to begin to understand its consequences.
Stefano Allievi is a professor of sociology at the University of Padua, Italy.
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main50.asp?filename=Ws200611Islam.asp