Conflicts over Mosques in Europe. Policy issues and trends
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Preface
The ‘Religion and Democracy
in Europe’ initiative
The Network of European Foundations (NEF) is an operational platform primarily
committed to strengthening the potential for cooperation in the form of joint ventures
between foundations at the European level. The NEF offers its members the
opportunity to identify common goals and, as an open structure, to join forces with
other foundations in Europe which may share similar concerns and objectives. It
is also open to collaboration with the public and private sectors in developing its
initiatives. Its areas of intervention to promote systemic social change include
migration, European citizenship, support for the European integration process,
youth empowerment and global European projects. The NEF is based in Brussels.
In January 2007 the NEF launched a special initiative on ‘Religion and
Democracy in Europe’. This was conducted with the participation of Hywel Ceri
Jones, NEF European policy adviser, and was based on a partnership between
several foundations, including: Van Leer Group Foundation (chair); Arcadia Trust;
Barrow Cadbury Trust; Bernheim Foundation; Compagnia di San Paolo; Ford
Foundation; Freudenberg Stiftung; King Baudouin Foundation; Riksbankens
Jubileumsfond; Stefan Batory Foundation; and Volkswagen Stiftung.
The ‘Religion and Democracy in Europe’ initiative focuses on the relation
between religion and democracy in European societies, covering both religion
and the public domain and religion and the state. The aim is to contribute to a
better informed debate on the topic through seminars and research on related
issues.
The first year of activities, which included a roundtable with specialized
journalists and a series of youth debates, culminated in the publication through
6 Conflicts over mosques in europe
Alliance Publishing Trust of a compendium in which all the material presented in
an international symposium held in Jerusalem was collected. This publication is
available on NEF’s website at www.nefic.org.
The second phase of the ‘Religion and Democracy in Europe’ initiative
(2008–9) aims to develop a series of reports addressing specific aspects of the
interaction both between the state and religion and between religion and society.
The reports are a mapping exercise of existing practices and different approaches
to specific issues, set in the broader context of the religion and democracy debate.
They target practitioners, policy makers and civil society actors. The reports have
been developed by acknowledged experts and address the following questions:
Religion and Healthcare –– in the European Union Dimitrina Petrova and
Jarlath Clifford
–– Teaching about Religions in European School Systems Luce Pepin
–– Conflicts over Mosques in Europe Stefano Allievi
–– Religion and Group focused Enmity Andreas Zick and Beate Kupper
Through this and other activities, the ‘Religion and Democracy in Europe’ initiative
aims to open up and contribute to the public debate on issues of strategic
importance for the future of European societies.
For more information
For more on NEF and its activities, please contact info@nefic.org.
For more on the ‘Religion and Democracy in Europe’ initiative, please contact
rienvangendt@vanleergroupfoundation.nl (chairman) or cristina.pineda@nefic.
org (coordinator).
About the authors
Stefano Allievi is Professor of Sociology at the University of Padua. His special
interests include migration issues, sociology of religion and cultural change; he
has particularly focused his studies on the presence of Islam in Europe, a subject
on which he has published extensively.
The text is also based on researches conducted by Jordi Moreras (Spain),
Maria Bombardieri (Italy), Athena Skoulariki (Greece), Ernst Furlinger (Austria),
Azra Akšamija (Bosnia Herzegovina), Felice Dassetto and Olivier Ralet
(Belgium), and Goran Larsson (Sweden); and on national overviews contributed
by Sophie Gilliat Ray and Jonathan Birt (Great Britain), Omero Marongiu Perria
(France), Michael Kreutz and Aladdin Sarhan (Germany), Nico Landman
(Netherlands), and Goran Larsson (Finland, Norway, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania).
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Introduction
The research background: exceptionalism and Islam
As the reader will immediately see, the present study is the only one in the series
not to have a general point of reference. Instead of addressing a broad issue such
as places of worship, it focuses right from the outset on a single issue: the question
of mosques, which is identified as a separate issue with its own specific
characteristics.
This approach faithfully reflects the current state of affairs, as we will
demonstrate in the pages below. Although forms of discrimination on the basis of
religion are not completely absent – in particular, cases of discrimination towards
certain minority religions or religious beliefs, some of which have even come
before the European courts – in no country and in no other case has the opening
of places of worship taken on such a high profile in the public imagination as
the question of mosques and Islamic places of worship. With the passage of time,
the question of mosques has led to more and more frequent disputes, debates,
conflicts and posturing, even in countries where such conflicts were previously
unknown and mosques were already present. This simple fact already puts us on a
road that we might define as ‘exceptionalism’ with reference to Islam: a tendency
to see Islam and Muslims as an exceptional case rather than a standard one; a
case that does not sit comfortably with others relating to religious pluralism, and
which therefore requires special bodies, actions and specifically targeted reactions,
unlike those used for other groups and religious minorities, and (as in the
present study) specific research.
8 Conflicts over mosques in europe
An example of this exceptionalism is seen in the forms of representation
of Islam in various European countries, which vary from case to case but differ, in
particular, with respect to the recognized practices of relations between states
and religious denominations in general. The most symbolic case is the creation
in various countries, such as France, Spain, Belgium and Italy, of collective bodies
of Islamic representation, with forms that often contradict the principles of
non interference in the internal affairs of religious communities proclaimed and
enshrined for other denominations and religious minorities. Forms of exceptionalism
from a legal, political and social perspective are, however, present in many
other fields, following a pervasive trend which affects countries with the widest
range of state structures and which appears to be in a phase of further growth.
This situation, together with the increasingly evident emergence into the
public arena of the dynamics of a conflict involving Islam (a kind of conflict in which
the construction of mosques is the most frequent and widespread cause of disagreement),
led to a desire to analyse recent cases of conflict, including clashes
in countries that are regarded as peripheral within the European Union (EU) or
that lie beyond its borders. For this reason, we have chosen, contrary to the usual
practice, to pay closest attention to the least studied and analysed countries,
for which scientific literature is least abundant. Setting off on this supposition,
we believe that meaningful data for the interpretation of broader dynamics may
emerge from an extensive analysis of the frequency and pervasiveness of these
conflicts, which are also affecting countries with a long history of immigration
and are more generally affecting the relationship between Islam and Europe.
For this reason we conducted a set of empirical investigations across
seven European countries that are among the least studied and least known
in this respect. We selected three Mediterranean countries which in certain
respects vary greatly from one another: two countries in similar situations, where
there is new immigration from Muslim countries and the memory of ancient
historical domination (Spain and Italy); and one in which there is new immigration
from Muslim countries along with a significant historical Islamic presence
(the memory of Turkish Ottoman domination) that poses a number of problems
(Greece). Also chosen were two countries which have a very significant historical
Islamic presence but which also face a number of new problems (Austria
and Bosnia Herzegovina); the Nordic country with the largest Islamic presence
(Sweden); and a central European country which has a long history of immigration
and a particular institutional nature (Belgium). The last of these is also notable
for its markedly local management of conflicts, which from a methodological
perspective makes it an interesting control group.
introduction9
For countries that are better known and for which the literature is much
more abundant and readily available in English or in languages that are widely
known and spoken in the EU (Great Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands), we
have consulted available literature and produced an overview (including some
particularly important recent empirical cases). The same was done for very
little known smaller countries, such as the Nordic and Baltic States.1
Keywords: conflict, mosques, Islam, Europe
Key elements and keywords of the research are: mosques, conflict, Islam, Europe.
‘Mosques’ and ‘conflict’ represent or describe the actual situation. This
tallies with the observation that these two words, which we will define in greater
detail below, tend to ‘go together’ – at least at this time in history, and in many
countries – with relative ease, producing specific dynamics. On the other hand,
Islam and Europe (or Islam and individual nations, or Islam and cultural interpretations
of their respective national self definitions, variously defined as Britishness,
Italianita, identite republicaine, etc, depending on the country) are the main
interpretative categories that arise from the collision of the first pairing.
It is interesting to note that the first pairing produces and expresses the
second one, which, however, rests on a different interpretative plane and at a
different level. The first pairing is local, the second global; the first is concrete
and has a clear empirical basis, the second is abstract and refers to cultural
value based registers; the first has a spatio temporal localization that is missing
in the second, or that expresses it in a completely different manner; and so forth.
Thus these words, paired together, end up having a contrasting value, which is
in itself a cultural product. ‘Mosques’ and ‘conflict’ are already two words that
directly express dissonance, the idea of a problem. The same is true if we take the
words ‘Islam’ and ‘Europe’. However, this is not necessarily the case if one looks
at facts rather than cultural interpretations. In fact, Islam and Europe have historically
lived in different degrees of approximation, and this should be outlined,
albeit briefly.
1 The following people have worked on the research, coordinated by Stefano Allievi: empirical
researches – Jordi Moreras (Spain), Maria Bombardieri (Italy), Athena Skoulariki (Greece), Ernst
Furlinger (Austria), Azra Akšamija (Bosnia Herzegovina), Felice Dassetto and Olivier Ralet
(Belgium), Goran Larsson (Sweden); national overviews – Sophie Gilliat Ray and Jonathan Birt
(Great Britain), Omero Marongiu Perria (France), Michael Kreutz and Aladdin Sarhan (Germany),
Nico Landman (Netherlands). Goran Larsson also provided a summary of the Baltic and Nordic
countries (Finland, Norway and Denmark; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). The authors provided
papers on the respective national cases. Where no other sources are mentioned, the data on specific
cases quoted in the report may be presumed to come from the above mentioned papers. Mistakes of
fact and interpretation rest on the shoulders of the author of the report, who relied on his personal
skills and experience in the field in his effort of reinterpretation.
10 Conflicts over mosques in europe
Islam and Europe: stages of approximation
We cannot here go into the details of historical processes that are long, complex
and far from linear. We can, however, attempt to summarize them, albeit in a schematic
manner that does not seek to reconstruct historical detail but to highlight
current trends (Allievi 2005a; Allievi 2005b).
Phase 1: Islam and Europe A long first stage, lasting for at least the first
ten centuries of the history of Islam, was one of major conflicts (analysed as
such, however, only at a later date), symbolized by the Crusades, which saw Islam
and (Christian) Europe facing one another, conceived and perceived as mutually
impenetrable and self referencing. All this was in spite of reality and history,
which show how permeability and exchange (of philosophical ideas, scientific
concepts, and artistic forms, as well as economic and trading links) were more
the norm than the exception.
Phase 2: Europe in Islam In the second phase, we see European dominance
of Islamic lands (the most powerful symbolic moment of this was the Napoleonic
expedition to Egypt in 1798). First, in the age of empires and the colonial
period, Europe dominated Muslim countries directly. Later, during the ongoing
stage of neo or post colonial influence ‘at a distance’ – through economic
globalization, the pervasiveness of the mass media and western consumption
patterns – Europe has gradually brought the Muslim world within transnational
economic trends and political institutions.
Phase 3: Islam in Europe In a third, more recent phase, Islam began to
spread in Europe through migration. This began in France, for example, between
the two world wars, and in most European countries during the period of postwar
reconstruction and economic boom – in the 1950s and 1960s in the centre and
north, and later still, from the late 1970s onwards, in southern Europe. It is still a
phase characterized mainly by first generation immigrants coming from former
colonies (from Algeria to France, for instance, and from the Indian subcontinent
to Great Britain), but there are also new forms of immigration (such as Turks
coming to Germany), which gradually expand as more and more countries export
labour in response to European demand.
Phase 4: the Islam of Europe In a fourth phase we observe the emergence
and consolidation of an Islam of Europe, through a gradual process of insertion,
manifested in the processes of integration – initially in the workplace, then in a
social and sometimes political context – and of generational transition. Together,
these contribute to the formation of a middle class and an intelligentsia of Islamic
origin: one that still has relations with the countries of origin, but which does not
come from outside, and is born and socialized in Europe – self formed and forced
or encouraged to build its own identity and its own space.
introduction11
Phase 5: European Islam The result of this process should be the formation
of a genuine European Islam, with its own pronounced identity different from
that of Arabic Islam or that of other countries and cultural areas of origin. This
Islam is (and even more in the future will be seen to be) a native European movement,
largely the result of a gradual and substantial process of ‘citizenization’
of Muslims residing in Europe, who look forward to the prospect of full rights on
an equal footing with other Europeans, with whom they share a common destiny.
Of this phase, for now just given in outline, one cannot say much, except that its
outcome will depend on the internal evolution of Muslim communities and their
populations; on the dynamics of global Islam; and, perhaps most importantly, on
the reactions and policies adopted towards them by the governments of individual
European countries, which will in turn be influenced by their political parties
and public opinion. In a word, the outcome will depend largely on non Muslims,
on the manner in which they approach the problem, on discussions of the issue,
and on the fears and visions of the wider world.
Today, most European countries find themselves somewhere between the
third and fourth phases, although there are some hints of the beginning of the fifth
phase, which will become more visible in the years and decades to come. It should
be borne in mind that the cycle constantly starts over again with the arrival of new
immigrants, and that the tendencies outlined are precisely that: general trends
that are empirically verifiable, but which do not involve entire Muslim populations,
who will show resistance, counter tendencies and differing positions on these
processes. Such resistance can also be found among second generation citizens.
Like all social phenomena, these cannot be generalized, and show elements
of complexity, contradiction and ambiguity.
The important point to appreciate is that we have in fact emerged from a
contraposition that we can now recognize as a false opposition: one that seeks
to place Islam and Europe as two horns of an insoluble dilemma. Today, Islam is in
Europe, and it is here to stay, albeit progressively and in different forms. And yet,
as the conflicts surrounding mosques in Europe show, interpretations increasingly
tend to go in the opposite direction: a sign that the trend we have outlined is
not really perceived and accepted as such. Interpretations of conflict are tending
increasingly to appear even in countries where the process of inclusion, of mixite,
of progressive ‘citizenization’ have gone furthest.
Cultural conflicts and public debates on Islam in Europe
The presence of Islam in Europe’s ‘public space’ could not go unnoticed either
socially or culturally. It is, or is perceived to be, too visible or too different not to
12 Conflicts over mosques in europe
provoke debates or even tensions, for historical, cultural, religious, political and
social reasons.
Confrontation seems to occur ‘across the board’. Islam is itself questioned,
often through essentialist and simplistic interpretations and controversies
regarding dogmatic aspects and customs. Some aspects of Islam are also
called into question for the way they manifest themselves, particularly in Muslim
countries: of these aspects, the most discussed are those related to the condition
of women and to gender equality, and to the relationship between religion and
violence, fundamentalism and, more generally, politics. Finally, confrontation
leads to questions and debate about the host society itself: on its degree of ‘openness’,
on its borders, on the possibilities of and limits to integration, on how best
to achieve this (in essence, this is the debate on multiculturalism), and on the
definition of any possible ‘tolerance thresholds’, at an ethnic or religious level.
All this may happen without there necessarily being any debate or direct
dialogue or confrontation with Muslims, or between society and the Muslims who
live in it. Often these are debates within societies about Muslims and Islam.
To give some examples, the presence of Islam in Europe raises various
kinds of tensions, controversies, debates and conflicts:
Conflicts about principles and ideas: from the Rushdie –– affair in Britain
(and elsewhere) to the cartoons affair in Denmark (and elsewhere). All
these are perfect examples of global/local – or ‘glocal’ – issues, showing
how easily questions concerning Islam in Europe can become influential
and produce a repositioning of public and social actors, both in Europe
and in Muslim countries.
–– Conflicts brought about by dramatic events happening in Europe
concerning Islam and caused by Islamic actors: terrorism (9/11 and its
consequences in European countries – where some of the terrorists,
such as Mohamed Atta, came from; the terrorist attacks in London and
Madrid) and individual demonstrative acts, such as the assassination of
Theo van Gogh.
–– Controversies frequently raised and discussed in public debate relating
to gender issues: the hijab is symbolic of this, but more generally, there
are questions on the role of women in Islam, how this is perceived
in the West and its effects on Muslim families, conflicts between
generations, etc.
There are controversies, however, in which not only different opinions regarding
relations with Islam are involved but also the Muslim social actors themselves.
The case of mosques is the most significant in this sense, even if it is not the only
introduction13
one, because it relates to a conflict that is not only debated within society, but is
about society itself. This point seems particularly significant, in that it implies the
perception of control over the territory and its symbolic imprinting. After all, control
of and over the territory is not only a cultural and symbolic fact, it is also (and
remains, in spite of everything) a very concrete and material sign of dominion and
power.
These disputes are not limited to the establishment of places of worship;
they also include the question of their visibility in European cities, which has an
evident symbolic value. This issue encompasses related questions regarding the
broadcasting of the adhan, the call to prayer, from mosques to the areas surrounding
them, as well as the issue of Muslim cemeteries and the right to obtain religiously
exclusive areas within existing cemeteries. These questions are important
for various reasons. They not only show how the presence of Islam in Europe
is debated and confronted; they are also crucial in understanding the broader
issues of Europe as a whole: its problems, its values and its identity.
The mosque issue, in itself, may not even exist. On the one hand, there is
nothing more obvious and natural than that foreign communities should wish and
need to have their own meeting places according to their religious affiliations, and
that they should enjoy the same fundamental rights that European constitutions
grant to other minorities. On the other hand, these conflicts reflect a malaise and/
or a deeper rejection, the reasons for which must be taken into account. Very few
of those opposing the presence of mosques or prayer halls would say that they
want to prevent anyone from praying. The reason given is always other than this; it
goes deeper and is linked to the symbolic appropriation of territory, which has to
do with history and its reconstruction, but it is also linked to deep socio cultural
dynamics, and to Islam itself and its presence in Europe. These conflicts cannot
be interpreted only from the perspective of political fearmongers. The building of
a mosque or the adaptation of a prayer hall is hardly ever merely an architectural
and urban planning issue; it generates in depth social and cultural discussions
and reactions. These conflicts also appear to be semantically over determined in
cultural terms.
The above set of reasons and empirical evidence help to explain why we
have conducted this research.
Guidelines and methodology of the research
In most European countries a clear national framework or a well defined policy
regarding the construction of mosques does not exist. In different countries
almost every possible approach to the subject has been tried, from opposition
14 Conflicts over mosques in europe
and refusal to political and even economic support. However, the way of dealing
with mosque construction has also changed over time for political reasons and
as a result of socio cultural changes. There may be differences in the policies
adopted in different regions and there may be striking differences in the policies
operating in different cities of the same country. There may also be significant
similarities in the policies adopted in the cities of countries with completely different
legislative frameworks and different systems of relations between the
state and religious communities. In order to understand how the various factors
interact, local research and investigation are needed, as well as a comparative
analysis and multifactorial explanations. The standard approach is to analyse
similar cases in different contexts, and different cases that imply different solutions
in similar contexts, in order to bypass the local influence of specific variables
(such as ruling political parties, etc), and also to compare and contrast other
variables.
The variables that must be taken into account include the form of the
state; the judicial systems governing church–state relations; the status of religious
minorities; differences in the laws covering citizenship; the percentages
of migrant and foreign populations; and the length of the period of immigration
(when it started, how it began and how it has changed over the years and generations).
It is important, in this sense, to have a common comparative framework,
but, as we shall see, these variables are far from providing a definitive explanation.
Conflicts and disputes regarding the question of mosques in Europe are
present in countries with formal church–state relations (such as concordats or
other agreements) as well as those operating other systems; and they occur both
in countries with a long history of immigration (such as those of central and northern
Europe) and in countries where immigration is more recent, such as those in
the Mediterranean region. It is therefore important to compare countries that have
similar systems and situations in terms of the presence of migrants and Muslim
populations, but which operate different policies as a result of different political
situations (eg Italy and Spain). At the same time, great care should be taken over
less studied countries, for which literature is scarce or rarely translated, but in
which changes in policies towards Islam and new trends are emerging.
To allow for a better comparison of the cases studied, an identical analysis
grid was given to all researchers. At the same time, for each country, an analysis
was requested covering a number of specific cases of conflict in greater depth.
The choice of cases analysed, and the criteria according to which this was carried
out, were agreed on a case by case basis with the research coordinator on the
basis of different criteria – in terms of their representativeness compared with
other similar cases but also in terms of their significant peculiarities. A criterion
introduction15
of proximity over time also prevailed, even if more temporally distant cases were
also analysed in order to see if there had been changes in issues triggering conflicts
and in their management and outcomes. For older cases in particular, and
for the best studied countries in any case, reference was made to the literature,
not particularly abundant, but significant at least in certain contexts.
Empirical studies were carried out in the following places:
Spain: Premia de Mar, Mataro, Bermejales –– (Seville), Lleida
–– Italy: Colle Val d’Elsa, Genoa, Brescia, Padua
–– Greece: the Great Mosque (Athens), minor Athenian mosques, Komotini
and other cases in Thrace
–– Austria: Bad Voslau, Bludenz (Vorarlberg)
–– Bosnia Herzegovina: Ustikolini, the King Fahd mosque and the Ciglane
mosque in Sarajevo
–– Belgium: Bastogne, Neder over Hembeek, Borgerhout (Antwerp)
–– Sweden: Gothenburg (three different mosques)
Although other studies were not planned, for countries in which studies were
mainly carried out through literature, we asked researchers to examine some
important cases in depth. The following instances were examined:
–– France: Roubaix, Bobigny
–– Germany: Cologne, Bochum
–– United Kingdom: Newham (East London), Stoke on Trent
–– Netherlands: Driebergen (the Hacy Bayram and Nasr mosques) and
Rotterdam (the Essalam mosque)
Many other empirical instances of conflict were analysed using available
literature.
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1 Results of the research
1.1 Defining the mosque in Europe
The first problem that arises is defining what we mean by a mosque. We do not
expect to find an exhaustive and universally shared definition: put simply, a
shared definition does not exist, certainly not in non Islamic countries, the focus
of our research. Here we will use an extensive and commonsense criterion: all
places open to the faithful, in which Muslims gather together to pray on a regular
basis, will be considered to be mosques. We are aware that this definition contains
an inevitable margin of error, but at the same time it is more meaningful and
more comprehensive of the dimensions and dynamics of the phenomenon we are
discussing. It appeals to the principal function – prayer – and its collective and
public aspect.2
Within the category of mosque, a number of differences are discernible.
Employing a scale of decreasing importance, the first element is that of ‘Islamic
centre’. By an Islamic centre we mean a centre of significant size, which has, in
addition to the function of prayer and worship, a number of social and cultural
functions through various forms of gathering (a Koranic school; courses and
meeting opportunities for adults, women and converts; conferences and other
2 This is what usually causes a problem for the opponents of mosques. They never say that they
are against the fact that Muslims pray – ‘they should do it at home’ was heard repeatedly by
representatives of the anti Islamic movement; rather, they are against the fact that they do it together
in places open to the public. As they put it, they are not against Islam, they are against mosques.
18 Conflicts over mosques in europe
educational and cultural activities),3 usually conducted in separate rooms from
the prayer hall itself. Such a centre also carries out the activities of institutional
and symbolic representation of Muslims. Islamic centres are a small but important
part of what we call mosques. Only in major cities might there be more than
one, and often there are none at all. Not infrequently they perform a centralizing
function of representation at a provincial or regional level. Usually, they also
organize special meetings, for example those relating to Islamic holidays.
One category that we often encounter, especially given its significance
in relation to conflicts surrounding places of worship, is that of ad hoc, or purpose built,
mosque, usually with visible signs of a dome and one or more minarets
(the real masgids).4 These may overlap, and are often the same as Islamic centres,
but there are cases of ad hoc mosques that are not organized and structured
Islamic centres, as such centres are not infrequently located in converted buildings
that do not have the visible form of a mosque and where signs of recognition
and external visible clues are limited to a sign or a plaque.
A third category – numerically by far the most significant in all European
countries – is the Islamic musalla, or prayer room. Musallas may be located in
industrial buildings, warehouses, former shops and apartments.5 They may only
serve to host the activity of prayer, but more often other activities are also performed
there (eg Koranic schools and other educational events). Within this category
we also find ‘ethnic’ musallas, which are attended only by members of one
ethnic group, usually on the grounds of language (non Arabophone ethnic groups,
for example). Special mention should be made of the prayer halls or Sufi zawiyas,
Il pdf di questo libro è disponibile Scarica il libro integrale
Convegno con monsignor Fisichella. Era necessario avviare il dibattito
/in 2009, Articoli / Articles, Articoli di Religione / Religion Articles, Articoli di Società / Society Articles, Religione / Religion, Società / Society /da StefanoDi questa vicenda si è parlato persino troppo. Ma è un segno, evidentemente, che di discutere c’era bisogno. Vorremmo evitare, tuttavia, almeno la logica degli schieramenti, il richiamo alla censura, il facile gioco dell’anatema reciproco, l’ideologizzazione esasperata.
La lettera aperta che io e i colleghi Curi e Zatti abbiamo scritto voleva essere un segnale e un richiamo. Un richiamo di opportunità e di metodo, e un segnale che all’università non si può e non si deve applicare la logica dell’occupazione del territorio e delle bandiere identitarie.
Da questo punto di vista l’iniziativa del 6 marzo non era impostata, a nostro parere, nella maniera ideale e più consona alla sede. Le stesse motivazioni ribadite dagli organizzatori, che pure di mestiere fanno un encomiabile lavoro, sono risultate assai deboli, nel motivare una scelta blindata e a senso unico. Di più: tale modo di procedere si ritorce contro le ragioni di cui gli stessi relatori sono portatori, che meritano ascolto e rispetto, e che è giusto vengano prese in considerazione e dibattute, anche in università.
Tuttavia, siamo stati chiari fin da subito: “Non intendiamo contestare il diritto di parola di alcuno. L’Università non è un luogo dove esso si nega. Al contrario, è semmai, ed eminentemente, un luogo in cui la parola si analizza, si approfondisce, si discute, dove non si fugge il confronto, ma lo si ricerca programmaticamente”. Quindi, nessuna censura. Nemmeno la richiesta di cambiare programma.
Evocare lo scontro tra laici e cattolici, o addirittura il bavaglio ai cristiani e alla Chiesa, è quindi una impostazione ideologica fuorviante e risibile, una vittimizzazione che nulla ha a che fare con quanto è in gioco in questo momento. Lo scontro non è tra laici e cattolici, ma tra chi vuole il confronto e chi vuole soltanto dire la sua.
Credo sia arduo, nell’unico paese al mondo in cui il giornalista esperto di questioni religiose si chiama vaticanista, e la presenza della Chiesa cattolica nello spazio pubblico, anche sui temi qui evocati, evidentissima, parlare con qualche senso logico e onestà intellettuale di crociate anticattoliche. Semmai, è probabile che l’attitudine alla privatizzazione della verità, visibile da varie sponde, esacerbi gli animi. Ma questa difficoltà attraversa tutte le identità e appartenenze, non solo la Chiesa. Non è un caso che i sondaggi intorno al caso Englaro, per citare l’ultimo e più clamoroso esempio di discussione pubblica sulla bioetica, abbiano concordemente mostrato una forte divaricazione tra le prese di posizione ufficiali della Chiesa cattolica e il pensiero di coloro che avrebbero dovuto da essa sentirsi rappresentati. Così come interventi anche di scienziati di campo laico e di impostazione assolutamente non religiosa abbiano mostrato dubbi, lacerazioni, ed esplicite posizioni in sintonia con quelle rappresentate anche, non solo, dalla Chiesa.
Dunque, nessuno scontro: nemmeno tra accademici e chierici. Su questo, due parole per evitare equivoci interessati: non abbiamo rifiutato alcun confronto. Semplicemente, non avevamo mai chiesto di partecipare a quel dibattito. E’ stato mons. Fisichella, per sua dichiarazione a questo giornale e a me telefonicamente, con un gesto apprezzato, a dichiararsi stupito delle modalità organizzative dell’incontro, mostrandosi disponibile a un dialogo che altri, più realisti del re, temevano. Proprio per questo, cogliendo questa disponibilità, e non praticando logiche di schieramento, i miei colleghi, in una iniziativa in corso di organizzazione, hanno rilanciato: invitando mons. Fisichella, ma in un contesto dialogico vero. Mi pare una lezione di stile: in sintonia con lo spirito e la lettera del nostro appello.
Ancora più arduo e in mala fede evocare un inesistente scontro tra destra e sinistra. Per molti motivi, uno dei quali è che chi scrive ha troppo rispetto per la Chiesa per volerla ascrivere alla destra, che pure vorrebbe anche oggi strumentalizzarla ai propri fini.
Detto questo, siamo in Università, di cui ho una concezione alta: un luogo in cui la discussione critica, il confronto aperto e la ricerca senza pregiudiziali sono la linfa vitale e la stessa ragion d’essere. E in cui la censura è fuori questione. Per questo, a titolo personale, parteciperò, tra il pubblico, all’iniziativa del 6 marzo, ascoltando le voci che lì si esprimeranno. E poi, con maggiore entusiasmo, parteciperò alle iniziative di confronto e di approfondimento che si stanno organizzando: e che altri (studenti, cittadini, associazioni) vorranno organizzare. Credo che l’Università, e la città, avranno tutto da guadagnare da una discussione pubblica e matura. Che siamo lieti sia iniziata.
Stefano Allievi
“Il Mattino”, 3 marzo 2009, pp. 1-12
anche in
“Ecco perché sarò in aula ad ascoltare monsignor Fisichella”, in “Corriere Veneto”, 3 marzo 2009, p. 7
L’islam cambia e ci cambia (forse)
/in 2009, Articoli / Articles, Articoli di Religione / Religion Articles, Articoli sull'Islam / Islam Articles, Islam, Religione / Religion /da StefanoAllievi S. (2009), L’islam cambia e ci cambia (forse), in “Popoli”, n. 3, marzo 2009, pp. 48-49 A R e R/I
Sull’etica-staminali nessuna esclusiva
/in 2009, Articoli / Articles, Articoli di Religione / Religion Articles, Articoli di Società / Society Articles, Religione / Religion, Società / Society /da StefanoIl giorno 6 marzo si svolgerà all’Università di Padova, nella Sala dei Giganti di Palazzo Liviano, un convegno su “Etica nella medicina dei trapianti e delle cellule staminali”. Tema di grande attualità, controverso, sul quale è aperto uno scontro sia nel mondo scientifico che nel paese, e di cui è certamente opportuno informare e discutere.
Sorprende tuttavia l’articolazione dell’incontro: che prevede, dopo i saluti d’uso, solo un’introduzione del Vicepresidente della Camera dei Deputati, on. Maurizio Lupi, esponente di Comunione e Liberazione, e un’unica relazione di Mons. Rino Fisichella, Presidente della Pontificia Accademia Pro Vita. Nessuna discussione è prevista.
Questa scelta chiusa al dibattito e di parte, del tutto legittima in qualunque altro contesto, in sede universitaria, luogo per eccellenza dell’educazione al pensiero critico, dispiace e sconcerta; perché su temi così importanti, che coinvolgono ragione ed emozione, fede e scienza, e producono un intenso dibattito sociale, si preferisce la ricerca dell’egemonia alla discussione critica.
Non intendiamo contestare il diritto di parola di alcuno. L’Università non è un luogo dove esso si nega. Al contrario, è semmai, ed eminentemente, un luogo in cui la parola si analizza, si approfondisce, si discute, dove non si fugge il confronto, ma lo si ricerca programmaticamente; non è invece il luogo per promuovere l’aggregazione per bandiere identitarie, oggi fin troppo praticata nella società italiana.
Chiediamo quindi che l’Università si faccia promotrice di una discussione franca e aperta su queste tematiche, che tenga conto di tutte le opinioni in campo, senza dare ad alcuno il diritto di definirne in esclusiva i temi e i limiti. Tanto più in questi tempi, in cui su tematiche analoghe e correlate si è acceso un vivo dibattito nella società, e in cui ogni idea di possesso esclusivo della verità, da qualunque parte provenga, divide drammaticamente le coscienze, anche all’interno degli stessi settori da cui proviene.
Prof. Stefano Allievi, sociologo
Prof. Umberto Curi, filosofo
Prof. Paolo Zatti, giurista
Qualche giorno dopo…
”Riguardo alla prevista ‘Lettura’ di Mons. Fisichella abbiamo sollevato una questione che non riguarda le persone né le opinioni, ma solo il metodo propagandistico, programmaticamente chiuso al confronto, estraneo allo spirito del dibattito universitario e particolarmente inopportuno nel momento in cui la questione bioetica vede in atto uno scontro aspro e condotte aggressive sul piano istituzionale e su quello mediatico, senza risparmiare le persone coinvolte.
Si levano ora all’interno del mondo studentesco voci e proposte che si caratterizzano per un atteggiamento eguale e contrario, e abbandonando il piano della critica e della discussione mirano ad espellere dall’ambito universitario una posizione etica, negando la base stessa di ogni confronto: il diritto di parola. Esprimiamo il nostro totale dissenso da queste posizioni e confidiamo che gli studenti sapranno isolarle. L’Università deve restare lo spazio della libertà di esprimersi e confrontarsi per tutte le opinioni che accettino le basi costituzionali della convivenza; solo l’intolleranza non può e non deve abitarvi”
Stefano Allievi, Umberto Curi, Paolo Zatti
“il Mattino”, 24 febbraio 2009, pag. 1-20
Qualche consiglio per salvare il PD
/in 2009, Articoli / Articles, Articoli di Politica / Politics Articles, Politica / Politics /da StefanoFinora il dibattito nel PD è stato tutto e troppo interno, autocentrato, rivolto al proprio ombelico: e questa è probabilmente una delle ragioni della sua attuale crisi.
Il PD ha commesso una serie di errori organizzativi (su quelli politici, ognuno faccia le sue valutazioni) clamorosi:
a) non facendo partire immediatamente la campagna per il tesseramento (lanciata in ritardo, quando già l’entusiasmo era calato e l’immagine appannata, a causa dei personalismi e dei continui conflitti interni molto più che non a causa di una prevedibile sconfitta elettorale);
b) non indicendo immediatamente un congresso che legittimasse la leadership, contro lo strapotere di correnti e sottocorrenti.
Entrambi errori voluti da coloro i quali, in quanto leader delle precedenti componenti, volevano prima insediarsi, contarsi, logorare l’avversario, spartirsi le risorse (dai soldi ai posti), per garantire reciproche rendite di posizione tra gruppi tra loro in dissenso, perdendosi in discussioni su temi poco sentiti, molto politichesi, con logiche che nulla avevano a che fare con un partito che si voleva nuovo. Personalmente, ho vissuto tutto questo aspetto con una certa amarezza: una promessa non mantenuta. Tuttavia, come altri, credo ancora nelle cose che si possono fare all’interno di questo progetto, per portarlo a compimento.
Ma per farlo dobbiamo sconfiggere i nemici primi del PD. D’Alema e i dalemiani, Rutelli e i rutelliani, Parisi e i parisiani, tanto per non fare sconti a nessuno, e altri ancora: cioè tutti quelli che avevano una logica di cricca e di corrente, ed erano in ricerca estenuante di visibilità, alimentando logoranti conflitti.
Ma ci aggiungerei anche le microcorrenti che pretendono abusivamente di rappresentare un’identità: i cosiddetti ‘cattolici’ (teodem o altri: da cattolico sono arcistufo di sentirmi dire che mi rappresenta la Binetti), per esempio, e tutti coloro che cercavano legittimità fuori anziché dentro il partito. Forse perché dentro sapevano che non ne avrebbero avuta un granché.
Basta! Con loro, basta!
Il nostro sogno e il nostro impegno politico (perché è nostro, non loro) rischia di essere affossato a causa di queste logiche.
Salviamo il PD, dissequestriamolo, iniziamo una lotta di liberazione interna dai cacicchi veri, che stanno a Roma, non sul territorio.
Ma per farlo occorre una leadership forte, e che creda in questa logica, anziché essere figlia di quelle precedenti (come probabilmente era l’intempestiva candidatura Bersani). E che sia finalmente legittimata. Altrimenti saremo noi il partito di plastica: altro che le ironie su Forza Italia o il PDL.
E questo anche a costo di cambiare subito lo statuto, consentendo quello che si è volutamente impedito fino ad ora: che gli iscritti possano esprimersi sui destini del loro partito, sulle sue scelte, sui suoi dirigenti, locali e nazionali.
Arrivo a dire: chiunque sia, ma sia un segretario legittimato e con pieni poteri.
Che sia Franceschini, perché è la soluzione più naturale e in continuità con il lavoro di Veltroni.
Che sia un leader proveniente dal territorio, anche se purtroppo non accadrà (un Chiamparino, un Soru, o qualunque altro abbia un responsabilità concreta e un popolarità almeno dove opera politicamente).
Che sia un illustre sconosciuto.
Che sia uno dei nemici interni del progetto del PD. Ma almeno sapremo di chi si tratta, e potremo, tutti quanti, trarne le dovute conseguenze, e decidere se ci piace ancora il progetto che il Partito Democratico rappresenta.
La ricchezza del PD sono le sue energie, i suoi sostenitori, i suoi elettori. Non sprechiamola per colpa dei soliti noti. Questo chiedono i semplici iscritti, quelli che finora non hanno avuto nemmeno un po’ di voce.
Sarebbe un delitto imperdonabile, e una responsabilità storica, continuare in un dibattito tra soli vertici, o presunti tali, che rischia di vedere implodere il PD: se una forza politica nuova si vuole davvero costruire, la sua forza non può che partire dal radicamento nel territorio, dalla sua vivacità, dalla sua capacità di cambiamento e di innovazione a quel livello, e dalla possibilità di esprimere la propria voce, da parte di tutti.
Il che significa che bisogna far partecipare le energie nuove che hanno creduto in questo progetto politico: fornendo, innanzitutto, occasioni di dibattito anche formali, negli organismi che hanno potere decisionale, non solo per ratificare decisioni altrui.
Salviamo il PD. Inondiamo di mail il sito del partito democratico, mandiamo fax e intasiamo di telefonate i centralini locali e nazionali del PD, chiamiamo quelli che conosciamo che domani parteciperanno all’assemblea nazionale, chiedendo con forza il congresso anticipato, per evitare una situazione dilatoria che servirebbe precisamente a far tirare in lungo coloro contro i quali e a causa dei quali Veltroni si è dovuto dimettere: e sarebbe una débacle, una morte annunciata estenuante e logorante, per il partito che si voleva democratico.
Stefano Allievi
“Il Mattino”, 20 febbraio 2009, p. 1-12
Due pesi e due misure
/in 2009, Articoli / Articles, Articoli di Religione / Religion Articles, Articoli di Società / Society Articles, Religione / Religion, Società / Society /da StefanoIl fatto: pregano in piazza, i primi; pregano in piazza, i secondi. Il luogo: davanti al Duomo di Milano, i primi; davanti alla clinica La Quiete di Udine, i secondi. Il motivo: in solidarietà con i loro correligionari di luoghi più sfortunati, i primi; in solidarietà con una ex-ragazza più sfortunata di loro, i secondi. Per che cosa: perché oltre 1300 di essi, di cui un terzo bambini, sono stati massacrati in pochi giorni in una guerra profondamente asimmetrica, i primi; perché una di loro potrebbe passare da una vita dubbia a una morte certa, i secondi. Contro che cosa: la violazione reiterata della legalità internazionale, i primi; l’applicazione di una pur approssimativa legalità nazionale, i secondi. Il giudizio: sono considerati estremisti e fondamentalisti, i primi; sono considerati difensori della vita, i secondi. Le reazioni: una campagna di stampa durissima nei confronti dei primi; la mera registrazione della notizia nei confronti dei secondi.
Si battono contro una morte certa, già avvenuta e di massa, i primi; si battono contro una morte opinabile, forse a venire, forse già avvenuta, i secondi. Sono solo una piccola parte della pubblica opinione che dicono di rappresentare, i primi; sono solo una piccola parte della pubblica opinione che dicono di rappresentare, i secondi. Chiamano assassini coloro contro cui si battono (uno stato potente e in questo momento aggressivo), i primi; chiamano assassini coloro contro cui si battono (un padre, un giudice, coloro che li sostengono), i secondi. C’è chi si è scusato pubblicamente per le azioni e le parole dei propri correligionari, tra i primi; non c’è chi abbia fatto altrettanto, tra i secondi. Sono una minoranza rumorosa, i primi; sono una minoranza rumorosa, i secondi. Non rappresentano la propria pubblica opinione, i primi; non rappresentano la propria pubblica opinione, stando ad autorevoli sondaggi, nemmeno i secondi. Eppure credono di avere la verità in tasca, i primi; eppure credono di avere la verità in tasca, i secondi. Godono in genere di pessima stampa, i primi; godono in genere di larga e ottima stampa, i secondi. Sono quindi condannati dalla pubblica opinione, i primi; non sono quindi condannati dalla pubblica opinione, i secondi. Si dice che strumentalizzano la preghiera in pubblico, i primi; non si dice che strumentalizzano la preghiera in pubblico, i secondi. Per cui ci si scandalizza e si vuole impedire che la ripetano, i primi; per cui non ci si scandalizza e non si vuole impedire che la ripetano, i secondi. Dimenticavo: sono musulmani, i primi; sono cattolici, i secondi.
Per quel che vale, non condivido metodo, toni e messaggio tanto dei primi quanto dei secondi, anche se posso comprendere alcune ragioni di entrambi. Non mi schiero quindi né con gli uni né con gli altri.
Come nei giochi della Settimana Enigmistica: trovate le somiglianze e le differenze tra le due figure. E poi datevene la spiegazione che preferite.
Stefano Allievi
Due pesi e due misure, in “Il Manifesto”, 7 febbraio 2009, p. 3
Barack Hussein Obama. Le lacrime di gioia dell’Islam
/in 2009, Articoli / Articles, Articoli di Politica / Politics Articles, Articoli di Religione / Religion Articles, Articoli sull'Islam / Islam Articles, Islam, Politica / Politics, Religione / Religion /da StefanoNon è l’Ich bin ein Berliner! kennedyano, ma nelle sue conseguenze politiche potrebbe assomigliarci. Dall’Europa infatti non ce ne accorgiamo, ma per un mondo arabo e un mondo islamico stanchi, disillusi ed esasperati da una lunga storia di umiliazioni e sconfitte culminata in questi giorni a Gaza, l’intervista che il presidente Obama ha rilasciato ad al-Arabiya è più che una boccata d’ossigeno: è il segnale di cambiamento e di svolta politica più ampio che ci si potesse aspettare dagli Stati Uniti d’America.
Le parole prefigurano una svolta quasi a centottanta gradi: le azioni, lo vedremo. Ma già il fatto che Obama chieda di essere giudicato “non dalle mie parole ma dalle mie azioni, e dalle azioni della mia amministrazione” è l’indicazione che un piano d’azione c’è già, e probabilmente sarà illustrato in dettaglio nel già attesissimo discorso da una capitale islamica, preannunciato entro i primi cento giorni di mandato.
Le linee guida le conosciamo: fine dell’unilateralismo arrogante (e, per quel che riguarda il mondo islamico, ostentatamente pro-israeliano), chiusura di Guantanamo, ritiro dall’Iraq, impegno per la soluzione del conflitto israelo-palestinese, persino un diverso atteggiamento nei confronti dell’Iran. Certo, è stato ribadito che Israele resta un alleato di riferimento: ma, anche qui, Obama ha parlato di “forte alleato”, non del più stretto alleato, o del baluardo dell’Occidente in Medio Oriente, come una retorica di anni ci aveva abituato. E forse l’annullamento del viaggio del ministro israeliano Barak negli Stati Uniti ha più a che fare con una riflessione e un bisogno di prepararsi su questo punto, che non con il soldato ucciso ieri l’altro da Hamas.
La svolta culturale non potrebbe essere più netta. Intanto, sul piano simbolico: per il fatto di aver scelto un network televisivo arabo per la sua prima intervista internazionale, il cui impatto si sapeva sarebbe stato globale. Ma anche sul piano lessicale. Che “il linguaggio che dobbiamo usare è il linguaggio del rispetto” non è qualcosa che arabi e musulmani siano abituati a sentirsi dire, dagli Stati Uniti. Obama stesso si è definito così, nel suo rapporto con arabi e musulmani: “listening, respectful”. Parola riecheggiata insistentemente: “Siamo pronti a iniziare una nuova partnership, basata sul mutuo rispetto e sul mutuo interesse”. “Start by listening instead of start by dictate” è una frase più forte e politicamente più impegnativa, per l’orecchio arabo quasi inverosimile, della sua traduzione italiana.
C’entra certamente la sua storia personale e familiare, che nell’intervista Obama ha voluto rievocare e mostra di usare sapientemente anche come mezzo per suscitare empatia. Ma il centro del messaggio riguarda anche chi l’ha eletto, basato com’è su un duplice impegno: dire ai musulmani che “l’America non è il vostro nemico. Qualche volta facciamo degli errori, non siamo così perfetti…” Ma anche dire agli americani che il mondo islamico è fatto soprattutto di gente normale, che “vuole vivere la sua vita e che i propri figli abbiano una vita migliore”, né più né meno degli americani stessi: lontano anni luce dalla retorica dell’asse del male.
Gli arabi come l’hanno vissuta? C’è chi ha pianto (come per un velo che finalmente cade più che di gioia vera e propria), chi ha espresso entusiasmo, chi cauta apertura, chi – moltissimi – attendismo. Ma c’è anche chi mostra disincanto o accusa apertamente di doppiogiochismo il presidente americano. Non è un caso che persino sulla pur ufficialissima e moderata emittente televisiva che ha ospitato l’intervista, un buon 15% delle reazioni sia stata negativa. In qualche caso riecheggiando il linguaggio intriso di razzismo, anch’esso tipico di una certa eredità araba, usato dal numero due di al Qaeda, al Zawahiri, in un messaggio pronunciato poco dopo l’elezione di Obama, che lo chiamava “servo negro” (“house slave”). Non sono pochi, del resto, coloro che lo rimproverano di non essere musulmano come il padre (anche se alla causa islamica ciò non avrebbe reso miglior servizio, dato che non sarebbe mai diventato presidente…).
E dall’Europa? La ferita palestinese sanguina anche nel corpo europeo della umma islamica. E quindi anche qui non basteranno le parole a rimarginarla. Ma la speranza è palpabile. Anche se i musulmani, soprattutto gli arabi, sono abituati a veder disattese le speranze di cambiamento radicale, sempre annunciate dai nuovi leader (come accaduto in questi anni in Algeria, Marocco, Giordania, Siria) ma mai mantenute. La speranza è tuttavia virtù islamica: e anche, come noto, l’ultima a morire.
Stefano Allievi
Allievi S. (2009), Barack Hussein Obama. Le lacrime di gioia dell’Islam, in “Il Manifesto”, 29 gennaio 2009, pp. 1 e 12
Omosessualità. Mi sorprende il ‘distacco’ delle donne
/in 2009, Interviste / Interviews, Società / Society /da StefanoClicca sull’immagine per leggere l’articolo
Allievi S. (2009), Omosessualità. Mi sorprende il ‘distacco’ delle donne, in “Il Gazzettino”, 27 gennaio 2009, p.11, intervista di Annamaria Bacchin I S
Conflicts over Mosques in Europe. Policy issues and trends
/in 2009, Foreign Languages, Libri / Books, Libri sull'Islam / Islam Books /da StefanoConflicts over Mosques in Europe. Policy issues and trends
Il pdf di questo libro è disponibile qui.
Preface
The ‘Religion and Democracy
in Europe’ initiative
The Network of European Foundations (NEF) is an operational platform primarily
committed to strengthening the potential for cooperation in the form of joint ventures
between foundations at the European level. The NEF offers its members the
opportunity to identify common goals and, as an open structure, to join forces with
other foundations in Europe which may share similar concerns and objectives. It
is also open to collaboration with the public and private sectors in developing its
initiatives. Its areas of intervention to promote systemic social change include
migration, European citizenship, support for the European integration process,
youth empowerment and global European projects. The NEF is based in Brussels.
In January 2007 the NEF launched a special initiative on ‘Religion and
Democracy in Europe’. This was conducted with the participation of Hywel Ceri
Jones, NEF European policy adviser, and was based on a partnership between
several foundations, including: Van Leer Group Foundation (chair); Arcadia Trust;
Barrow Cadbury Trust; Bernheim Foundation; Compagnia di San Paolo; Ford
Foundation; Freudenberg Stiftung; King Baudouin Foundation; Riksbankens
Jubileumsfond; Stefan Batory Foundation; and Volkswagen Stiftung.
The ‘Religion and Democracy in Europe’ initiative focuses on the relation
between religion and democracy in European societies, covering both religion
and the public domain and religion and the state. The aim is to contribute to a
better informed debate on the topic through seminars and research on related
issues.
The first year of activities, which included a roundtable with specialized
journalists and a series of youth debates, culminated in the publication through
6 Conflicts over mosques in europe
Alliance Publishing Trust of a compendium in which all the material presented in
an international symposium held in Jerusalem was collected. This publication is
available on NEF’s website at www.nefic.org.
The second phase of the ‘Religion and Democracy in Europe’ initiative
(2008–9) aims to develop a series of reports addressing specific aspects of the
interaction both between the state and religion and between religion and society.
The reports are a mapping exercise of existing practices and different approaches
to specific issues, set in the broader context of the religion and democracy debate.
They target practitioners, policy makers and civil society actors. The reports have
been developed by acknowledged experts and address the following questions:
Religion and Healthcare –– in the European Union Dimitrina Petrova and
Jarlath Clifford
–– Teaching about Religions in European School Systems Luce Pepin
–– Conflicts over Mosques in Europe Stefano Allievi
–– Religion and Group focused Enmity Andreas Zick and Beate Kupper
Through this and other activities, the ‘Religion and Democracy in Europe’ initiative
aims to open up and contribute to the public debate on issues of strategic
importance for the future of European societies.
For more information
For more on NEF and its activities, please contact info@nefic.org.
For more on the ‘Religion and Democracy in Europe’ initiative, please contact
rienvangendt@vanleergroupfoundation.nl (chairman) or cristina.pineda@nefic.
org (coordinator).
About the authors
Stefano Allievi is Professor of Sociology at the University of Padua. His special
interests include migration issues, sociology of religion and cultural change; he
has particularly focused his studies on the presence of Islam in Europe, a subject
on which he has published extensively.
The text is also based on researches conducted by Jordi Moreras (Spain),
Maria Bombardieri (Italy), Athena Skoulariki (Greece), Ernst Furlinger (Austria),
Azra Akšamija (Bosnia Herzegovina), Felice Dassetto and Olivier Ralet
(Belgium), and Goran Larsson (Sweden); and on national overviews contributed
by Sophie Gilliat Ray and Jonathan Birt (Great Britain), Omero Marongiu Perria
(France), Michael Kreutz and Aladdin Sarhan (Germany), Nico Landman
(Netherlands), and Goran Larsson (Finland, Norway, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania).
7
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Introduction
The research background: exceptionalism and Islam
As the reader will immediately see, the present study is the only one in the series
not to have a general point of reference. Instead of addressing a broad issue such
as places of worship, it focuses right from the outset on a single issue: the question
of mosques, which is identified as a separate issue with its own specific
characteristics.
This approach faithfully reflects the current state of affairs, as we will
demonstrate in the pages below. Although forms of discrimination on the basis of
religion are not completely absent – in particular, cases of discrimination towards
certain minority religions or religious beliefs, some of which have even come
before the European courts – in no country and in no other case has the opening
of places of worship taken on such a high profile in the public imagination as
the question of mosques and Islamic places of worship. With the passage of time,
the question of mosques has led to more and more frequent disputes, debates,
conflicts and posturing, even in countries where such conflicts were previously
unknown and mosques were already present. This simple fact already puts us on a
road that we might define as ‘exceptionalism’ with reference to Islam: a tendency
to see Islam and Muslims as an exceptional case rather than a standard one; a
case that does not sit comfortably with others relating to religious pluralism, and
which therefore requires special bodies, actions and specifically targeted reactions,
unlike those used for other groups and religious minorities, and (as in the
present study) specific research.
8 Conflicts over mosques in europe
An example of this exceptionalism is seen in the forms of representation
of Islam in various European countries, which vary from case to case but differ, in
particular, with respect to the recognized practices of relations between states
and religious denominations in general. The most symbolic case is the creation
in various countries, such as France, Spain, Belgium and Italy, of collective bodies
of Islamic representation, with forms that often contradict the principles of
non interference in the internal affairs of religious communities proclaimed and
enshrined for other denominations and religious minorities. Forms of exceptionalism
from a legal, political and social perspective are, however, present in many
other fields, following a pervasive trend which affects countries with the widest
range of state structures and which appears to be in a phase of further growth.
This situation, together with the increasingly evident emergence into the
public arena of the dynamics of a conflict involving Islam (a kind of conflict in which
the construction of mosques is the most frequent and widespread cause of disagreement),
led to a desire to analyse recent cases of conflict, including clashes
in countries that are regarded as peripheral within the European Union (EU) or
that lie beyond its borders. For this reason, we have chosen, contrary to the usual
practice, to pay closest attention to the least studied and analysed countries,
for which scientific literature is least abundant. Setting off on this supposition,
we believe that meaningful data for the interpretation of broader dynamics may
emerge from an extensive analysis of the frequency and pervasiveness of these
conflicts, which are also affecting countries with a long history of immigration
and are more generally affecting the relationship between Islam and Europe.
For this reason we conducted a set of empirical investigations across
seven European countries that are among the least studied and least known
in this respect. We selected three Mediterranean countries which in certain
respects vary greatly from one another: two countries in similar situations, where
there is new immigration from Muslim countries and the memory of ancient
historical domination (Spain and Italy); and one in which there is new immigration
from Muslim countries along with a significant historical Islamic presence
(the memory of Turkish Ottoman domination) that poses a number of problems
(Greece). Also chosen were two countries which have a very significant historical
Islamic presence but which also face a number of new problems (Austria
and Bosnia Herzegovina); the Nordic country with the largest Islamic presence
(Sweden); and a central European country which has a long history of immigration
and a particular institutional nature (Belgium). The last of these is also notable
for its markedly local management of conflicts, which from a methodological
perspective makes it an interesting control group.
introduction9
For countries that are better known and for which the literature is much
more abundant and readily available in English or in languages that are widely
known and spoken in the EU (Great Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands), we
have consulted available literature and produced an overview (including some
particularly important recent empirical cases). The same was done for very
little known smaller countries, such as the Nordic and Baltic States.1
Keywords: conflict, mosques, Islam, Europe
Key elements and keywords of the research are: mosques, conflict, Islam, Europe.
‘Mosques’ and ‘conflict’ represent or describe the actual situation. This
tallies with the observation that these two words, which we will define in greater
detail below, tend to ‘go together’ – at least at this time in history, and in many
countries – with relative ease, producing specific dynamics. On the other hand,
Islam and Europe (or Islam and individual nations, or Islam and cultural interpretations
of their respective national self definitions, variously defined as Britishness,
Italianita, identite republicaine, etc, depending on the country) are the main
interpretative categories that arise from the collision of the first pairing.
It is interesting to note that the first pairing produces and expresses the
second one, which, however, rests on a different interpretative plane and at a
different level. The first pairing is local, the second global; the first is concrete
and has a clear empirical basis, the second is abstract and refers to cultural
value based registers; the first has a spatio temporal localization that is missing
in the second, or that expresses it in a completely different manner; and so forth.
Thus these words, paired together, end up having a contrasting value, which is
in itself a cultural product. ‘Mosques’ and ‘conflict’ are already two words that
directly express dissonance, the idea of a problem. The same is true if we take the
words ‘Islam’ and ‘Europe’. However, this is not necessarily the case if one looks
at facts rather than cultural interpretations. In fact, Islam and Europe have historically
lived in different degrees of approximation, and this should be outlined,
albeit briefly.
1 The following people have worked on the research, coordinated by Stefano Allievi: empirical
researches – Jordi Moreras (Spain), Maria Bombardieri (Italy), Athena Skoulariki (Greece), Ernst
Furlinger (Austria), Azra Akšamija (Bosnia Herzegovina), Felice Dassetto and Olivier Ralet
(Belgium), Goran Larsson (Sweden); national overviews – Sophie Gilliat Ray and Jonathan Birt
(Great Britain), Omero Marongiu Perria (France), Michael Kreutz and Aladdin Sarhan (Germany),
Nico Landman (Netherlands). Goran Larsson also provided a summary of the Baltic and Nordic
countries (Finland, Norway and Denmark; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). The authors provided
papers on the respective national cases. Where no other sources are mentioned, the data on specific
cases quoted in the report may be presumed to come from the above mentioned papers. Mistakes of
fact and interpretation rest on the shoulders of the author of the report, who relied on his personal
skills and experience in the field in his effort of reinterpretation.
10 Conflicts over mosques in europe
Islam and Europe: stages of approximation
We cannot here go into the details of historical processes that are long, complex
and far from linear. We can, however, attempt to summarize them, albeit in a schematic
manner that does not seek to reconstruct historical detail but to highlight
current trends (Allievi 2005a; Allievi 2005b).
Phase 1: Islam and Europe A long first stage, lasting for at least the first
ten centuries of the history of Islam, was one of major conflicts (analysed as
such, however, only at a later date), symbolized by the Crusades, which saw Islam
and (Christian) Europe facing one another, conceived and perceived as mutually
impenetrable and self referencing. All this was in spite of reality and history,
which show how permeability and exchange (of philosophical ideas, scientific
concepts, and artistic forms, as well as economic and trading links) were more
the norm than the exception.
Phase 2: Europe in Islam In the second phase, we see European dominance
of Islamic lands (the most powerful symbolic moment of this was the Napoleonic
expedition to Egypt in 1798). First, in the age of empires and the colonial
period, Europe dominated Muslim countries directly. Later, during the ongoing
stage of neo or post colonial influence ‘at a distance’ – through economic
globalization, the pervasiveness of the mass media and western consumption
patterns – Europe has gradually brought the Muslim world within transnational
economic trends and political institutions.
Phase 3: Islam in Europe In a third, more recent phase, Islam began to
spread in Europe through migration. This began in France, for example, between
the two world wars, and in most European countries during the period of postwar
reconstruction and economic boom – in the 1950s and 1960s in the centre and
north, and later still, from the late 1970s onwards, in southern Europe. It is still a
phase characterized mainly by first generation immigrants coming from former
colonies (from Algeria to France, for instance, and from the Indian subcontinent
to Great Britain), but there are also new forms of immigration (such as Turks
coming to Germany), which gradually expand as more and more countries export
labour in response to European demand.
Phase 4: the Islam of Europe In a fourth phase we observe the emergence
and consolidation of an Islam of Europe, through a gradual process of insertion,
manifested in the processes of integration – initially in the workplace, then in a
social and sometimes political context – and of generational transition. Together,
these contribute to the formation of a middle class and an intelligentsia of Islamic
origin: one that still has relations with the countries of origin, but which does not
come from outside, and is born and socialized in Europe – self formed and forced
or encouraged to build its own identity and its own space.
introduction11
Phase 5: European Islam The result of this process should be the formation
of a genuine European Islam, with its own pronounced identity different from
that of Arabic Islam or that of other countries and cultural areas of origin. This
Islam is (and even more in the future will be seen to be) a native European movement,
largely the result of a gradual and substantial process of ‘citizenization’
of Muslims residing in Europe, who look forward to the prospect of full rights on
an equal footing with other Europeans, with whom they share a common destiny.
Of this phase, for now just given in outline, one cannot say much, except that its
outcome will depend on the internal evolution of Muslim communities and their
populations; on the dynamics of global Islam; and, perhaps most importantly, on
the reactions and policies adopted towards them by the governments of individual
European countries, which will in turn be influenced by their political parties
and public opinion. In a word, the outcome will depend largely on non Muslims,
on the manner in which they approach the problem, on discussions of the issue,
and on the fears and visions of the wider world.
Today, most European countries find themselves somewhere between the
third and fourth phases, although there are some hints of the beginning of the fifth
phase, which will become more visible in the years and decades to come. It should
be borne in mind that the cycle constantly starts over again with the arrival of new
immigrants, and that the tendencies outlined are precisely that: general trends
that are empirically verifiable, but which do not involve entire Muslim populations,
who will show resistance, counter tendencies and differing positions on these
processes. Such resistance can also be found among second generation citizens.
Like all social phenomena, these cannot be generalized, and show elements
of complexity, contradiction and ambiguity.
The important point to appreciate is that we have in fact emerged from a
contraposition that we can now recognize as a false opposition: one that seeks
to place Islam and Europe as two horns of an insoluble dilemma. Today, Islam is in
Europe, and it is here to stay, albeit progressively and in different forms. And yet,
as the conflicts surrounding mosques in Europe show, interpretations increasingly
tend to go in the opposite direction: a sign that the trend we have outlined is
not really perceived and accepted as such. Interpretations of conflict are tending
increasingly to appear even in countries where the process of inclusion, of mixite,
of progressive ‘citizenization’ have gone furthest.
Cultural conflicts and public debates on Islam in Europe
The presence of Islam in Europe’s ‘public space’ could not go unnoticed either
socially or culturally. It is, or is perceived to be, too visible or too different not to
12 Conflicts over mosques in europe
provoke debates or even tensions, for historical, cultural, religious, political and
social reasons.
Confrontation seems to occur ‘across the board’. Islam is itself questioned,
often through essentialist and simplistic interpretations and controversies
regarding dogmatic aspects and customs. Some aspects of Islam are also
called into question for the way they manifest themselves, particularly in Muslim
countries: of these aspects, the most discussed are those related to the condition
of women and to gender equality, and to the relationship between religion and
violence, fundamentalism and, more generally, politics. Finally, confrontation
leads to questions and debate about the host society itself: on its degree of ‘openness’,
on its borders, on the possibilities of and limits to integration, on how best
to achieve this (in essence, this is the debate on multiculturalism), and on the
definition of any possible ‘tolerance thresholds’, at an ethnic or religious level.
All this may happen without there necessarily being any debate or direct
dialogue or confrontation with Muslims, or between society and the Muslims who
live in it. Often these are debates within societies about Muslims and Islam.
To give some examples, the presence of Islam in Europe raises various
kinds of tensions, controversies, debates and conflicts:
Conflicts about principles and ideas: from the Rushdie –– affair in Britain
(and elsewhere) to the cartoons affair in Denmark (and elsewhere). All
these are perfect examples of global/local – or ‘glocal’ – issues, showing
how easily questions concerning Islam in Europe can become influential
and produce a repositioning of public and social actors, both in Europe
and in Muslim countries.
–– Conflicts brought about by dramatic events happening in Europe
concerning Islam and caused by Islamic actors: terrorism (9/11 and its
consequences in European countries – where some of the terrorists,
such as Mohamed Atta, came from; the terrorist attacks in London and
Madrid) and individual demonstrative acts, such as the assassination of
Theo van Gogh.
–– Controversies frequently raised and discussed in public debate relating
to gender issues: the hijab is symbolic of this, but more generally, there
are questions on the role of women in Islam, how this is perceived
in the West and its effects on Muslim families, conflicts between
generations, etc.
There are controversies, however, in which not only different opinions regarding
relations with Islam are involved but also the Muslim social actors themselves.
The case of mosques is the most significant in this sense, even if it is not the only
introduction13
one, because it relates to a conflict that is not only debated within society, but is
about society itself. This point seems particularly significant, in that it implies the
perception of control over the territory and its symbolic imprinting. After all, control
of and over the territory is not only a cultural and symbolic fact, it is also (and
remains, in spite of everything) a very concrete and material sign of dominion and
power.
These disputes are not limited to the establishment of places of worship;
they also include the question of their visibility in European cities, which has an
evident symbolic value. This issue encompasses related questions regarding the
broadcasting of the adhan, the call to prayer, from mosques to the areas surrounding
them, as well as the issue of Muslim cemeteries and the right to obtain religiously
exclusive areas within existing cemeteries. These questions are important
for various reasons. They not only show how the presence of Islam in Europe
is debated and confronted; they are also crucial in understanding the broader
issues of Europe as a whole: its problems, its values and its identity.
The mosque issue, in itself, may not even exist. On the one hand, there is
nothing more obvious and natural than that foreign communities should wish and
need to have their own meeting places according to their religious affiliations, and
that they should enjoy the same fundamental rights that European constitutions
grant to other minorities. On the other hand, these conflicts reflect a malaise and/
or a deeper rejection, the reasons for which must be taken into account. Very few
of those opposing the presence of mosques or prayer halls would say that they
want to prevent anyone from praying. The reason given is always other than this; it
goes deeper and is linked to the symbolic appropriation of territory, which has to
do with history and its reconstruction, but it is also linked to deep socio cultural
dynamics, and to Islam itself and its presence in Europe. These conflicts cannot
be interpreted only from the perspective of political fearmongers. The building of
a mosque or the adaptation of a prayer hall is hardly ever merely an architectural
and urban planning issue; it generates in depth social and cultural discussions
and reactions. These conflicts also appear to be semantically over determined in
cultural terms.
The above set of reasons and empirical evidence help to explain why we
have conducted this research.
Guidelines and methodology of the research
In most European countries a clear national framework or a well defined policy
regarding the construction of mosques does not exist. In different countries
almost every possible approach to the subject has been tried, from opposition
14 Conflicts over mosques in europe
and refusal to political and even economic support. However, the way of dealing
with mosque construction has also changed over time for political reasons and
as a result of socio cultural changes. There may be differences in the policies
adopted in different regions and there may be striking differences in the policies
operating in different cities of the same country. There may also be significant
similarities in the policies adopted in the cities of countries with completely different
legislative frameworks and different systems of relations between the
state and religious communities. In order to understand how the various factors
interact, local research and investigation are needed, as well as a comparative
analysis and multifactorial explanations. The standard approach is to analyse
similar cases in different contexts, and different cases that imply different solutions
in similar contexts, in order to bypass the local influence of specific variables
(such as ruling political parties, etc), and also to compare and contrast other
variables.
The variables that must be taken into account include the form of the
state; the judicial systems governing church–state relations; the status of religious
minorities; differences in the laws covering citizenship; the percentages
of migrant and foreign populations; and the length of the period of immigration
(when it started, how it began and how it has changed over the years and generations).
It is important, in this sense, to have a common comparative framework,
but, as we shall see, these variables are far from providing a definitive explanation.
Conflicts and disputes regarding the question of mosques in Europe are
present in countries with formal church–state relations (such as concordats or
other agreements) as well as those operating other systems; and they occur both
in countries with a long history of immigration (such as those of central and northern
Europe) and in countries where immigration is more recent, such as those in
the Mediterranean region. It is therefore important to compare countries that have
similar systems and situations in terms of the presence of migrants and Muslim
populations, but which operate different policies as a result of different political
situations (eg Italy and Spain). At the same time, great care should be taken over
less studied countries, for which literature is scarce or rarely translated, but in
which changes in policies towards Islam and new trends are emerging.
To allow for a better comparison of the cases studied, an identical analysis
grid was given to all researchers. At the same time, for each country, an analysis
was requested covering a number of specific cases of conflict in greater depth.
The choice of cases analysed, and the criteria according to which this was carried
out, were agreed on a case by case basis with the research coordinator on the
basis of different criteria – in terms of their representativeness compared with
other similar cases but also in terms of their significant peculiarities. A criterion
introduction15
of proximity over time also prevailed, even if more temporally distant cases were
also analysed in order to see if there had been changes in issues triggering conflicts
and in their management and outcomes. For older cases in particular, and
for the best studied countries in any case, reference was made to the literature,
not particularly abundant, but significant at least in certain contexts.
Empirical studies were carried out in the following places:
Spain: Premia de Mar, Mataro, Bermejales –– (Seville), Lleida
–– Italy: Colle Val d’Elsa, Genoa, Brescia, Padua
–– Greece: the Great Mosque (Athens), minor Athenian mosques, Komotini
and other cases in Thrace
–– Austria: Bad Voslau, Bludenz (Vorarlberg)
–– Bosnia Herzegovina: Ustikolini, the King Fahd mosque and the Ciglane
mosque in Sarajevo
–– Belgium: Bastogne, Neder over Hembeek, Borgerhout (Antwerp)
–– Sweden: Gothenburg (three different mosques)
Although other studies were not planned, for countries in which studies were
mainly carried out through literature, we asked researchers to examine some
important cases in depth. The following instances were examined:
–– France: Roubaix, Bobigny
–– Germany: Cologne, Bochum
–– United Kingdom: Newham (East London), Stoke on Trent
–– Netherlands: Driebergen (the Hacy Bayram and Nasr mosques) and
Rotterdam (the Essalam mosque)
Many other empirical instances of conflict were analysed using available
literature.
17
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
1 Results of the research
1.1 Defining the mosque in Europe
The first problem that arises is defining what we mean by a mosque. We do not
expect to find an exhaustive and universally shared definition: put simply, a
shared definition does not exist, certainly not in non Islamic countries, the focus
of our research. Here we will use an extensive and commonsense criterion: all
places open to the faithful, in which Muslims gather together to pray on a regular
basis, will be considered to be mosques. We are aware that this definition contains
an inevitable margin of error, but at the same time it is more meaningful and
more comprehensive of the dimensions and dynamics of the phenomenon we are
discussing. It appeals to the principal function – prayer – and its collective and
public aspect.2
Within the category of mosque, a number of differences are discernible.
Employing a scale of decreasing importance, the first element is that of ‘Islamic
centre’. By an Islamic centre we mean a centre of significant size, which has, in
addition to the function of prayer and worship, a number of social and cultural
functions through various forms of gathering (a Koranic school; courses and
meeting opportunities for adults, women and converts; conferences and other
2 This is what usually causes a problem for the opponents of mosques. They never say that they
are against the fact that Muslims pray – ‘they should do it at home’ was heard repeatedly by
representatives of the anti Islamic movement; rather, they are against the fact that they do it together
in places open to the public. As they put it, they are not against Islam, they are against mosques.
18 Conflicts over mosques in europe
educational and cultural activities),3 usually conducted in separate rooms from
the prayer hall itself. Such a centre also carries out the activities of institutional
and symbolic representation of Muslims. Islamic centres are a small but important
part of what we call mosques. Only in major cities might there be more than
one, and often there are none at all. Not infrequently they perform a centralizing
function of representation at a provincial or regional level. Usually, they also
organize special meetings, for example those relating to Islamic holidays.
One category that we often encounter, especially given its significance
in relation to conflicts surrounding places of worship, is that of ad hoc, or purpose built,
mosque, usually with visible signs of a dome and one or more minarets
(the real masgids).4 These may overlap, and are often the same as Islamic centres,
but there are cases of ad hoc mosques that are not organized and structured
Islamic centres, as such centres are not infrequently located in converted buildings
that do not have the visible form of a mosque and where signs of recognition
and external visible clues are limited to a sign or a plaque.
A third category – numerically by far the most significant in all European
countries – is the Islamic musalla, or prayer room. Musallas may be located in
industrial buildings, warehouses, former shops and apartments.5 They may only
serve to host the activity of prayer, but more often other activities are also performed
there (eg Koranic schools and other educational events). Within this category
we also find ‘ethnic’ musallas, which are attended only by members of one
ethnic group, usually on the grounds of language (non Arabophone ethnic groups,
for example). Special mention should be made of the prayer halls or Sufi zawiyas,
Il pdf di questo libro è disponibile Scarica il libro integrale
Il diavolo e l’acquavite
/in 2008, Articoli / Articles, Articoli di Religione / Religion Articles, Articoli di Società / Society Articles, Religione / Religion, Società / Society /da StefanoVolgere il male in bene, il diavolo in acqua santa (o magari in acqua della vita, ovvero in acquavite), è prerogativa del sacro. Possiamo dimostrarlo con un breve apologo enoico.
Per un qualche errore di dosaggio nei fermenti, accadeva che alcune bottiglie del vino bianco di una certa regione della Francia si stappassero all’improvviso: questo vino, chiamato “diable”, perché indiavolato, ‘saltatappo’, a causa di questo errore di fermentazione doveva essere buttato.
Ma un monaco benedettino (appartenente cioè a quell’ordine a cui dobbiamo, insieme ai cistercensi, se la viticoltura è sopravvissuta alla caduta dell’Impero Romano e alle invasioni barbariche, grazie alla tradizione vitivinicola che custodirono e tennero viva all’interno dei conventi) ebbe l’illuminazione di lasciare fermentare appositamente una seconda volta, ma in bottiglie ben spesse e con i tappi di sughero accuratamente legati, quel vino destinato usualmente a più tranquilli approdi.
Dobbiamo a quell’oscuro e per molti santo monaco, tale Dom Pérignon, il cui nome è ora giustamente giunto a fama imperitura, la geniale creazione di quello che è oggi il vino più famoso del mondo: lo Champagne, dal nome di quella regione di Francia le cui vigne, secondo alcuni paleontologi sicuramente francesi e sciovinisti, sarebbero le più antiche al mondo.
Grazie agli sforzi certamente illuminati (è banale dirlo: dallo spirito…) di quest’uomo di preghiera, il “diable”, pur conservando la sua energia e il suo gas, è vinto e sottoposto all’ordine del mondo e al dominio dell’uomo, per la sua gioia e la letizia dei suoi commensali.
A proteggerne il prezioso frutto aiuterà anche San Vincenzo, diacono spagnolo martirizzato nel 304, divenuto in Francia il patrono dei vignaioli (e dei bevitori, immaginiamo), pare, a causa del gioco di parole cui si presta il suo nome, che sarebbe piaciuto a un cabalista: Vincent, cioè vin-sans-eau.
Allievi S., (2008), Il diavolo e l’acquavite, in “Servitium”, n.177, pp.105-106
Del vino e dell’islam
/in 2008, Articoli / Articles, Articoli di Religione / Religion Articles, Articoli di Società / Society Articles, Articoli sull'Islam / Islam Articles, Islam, Religione / Religion, Società / Society /da StefanoIl vino, le bevande inebrianti, per estensione tutto ciò che altera la coscienza, e quindi anche le droghe, è come noto vietato da un precetto coranico.
Ma, come altrettanto noto ai frequentatori del mondo musulmano, così come dei musulmani immigrati, si tratta del meno rispettato dei divieti alimentari. Vive, più o meno, la stessa sorte del divieto dei rapporti prematrimoniali nel mondo cattolico. Ma si tratta di un peccato evidentemente più frequente e ripetuto…
Il problema, in realtà, è innanzitutto nelle origini, ovvero nel precetto. Che, incessantemente ripetuto dai guardiani dell’ortodossia, e perciò considerato una sunna, ovvero una tradizione inderogabile, è in realtà assai più ambiguo anche nella sua genesi, nella sua origine e nelle sue successive modificazioni.
Il vino viene presentato in alcune pagine del Corano come frutto buono e inebriante che diventa addirittura segno per chi sa ragionare e riconoscere il divino sulla terra. La sua prima menzione, nell’ordine della rivelazione (come noto, il testo del Corano è riportato non in ordine cronologico, ma con un criterio di lunghezza, dalla sura più lunga alla più breve – come le lettere di Paolo, per capirci; seguiamo qui la classificazione cronologica classica della vulgata di re Fu’ad, come riportata nella traduzione del Bausani, e ne riportiamo l’ordine): “Pure dai frutti dei palmeti e delle vigne ricavate bevanda inebriante e cibo eccellente. Ecco un segno per coloro che capiscono” (sura 16,67; abbiamo scelto qui la traduzione dell’Ucoii: probabilmente non la più filologica, ma certamente la più diffusa tra i musulmani in Italia, e quindi anche, dal nostro punto di vista, la più inattacabile). Le successive sure meccane che parlano di vino, lo descrivono come uno dei premi di cui godranno i giusti in paradiso: “Provvederemo loro i frutti e le carni che desidereranno. Si scambieranno un calice immune da vanità o peccato” (52,22-23; più esplicito Bausani: “E si passeranno a vicenda dei calici d’un vino che non farà nascer discorsi sciocchi, o eccitazion di peccato”). E ancora: “I giusti saranno nella delizia, [appoggiati] su alti divani guarderanno. Sui loro volti vedrai il riflesso della Delizia. Berranno un nettare puro, suggellato con suggello di muschio – che vi aspirino coloro che ne sono degni” (83,22-26; anche qui più esplicito Bausani, che al v. 25 traduce: “saranno abbeverati di vino squisito”). Fin qui, le sure meccane, rivelate quando Muhammad era la guida di una comunità minoritaria e anche mal vista, una religione tra tante in quella città politeista e plurale sul piano religioso che era La Mecca al tempo del Profeta.
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