

Conflicts over Mosques in Europe

Policy issues and trends

Stefano Allievi

**NEF Initiative on Religion
and Democracy in Europe**



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Stefano Allievi

in collaboration with
Ethnobarometer

**NEF Initiative on Religion
and Democracy in Europe**



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Preface

The 'Religion and Democracy in Europe' initiative

The Network of European Foundations (NEF) is an operational platform primarily committed to strengthening the potential for cooperation in the form of joint ventures between foundations at the European level. The NEF offers its members the opportunity to identify common goals and, as an open structure, to join forces with other foundations in Europe which may share similar concerns and objectives. It is also open to collaboration with the public and private sectors in developing its initiatives. Its areas of intervention to promote systemic social change include migration, European citizenship, support for the European integration process, youth empowerment and global European projects. The NEF is based in Brussels.

In January 2007 the NEF launched a special initiative on 'Religion and Democracy in Europe'. This was conducted with the participation of Hywel Ceri Jones, NEF European policy adviser, and was based on a partnership between several foundations, including: Van Leer Group Foundation (chair); Arcadia Trust; Barrow Cadbury Trust; Bernheim Foundation; Compagnia di San Paolo; Ford Foundation; Freudenberg Stiftung; King Baudouin Foundation; Riksbankens Jubileumsfond; Stefan Batory Foundation; and Volkswagen Stiftung.

The 'Religion and Democracy in Europe' initiative focuses on the relation between religion and democracy in European societies, covering both religion and the public domain and religion and the state. The aim is to contribute to a better-informed debate on the topic through seminars and research on related issues.

The first year of activities, which included a roundtable with specialized journalists and a series of youth debates, culminated in the publication through

Alliance Publishing Trust of a compendium in which all the material presented in an international symposium held in Jerusalem was collected. This publication is available on NEF's website at www.nefic.org.

The second phase of the 'Religion and Democracy in Europe' initiative (2008–9) aims to develop a series of reports addressing specific aspects of the interaction both between the state and religion and between religion and society. The reports are a mapping exercise of existing practices and different approaches to specific issues, set in the broader context of the religion and democracy debate. They target practitioners, policy-makers and civil society actors. The reports have been developed by acknowledged experts and address the following questions:

- *Religion and Healthcare in the European Union* Dimitrina Petrova and Jarlath Clifford
- *Teaching about Religions in European School Systems* Luce Pépin
- *Conflicts over Mosques in Europe* Stefano Allievi
- *Religion and Group-focused Enmity* Andreas Zick and Beate Küpper

Through this and other activities, the 'Religion and Democracy in Europe' initiative aims to open up and contribute to the public debate on issues of strategic importance for the future of European societies.

For more information

For more on NEF and its activities, please contact info@nefic.org.

For more on the 'Religion and Democracy in Europe' initiative, please contact rienvangendt@vanleergroupfoundation.nl (chairman) or cristina.pineda@nefic.org (coordinator).

About the authors

Stefano Allievi is Professor of Sociology at the University of Padua. His special interests include migration issues, sociology of religion and cultural change; he has particularly focused his studies on the presence of Islam in Europe, a subject on which he has published extensively.

The text is also based on researches conducted by Jordi Moreras (Spain), Maria Bombardieri (Italy), Athena Skoulariki (Greece), Ernst Furlinger (Austria), Azra Akšamija (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Felice Dassetto and Olivier Ralet (Belgium), and Göran Larsson (Sweden); and on national overviews contributed by Sophie Gilliat-Ray and Jonathan Birt (Great Britain), Omero Marongiu-Perria (France), Michael Kreutz and Aladdin Sarhan (Germany), Nico Landman (Netherlands), and Göran Larsson (Finland, Norway, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania).

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Introduction

The research background: exceptionalism and Islam

As the reader will immediately see, the present study is the only one in the series not to have a general point of reference. Instead of addressing a broad issue such as places of worship, it focuses right from the outset on a single issue: the question of mosques, which is identified as a separate issue with its own specific characteristics.

This approach faithfully reflects the current state of affairs, as we will demonstrate in the pages below. Although forms of discrimination on the basis of religion are not completely absent—in particular, cases of discrimination towards certain minority religions or religious beliefs, some of which have even come before the European courts—in no country and in no other case has the opening of places of worship taken on such a high profile in the public imagination as the question of mosques and Islamic places of worship. With the passage of time, the question of mosques has led to more and more frequent disputes, debates, conflicts and posturing, even in countries where such conflicts were previously unknown and mosques were already present. This simple fact already puts us on a road that we might define as 'exceptionalism' with reference to Islam: a tendency to see Islam and Muslims as an exceptional case rather than a standard one; a case that does not sit comfortably with others relating to religious pluralism, and which therefore requires special bodies, actions and specifically targeted reactions, unlike those used for other groups and religious minorities, and (as in the present study) specific research.

An example of this exceptionalism is seen in the forms of representation of Islam in various European countries, which vary from case to case but differ, in particular, with respect to the recognized practices of relations between states and religious denominations in general. The most symbolic case is the creation in various countries, such as France, Spain, Belgium and Italy, of collective bodies of Islamic representation, with forms that often contradict the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of religious communities proclaimed and enshrined for other denominations and religious minorities. Forms of exceptionalism from a legal, political and social perspective are, however, present in many other fields, following a pervasive trend which affects countries with the widest range of state structures and which appears to be in a phase of further growth.

This situation, together with the increasingly evident emergence into the public arena of the dynamics of a conflict involving Islam (a kind of conflict in which the construction of mosques is the most frequent and widespread cause of disagreement), led to a desire to analyse recent cases of conflict, including clashes in countries that are regarded as peripheral within the European Union (EU) or that lie beyond its borders. For this reason, we have chosen, contrary to the usual practice, to pay closest attention to the *least* studied and analysed countries, for which scientific literature is least abundant. Setting off on this supposition, we believe that meaningful data for the interpretation of broader dynamics may emerge from an extensive analysis of the frequency and pervasiveness of these conflicts, which are also affecting countries with a long history of immigration and are more generally affecting the relationship between Islam and Europe.

For this reason we conducted a set of empirical investigations across seven European countries that are among the least studied and least known in this respect. We selected three Mediterranean countries which in certain respects vary greatly from one another: two countries in similar situations, where there is new immigration from Muslim countries and the memory of ancient historical domination (Spain and Italy); and one in which there is new immigration from Muslim countries along with a significant historical Islamic presence (the memory of Turkish Ottoman domination) that poses a number of problems (Greece). Also chosen were two countries which have a very significant historical Islamic presence but which also face a number of new problems (Austria and Bosnia-Herzegovina); the Nordic country with the largest Islamic presence (Sweden); and a central European country which has a long history of immigration and a particular institutional nature (Belgium). The last of these is also notable for its markedly local management of conflicts, which from a methodological perspective makes it an interesting control group.

For countries that are better known and for which the literature is much more abundant and readily available in English or in languages that are widely known and spoken in the EU (Great Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands), we have consulted available literature and produced an overview (including some particularly important recent empirical cases). The same was done for very little-known smaller countries, such as the Nordic and Baltic States.¹

Keywords: conflict, mosques, Islam, Europe

Key elements and keywords of the research are: mosques, conflict, Islam, Europe.

'Mosques' and 'conflict' represent or describe the actual situation. This tallies with the observation that these two words, which we will define in greater detail below, tend to 'go together' – at least at this time in history, and in many countries – with relative ease, producing specific dynamics. On the other hand, Islam and Europe (or Islam and individual nations, or Islam and cultural interpretations of their respective national self-definitions, variously defined as Britishness, *Italianità*, *identité républicaine*, etc, depending on the country) are the main interpretative categories that arise from the collision of the first pairing.

It is interesting to note that the first pairing produces and expresses the second one, which, however, rests on a different interpretative plane and at a different level. The first pairing is local, the second global; the first is concrete and has a clear empirical basis, the second is abstract and refers to cultural value-based registers; the first has a spatio-temporal localization that is missing in the second, or that expresses it in a completely different manner; and so forth. Thus these words, paired together, end up having a contrasting value, which is in itself a cultural product. 'Mosques' and 'conflict' are already two words that directly express dissonance, the idea of a problem. The same is true if we take the words 'Islam' and 'Europe'. However, this is not necessarily the case if one looks at facts rather than cultural interpretations. In fact, Islam and Europe have historically lived in different degrees of approximation, and this should be outlined, albeit briefly.

¹ The following people have worked on the research, coordinated by Stefano Allievi: **empirical researches** – Jordi Moreras (Spain), Maria Bombardieri (Italy), Athena Skoulariki (Greece), Ernst Furlinger (Austria), Azra Akšamija (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Felice Dassetto and Olivier Ralet (Belgium), Göran Larsson (Sweden); **national overviews** – Sophie Gilliat-Ray and Jonathan Birt (Great Britain), Omero Marongiu-Perria (France), Michael Kreutz and Aladdin Sarhan (Germany), Nico Landman (Netherlands). Göran Larsson also provided a summary of the Baltic and Nordic countries (Finland, Norway and Denmark; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). The authors provided papers on the respective national cases. Where no other sources are mentioned, the data on specific cases quoted in the report may be presumed to come from the above-mentioned papers. Mistakes of fact and interpretation rest on the shoulders of the author of the report, who relied on his personal skills and experience in the field in his effort of reinterpretation.

Islam and Europe: stages of approximation

We cannot here go into the details of historical processes that are long, complex and far from linear. We can, however, attempt to summarize them, albeit in a schematic manner that does not seek to reconstruct historical detail but to highlight current trends (Allievi 2005a; Allievi 2005b).

Phase 1: Islam and Europe A long first stage, lasting for at least the first ten centuries of the history of Islam, was one of major conflicts (analysed as such, however, only at a later date), symbolized by the Crusades, which saw Islam and (Christian) Europe facing one another, conceived and perceived as mutually impenetrable and self-referencing. All this was in spite of reality and history, which show how permeability and exchange (of philosophical ideas, scientific concepts, and artistic forms, as well as economic and trading links) were more the norm than the exception.

Phase 2: Europe in Islam In the second phase, we see European dominance of Islamic lands (the most powerful symbolic moment of this was the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt in 1798). First, in the age of empires and the colonial period, Europe dominated Muslim countries directly. Later, during the ongoing stage of neo- or post-colonial influence 'at a distance' – through economic globalization, the pervasiveness of the mass media and western consumption patterns – Europe has gradually brought the Muslim world within transnational economic trends and political institutions.

Phase 3: Islam in Europe In a third, more recent phase, Islam began to spread in Europe through migration. This began in France, for example, between the two world wars, and in most European countries during the period of post-war reconstruction and economic boom – in the 1950s and 1960s in the centre and north, and later still, from the late 1970s onwards, in southern Europe. It is still a phase characterized mainly by first-generation immigrants coming from former colonies (from Algeria to France, for instance, and from the Indian subcontinent to Great Britain), but there are also new forms of immigration (such as Turks coming to Germany), which gradually expand as more and more countries export labour in response to European demand.

Phase 4: the Islam of Europe In a fourth phase we observe the emergence and consolidation of an Islam of Europe, through a gradual process of insertion, manifested in the processes of integration – initially in the workplace, then in a social and sometimes political context – and of generational transition. Together, these contribute to the formation of a middle class and an intelligentsia of Islamic origin: one that still has relations with the countries of origin, but which does not come from outside, and is born and socialized in Europe – self-formed and forced or encouraged to build its own identity and its own space.

Phase 5: European Islam The result of this process should be the formation of a genuine European Islam, with its own pronounced identity different from that of Arabic Islam or that of other countries and cultural areas of origin. This Islam is (and even more in the future will be seen to be) a native European movement, largely the result of a gradual and substantial process of 'citizenization' of Muslims residing in Europe, who look forward to the prospect of full rights on an equal footing with other Europeans, with whom they share a common destiny. Of this phase, for now just given in outline, one cannot say much, except that its outcome will depend on the internal evolution of Muslim communities and their populations; on the dynamics of global Islam; and, perhaps most importantly, on the reactions and policies adopted towards them by the governments of individual European countries, which will in turn be influenced by their political parties and public opinion. In a word, the outcome will depend largely on non-Muslims, on the manner in which they approach the problem, on discussions of the issue, and on the fears and visions of the wider world.

Today, most European countries find themselves somewhere between the third and fourth phases, although there are some hints of the beginning of the fifth phase, which will become more visible in the years and decades to come. It should be borne in mind that the cycle constantly starts over again with the arrival of new immigrants, and that the tendencies outlined are precisely that: general trends that are empirically verifiable, but which do not involve entire Muslim populations, who will show resistance, counter-tendencies and differing positions on these processes. Such resistance can also be found among second-generation citizens. Like all social phenomena, these cannot be generalized, and show elements of complexity, contradiction and ambiguity.

The important point to appreciate is that we have in fact emerged from a contraposition that we can now recognize as a false opposition: one that seeks to place Islam and Europe as two horns of an insoluble dilemma. Today, Islam is *in* Europe, and it is here to stay, albeit progressively and in different forms. And yet, as the conflicts surrounding mosques in Europe show, interpretations increasingly tend to go in the opposite direction: a sign that the trend we have outlined is not really perceived and accepted as such. Interpretations of conflict are tending increasingly to appear even in countries where the process of inclusion, of *mixité*, of progressive 'citizenization' have gone furthest.

Cultural conflicts and public debates on Islam in Europe

The presence of Islam in Europe's 'public space' could not go unnoticed either socially or culturally. It is, or is perceived to be, too visible or too different not to

provoke debates or even tensions, for historical, cultural, religious, political and social reasons.

Confrontation seems to occur 'across the board'. Islam is itself questioned, often through essentialist and simplistic interpretations and controversies regarding dogmatic aspects and customs. Some aspects of Islam are also called into question for the way they manifest themselves, particularly in Muslim countries: of these aspects, the most discussed are those related to the condition of women and to gender equality, and to the relationship between religion and violence, fundamentalism and, more generally, politics. Finally, confrontation leads to questions and debate about the host society itself: on its degree of 'openness', on its borders, on the possibilities of and limits to integration, on how best to achieve this (in essence, this is the debate on multiculturalism), and on the definition of any possible 'tolerance thresholds', at an ethnic or religious level.

All this may happen without there necessarily being any debate or direct dialogue or confrontation *with* Muslims, or between society and the Muslims who live in it. Often these are debates *within* societies *about* Muslims and Islam.

To give some examples, the presence of Islam in Europe raises various kinds of tensions, controversies, debates and conflicts:

- Conflicts about principles and ideas: from the Rushdie affair in Britain (and elsewhere) to the cartoons affair in Denmark (and elsewhere). All these are perfect examples of global/local – or 'glocal' – issues, showing how easily questions concerning Islam in Europe can become influential and produce a repositioning of public and social actors, both in Europe and in Muslim countries.
- Conflicts brought about by dramatic events happening in Europe concerning Islam and caused by Islamic actors: terrorism (9/11 and its consequences in European countries – where some of the terrorists, such as Mohamed Atta, came from; the terrorist attacks in London and Madrid) and individual demonstrative acts, such as the assassination of Theo van Gogh.
- Controversies frequently raised and discussed in public debate relating to gender issues: the *hijab* is symbolic of this, but more generally, there are questions on the role of women in Islam, how this is perceived in the West and its effects on Muslim families, conflicts between generations, etc.

There are controversies, however, in which not only different opinions regarding relations with Islam are involved but also the Muslim social actors themselves. The case of mosques is the most significant in this sense, even if it is not the only

one, because it relates to a conflict that is not only debated *within* society, but is *about* society itself. This point seems particularly significant, in that it implies the perception of control over the territory and its symbolic imprinting. After all, control of and over the territory is not only a cultural and symbolic fact, it is also (and remains, in spite of everything) a very concrete and material sign of dominion and power.

These disputes are not limited to the establishment of places of worship; they also include the question of their visibility in European cities, which has an evident symbolic value. This issue encompasses related questions regarding the broadcasting of the *adhan*, the call to prayer, from mosques to the areas surrounding them, as well as the issue of Muslim cemeteries and the right to obtain religiously exclusive areas within existing cemeteries. These questions are important for various reasons. They not only show how the presence of Islam in Europe is debated and confronted; they are also crucial in understanding the broader issues of Europe as a whole: its problems, its values and its identity.

The mosque issue, in itself, may not even exist. On the one hand, there is nothing more obvious and natural than that foreign communities should wish and need to have their own meeting places according to their religious affiliations, and that they should enjoy the same fundamental rights that European constitutions grant to other minorities. On the other hand, these conflicts reflect a malaise and/or a deeper rejection, the reasons for which must be taken into account. Very few of those opposing the presence of mosques or prayer halls would say that they want to prevent anyone from praying. The reason given is always other than this; it goes deeper and is linked to the symbolic appropriation of territory, which has to do with history and its reconstruction, but it is also linked to deep socio-cultural dynamics, and to Islam itself and its presence in Europe. These conflicts cannot be interpreted only from the perspective of political fearmongers. The building of a mosque or the adaptation of a prayer hall is hardly ever merely an architectural and urban planning issue; it generates in-depth social and cultural discussions and reactions. These conflicts also appear to be semantically over-determined in cultural terms.

The above set of reasons and empirical evidence help to explain why we have conducted this research.

Guidelines and methodology of the research

In most European countries a clear national framework or a well-defined policy regarding the construction of mosques does not exist. In different countries almost every possible approach to the subject has been tried, from opposition

and refusal to political and even economic support. However, the way of dealing with mosque construction has also changed over time for political reasons and as a result of socio-cultural changes. There may be differences in the policies adopted in different regions and there may be striking differences in the policies operating in different cities of the same country. There may also be significant similarities in the policies adopted in the cities of countries with completely different legislative frameworks and different systems of relations between the state and religious communities. In order to understand how the various factors interact, local research and investigation are needed, as well as a comparative analysis and multifactorial explanations. The standard approach is to analyse similar cases in different contexts, and different cases that imply different solutions in similar contexts, in order to bypass the local influence of specific variables (such as ruling political parties, etc), and also to compare and contrast other variables.

The variables that must be taken into account include the form of the state; the judicial systems governing church–state relations; the status of religious minorities; differences in the laws covering citizenship; the percentages of migrant and foreign populations; and the length of the period of immigration (when it started, how it began and how it has changed over the years and generations). It is important, in this sense, to have a common comparative framework, but, as we shall see, these variables are far from providing a definitive explanation. Conflicts and disputes regarding the question of mosques in Europe are present in countries with formal church–state relations (such as concordats or other agreements) as well as those operating other systems; and they occur both in countries with a long history of immigration (such as those of central and northern Europe) and in countries where immigration is more recent, such as those in the Mediterranean region. It is therefore important to compare countries that have similar systems and situations in terms of the presence of migrants and Muslim populations, but which operate different policies as a result of different political situations (eg Italy and Spain). At the same time, great care should be taken over less-studied countries, for which literature is scarce or rarely translated, but in which changes in policies towards Islam and new trends are emerging.

To allow for a better comparison of the cases studied, an identical analysis grid was given to all researchers. At the same time, for each country, an analysis was requested covering a number of specific cases of conflict in greater depth. The choice of cases analysed, and the criteria according to which this was carried out, were agreed on a case-by-case basis with the research coordinator on the basis of different criteria – in terms of their representativeness compared with other similar cases but also in terms of their significant peculiarities. A criterion

of proximity over time also prevailed, even if more temporally distant cases were also analysed in order to see if there had been changes in issues triggering conflicts and in their management and outcomes. For older cases in particular, and for the best-studied countries in any case, reference was made to the literature, not particularly abundant, but significant at least in certain contexts.

Empirical studies were carried out in the following places:

- Spain: Premià de Mar, Matarò, Bermejales (Seville), Lleida
- Italy: Colle Val d'Elsa, Genoa, Brescia, Padua
- Greece: the Great Mosque (Athens), minor Athenian mosques, Komotini and other cases in Thrace
- Austria: Bad Vöslau, Bludenz (Vorarlberg)
- Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ustikolini, the King Fahd mosque and the Ciglane mosque in Sarajevo
- Belgium: Bastogne, Neder-over-Hembeek, Borgerhout (Antwerp)
- Sweden: Gothenburg (three different mosques)

Although other studies were not planned, for countries in which studies were mainly carried out through literature, we asked researchers to examine some important cases in depth. The following instances were examined:

- France: Roubaix, Bobigny
- Germany: Cologne, Bochum
- United Kingdom: Newham (East London), Stoke-on-Trent
- Netherlands: Driebergen (the Hacı Bayram and Nasr mosques) and Rotterdam (the Essalam mosque)

Many other empirical instances of conflict were analysed using available literature.

1 Results of the research

1.1 Defining the mosque in Europe

The first problem that arises is defining what we mean by a mosque. We do not expect to find an exhaustive and universally shared definition: put simply, a shared definition does not exist, certainly not in non-Islamic countries, the focus of our research. Here we will use an extensive and commonsense criterion: all places open to the faithful, in which Muslims gather together to pray on a regular basis, will be considered to be mosques. We are aware that this definition contains an inevitable margin of error, but at the same time it is more meaningful and more comprehensive of the dimensions and dynamics of the phenomenon we are discussing. It appeals to the principal function – prayer – and its collective and public aspect.²

Within the category of mosque, a number of differences are discernible. Employing a scale of decreasing importance, the first element is that of 'Islamic centre'. By an Islamic centre we mean a centre of significant size, which has, in addition to the function of prayer and worship, a number of social and cultural functions through various forms of gathering (a Koranic school; courses and meeting opportunities for adults, women and converts; conferences and other

² This is what usually causes a problem for the opponents of mosques. They never say that they are against the fact that Muslims pray – 'they should do it at home' was heard repeatedly by representatives of the anti-Islamic movement; rather, they are against the fact that they do it together in places open to the public. As they put it, they are not against Islam, they are against mosques.

educational and cultural activities),³ usually conducted in separate rooms from the prayer hall itself. Such a centre also carries out the activities of institutional and symbolic representation of Muslims. Islamic centres are a small but important part of what we call mosques. Only in major cities might there be more than one, and often there are none at all. Not infrequently they perform a centralizing function of representation at a provincial or regional level. Usually, they also organize special meetings, for example those relating to Islamic holidays.

One category that we often encounter, especially given its significance in relation to conflicts surrounding places of worship, is that of *ad hoc*, or purpose-built, mosque, usually with visible signs of a dome and one or more minarets (the real *masgids*).⁴ These may overlap, and are often the same as Islamic centres, but there are cases of *ad hoc* mosques that are not organized and structured Islamic centres, as such centres are not infrequently located in converted buildings that do not have the visible form of a mosque and where signs of recognition and external visible clues are limited to a sign or a plaque.

A third category – numerically by far the most significant in all European countries – is the Islamic *musalla*, or prayer room. *Musallas* may be located in industrial buildings, warehouses, former shops and apartments.⁵ They may only serve to host the activity of prayer, but more often other activities are also performed there (eg Koranic schools and other educational events). Within this category we also find ‘ethnic’ *musallas*, which are attended only by members of one ethnic group, usually on the grounds of language (non-Arabophone ethnic groups, for example). Special mention should be made of the prayer halls or Sufi *zawiyas*, ie those belonging to mystical brotherhoods; these sometimes have an ethnic-linguistic specificity (such as Senegalese *murids* and certain brotherhoods with an Indo-Pakistani origin), but some – especially those attended mostly by converts – may have a strong inter-ethnic character. There are also prayer halls belonging to minority Muslim groups (Shiites, Ahmadiyya, etc), when they have the resources to build their own structures. These three categories of prayer hall have the prerogative to be semi-closed: that is, in principle they are open to any Muslim, but in fact they are frequented only by those belonging to a specific group. This is particularly true of Sufi groups in which – albeit with significant exceptions, notably in the English-speaking world – there can be no external sign of recognition, and

³ For a description of an important example, see Amiraux 2009. In this sense they are also places where Islamic knowledge is produced, especially in what is still the most widespread and pervasive form – oral (on this see Van Bruinessen and Allievi 2009).

⁴ It is not very useful, however, in Europe to apply the distinction between *masgid* and *jami*, or between a ‘weekday’ mosque and the traditional congregational mosque where the community is found on Friday. In fact, almost all mosques in Europe fulfil both functions.

⁵ In the literature these are variously called basement mosques, *mosquées hangars*, house mosques, *hinterhofmoschee*, backyard mosques, *mescit*, *mescid*, prayer halls, etc.

they have no desire to open themselves up to the ordinary Muslim in the area who is simply looking for a place to pray, because the moments of the meeting may be different from the usual canonical ones, using particular liturgies and *dhikr*.

Some *musallas* are temporary for various reasons. This may be because they share premises with other activities (this may occur, for instance, in universities, hospitals, football stadiums and accommodation centres for immigrants), so they serve as prayer halls only at certain times or in certain periods of the year. Such is the case with mosques that are situated in temporary gathering places (for instance, holiday destinations that attract Muslim workers only at certain times of the year, or rural mosques where seasonal workers are employed in agriculture). Many isolated rural mosques, which are often outside the scope of the federations and relatively unknown, are nevertheless stable, although economically weaker at certain times of the year.

While it is relatively easy to calculate the number of Islamic centres, mosques built *ad hoc* and major prayer halls, the calculation of 'hidden' and temporary mosques is inevitably more complicated and often not very accurate. However, in this paper, when we talk of mosques in general, the term is meant to include all types of mosques and prayer halls within a country.

Most mosques play complex and varied roles: religious, social, cultural, political and economic, for instance. Other activities of interest and gatherings often take place around a mosque: halal butchers, ethnic shops, phone centres, import–export activities, ethnic-religious libraries (Islamic, but also often places where one can find books, videos, CDs and DVDs of the main ethnic and linguistic community in the area). In neighbourhoods with a strong ethnic character or a strong immigrant presence, a mosque will take its place quite naturally in the area. Furthermore, at a local level, mosques are also community centres and represent an interface with various networks – ethnic, national (linked to the countries of origin) and transnational (religious and political).⁶

1.2 Summary of historical and comparative elements

The presence of mosques in Europe is a recent phenomenon almost entirely linked to the presence of Muslim immigrant workers in Europe. The exceptions are Andalusia and Sicily, which in the distant past were under Muslim domination; the areas under Ottoman rule in eastern Europe and the Balkans, from Bulgaria to Greece, part of which later came under the Austro-Hungarian empire (Bosnia); and a small Tatar presence in Finland. There are also some individual mosques from the more recent past, established for various reasons: commercial

⁶ On the functions of mosques, see Waardenburg 1988; on social practices in Europe, see Dassetto 1996; on transnational networks, see Allievi and Nielsen 2003.

and mercantile interests (in ports, such as in the United Kingdom), military reasons (eg the presence of Muslim units in the Prussian army), or colonization, where military presence also played an important role (in France, Great Britain and the Netherlands in particular). Sometimes these mosques have been a powerful historical symbol (for instance in Andalusia, because of their importance for the entire Arab world); at other times they have been little more than the product of a historical reference, without consequences.

Nevertheless, the modern and contemporary history of mosques in Europe is linked to immigrant workers coming from Muslim countries. Often the first prayer halls appeared in the foyers of buildings where these workers lived or in their workplaces. A later stage, roughly coinciding with the end of the 1970s and especially the 1980s, saw the gradual spread of prayer halls, which was partly the result of a growing awareness that this was a permanent migration, no longer associated with the myth of a return to the homeland. Such awareness in turn owed much to the economic downturn caused by the oil crisis of the early 1970s and to the simultaneous approval in those years of immigration laws that were progressively more restrictive. As a result of these, an immigrant had to decide either to stay put or to leave forever – there was no alternative, such as a return ‘home’ that was continuously postponed. The awareness was also due, in part, to the gradual growth of nuclear families and the advent of second generations.

The spread of mosques has usually taken the following (idealized) path.⁷ A prayer room opens in a given area once what we might consider a variable of the religious concept of ‘ethnic threshold’ is exceeded, ie only when a sufficient number of Muslims wish to undertake and achieve this goal. These ‘grass roots’ mosques, being created from below and self-financed, call for a significant effort on the part of family heads (we are dealing here almost exclusively with men), who often embody a model of patriarchal father in crisis and feel the need to transmit their cultural and religious experiences to the next generation. Often there is a

⁷ For overviews of the synthesis, see Dassetto and Bastenier 1988; Nielsen 1992; Shadid and van Koningsveld 1995; Dassetto 1996; Rath, Groenendijk, Penninx and Meyer 2001; Allievi 2002; Cesari 2004; and the state of the art in Maussen 2007. For comparative research at a European level, see Maréchal, Allievi, Dassetto and Nielsen 2003. This study also provided part of the data for a more recent report for the European Parliament: Dassetto, Ferrari and Maréchal 2007. A new Eurislam project funded by the European Commission was recently started (in 2008); limited to only six countries, its results are expected by 2011. Collections of essays that contain references to the issues treated here include Gerholm and Lithman 1988; Shadid and van Koningsveld 1991 and 2002; Lewis and Schnapper 1992; Waardenburg et al 1994; Nonneman, Niblock and Szajkowski 1996; Vertovec and Peach 1997; Haddad 2002; Haddad and Smith 2002; Hunter 2002; and Cesari and McLoughlin 2005. Influential studies of national situations, which from different points of view have opened up the debate on the Islamic presence in their respective countries, include Dassetto and Bastenier 1984 for Belgium; Kepel 1987 for France (and ten years later Cesari 1997); Landman 1992 for the Netherlands; Allievi and Dassetto 1993 for Italy (with a revision ten years later in Allievi 2003); and Lewis 1994 for Britain. For Germany, see Spuler-Stegemann 2002. For the Scandinavian countries, see Larsson and Sander 2008 and Larsson 2009.

single ethno-national group, which, language permitting (in the case of Arabs, for example), is open to other users. Often a board or committee is established in which the foundational origins are clearly evident, often for a long time and even when the community of origin has perhaps become a minority.

Gradually, increasing concentrations of the Muslim population and other secondary 'thresholds' (ethnic language, for example) are reached; political and religious differences too have led to the multiplication of prayer halls. Sometimes these are merely temporary or episodic, and are often precarious, albeit with a certain effervescence and vitality. They also suffer a high mortality rate due to a lack of resources and prospects and to bad planning (this may include promises of external funding which never arrives and is sometimes little more than wishful thinking).

At the same time, in capital cities in particular, large purpose-built Islamic centres have been constructed, financed with external resources, often (especially in the capitals) with the support of the Muslim World League (*Rabita al-alam al-islami*) under Saudi control. The ambassadors of Islamic countries are usually represented on the boards of these mosques, but control is almost always in the hands of the financing body. Sometimes other transnational bodies intervene with funding, such as the Turkish DITIB (Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs), or national diasporas: the embassies of Morocco, Iranian institutions promoting Shiite mosques, and so forth.

With regard to geographical location, with the partial exception of the large Islamic centres, mosques have mostly been located in the industrial suburbs, where it is easier to find buildings of sufficient size to adapt to their purposes at an affordable price, or in ethnic neighbourhoods, on the outskirts of a big city.

It is worth noting that in Europe there is a general trend towards a kind of westernization of mosque functions, and even, one might say, in purely formal and institutional terms, their 'Christianization'. On the one hand, they carry out functions that, in the countries of origin, they would never perform: celebration of weddings and funerals, and social gatherings based on language and ethnic groups. On the other, mostly as a result of pressure from the host society and an internal 'evolutionary' push, the mosque ends up being treated as a kind of church – the imam considered a 'priest', the imam or emir of the main Islamic centre itself seen as a kind of 'bishop' and representative of all Muslims. Moreover, the entry into the mechanism of religious welfare typical of various host countries, applied to pre-existing religious minorities, gives the staff of mosques and the mosques themselves roles and a stability that they did not have, often forcing the pace of institutionalization mechanisms that would occur naturally if processes were left to their own internal dynamics. In this sense, the institutional advancement of

those social aspects of Islam that are linked to mosques sometimes appears too fast, as a result of this exogenous factor driving the community, especially when compared with the institutional power and sometimes the financial capabilities of the Islamic communities involved.

With the passage of time and leadership, some mosques (relatively few until now) have been passed down from the Islam of the fathers to that of their sons, and have changed in terms of both their character and their policies. More often, youth and transnational organizations have produced their own network of mosques. Above all, the strongest and most entrenched mosques have been able to expand gradually, moving to new premises and acquiring ground on which to build; they have thus been able to respond to the obvious growth in needs and numbers, transforming themselves from mosques into community centres and *mosquées de proximité*. The concept of proximity is particularly important in ethnic neighbourhoods, where it allows for 'family' use and a high level of social control operated by the neighbourhood. This represents a guarantee specifically for first-generation parents, while allowing more room for movement for the second generation, and, more generally, for categories such as the elderly, for whom the mosque becomes an easy-to-reach place for socializing; for children, as it can be reached safely; and for women, for whom it becomes important as a mediator in relation to the host society, a place for counselling and discussion on life and opinions.

The same road is taken, at greater speed but at different times, in countries exposed to new immigration phenomena. Typical in this respect are the countries in the Mediterranean area, which in the past were exporters of labour to central and northern Europe.

In countries where a recognized native 'ethnic' Islamic presence already exists (Greece, Finland, some countries in eastern Europe), a new wave of Muslim immigrants has begun to make itself felt. For the moment, they live in a state of mutual separation, with low levels of interaction and *mixité*. In practice they do not enjoy the same rights and recognition linked to places of worship that are enjoyed by historical minorities, who are already part of the institutional landscape of their respective countries.

1.3 A general overview

The table opposite presents data on the number of mosques in the various European countries we analysed.⁸

⁸ The data is drawn mainly from reports produced on the basis of this research.

The number of mosques in different European countries

Country	Population (million)	Immigrants (million)	Muslims (million)	% of pop. Muslim	Mosques	Purpose-built ⁹	Under construction
Spain	46	4.5	0.8–1 ¹⁰	2.2	454	14	none
Italy	59	3.4	1.3	1.9	661	3	5–6
Greece	11.2	1.15	0.2–0.3 ¹¹	0.4	< 400 ¹²	¹³	15 ¹⁴
Austria	8	0.7	0.4	4.8 ¹⁵	> 200 ¹⁶	4	2
Bosnia	3.8	¹⁷	1.5	40	1,867 ¹⁸	1,472	
France	65	4.9 ¹⁹	5.5	8	2,100	< 200 ²⁰	60
Germany	82	7.2	3.2–3.4	3	2,600	66	200 ²¹
United Kingdom	61	4.8 ²²	2.4	4	850–1,500 ²³	9–20% ²⁴	
Netherlands	16.5	3.2	1	6	432	100	15
Belgium	10.6	1 ²⁵	0.4–0.5	3.5–4	330		
Sweden	9		0.35–0.4	3.8–4.4	> 50	6	1 ²⁶
Norway	4.5		0.12	2.5	120	3	
Finland	6		0.04	0.8	30–40 ²⁷	2	3 ²⁸
Denmark	5.5		0.2	3.5	115		

⁹ This expression refers to mosques built as such to perform the function of worship; for the most part, they are also aesthetically recognizable as such, but this is not necessarily so.

¹⁰ Other assessments put the total at 1.145 million Muslims.

¹¹ Of which about 120,000 belong to the Thracian minority. The figure underlines the difficulty in counting illegal immigrants.

¹² There are 301 in Thrace (of which 24 are closed and 277 still operating); and about 60 in the district of Athens, including 26 in the city, where the vast majority of immigrants live and where they constitute 17 per cent of the population.

¹³ A large number of those in Thrace.

¹⁴ All in Thrace.

¹⁵ But they number 8.3 per cent in Vorarlberg and very few in Carinthia, the two regions which stand out in the campaign against mosques, as we shall see. Over one-third of the Islamic population, 121,000 Muslims representing 35.7 per cent of the total, lives in the Vienna area.

¹⁶ Including 75 in the Vienna area.

¹⁷ Rather than immigrants, in the Bosnian case one should speak of 'displaced persons' of the various ethnic groups.

¹⁸ There were 1,703 before the war, of which nearly 1,200 were totally destroyed or damaged between 1992 and 1995; 376 were built from scratch in the following years. Today there are three Islamic centres, all funded by Saudi Arabia, while there were none before the war. This destruction, which

As a purely statistical exercise, if we compare the total number of Muslim inhabitants in the countries examined with the number of mosques, we obtain the following results:²⁹ 18.06 million Muslims and 10,869 mosques, roughly equivalent to one mosque for every 1,660 inhabitants – a significant amount roughly comparable to that obtaining in many Muslim countries or, in Europe, to places of worship of the dominant Christian religion in the respective countries. In addition, if we exclude the data on Bosnia, the only country in the group where Islam is a historically established presence and the most widespread (though not the majority) religion, we get a figure of 9,002 mosques for 16.56 million Muslims, a figure which is not substantially different (one mosque per 1,840 Muslims) and which does not alter the overall picture. If we also exclude the 120,000 Muslims and 301 mosques in Thrace, the other historical Muslim minority within the part of Europe here under review, we are left with 8,701 mosques serving a world of Islamic immigration

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also involved hundreds of churches, mostly Catholic, was defined by the Council of Europe as 'a major cultural catastrophe'. Among those entirely destroyed were the Ferhadija mosque in Banja Luka (1579) and the Alazda mosque in Foca (1550), as well as that of Ustikolina, analysed as an empirical case later.

¹⁹ The calculation is complicated, given the long tradition of hospitality and 'citizenization' within the country. Therefore the number of immigrants is not the same as that of foreigners.

²⁰ The various sources range from more than 100 to fewer than 200. This is due to the fact that French Islam has experienced a period of great effervescence in recent times, in terms of reorganization and visibility, and yet there is no research that measures it. What we present here is a first approximation of a field that is still only partly explored.

²¹ The figure is particularly high compared to other countries as it includes projects on which work has not yet begun or which are still only at the planning stage.

²² The figure refers to the population of 'ethnic minority origin', not immigrants, as these people are largely British citizens.

²³ The variability is due to the fact that many mosques are not registered. Valid and complete statistical data is available for only about 255 mosques.

²⁴ These are the estimates obtained in some sample cities. Depending on the city, the percentage varies considerably. Birmingham: total mosques 116, purpose-built 10, percentage purpose-built 9%; Bradford: 44, 6, 13%; Cardiff: 10, 2, 20%; Leicester: 25, 5, 20%; Manchester: 31, 5, 16%.

²⁵ The foreign population is greatly underestimated, when compared to other countries, as a consequence of the very simple naturalization policy which means that one can obtain Belgian citizenship after three years; that citizenship is automatic following marriage to a citizen; and that the son of a foreigner born in Belgium is automatically Belgian. If indirect indicators are used, today in Belgium more than one child in ten has a culturally Muslim name and in Brussels the percentage rises to a third.

²⁶ And six new projects have already been presented in as many cities.

²⁷ Five of these belong to the Tatar community.

²⁸ These three projects comprise a large mosque in Copenhagen and Islamic centres in Aarhus and Helsingør.

²⁹ In both cases, where the figures lie within a range, we have reported the highest figure indicated to us, but even if we were to choose the lowest, the proportions would not change.

made up of approximately 16.44 million people, corresponding to one prayer room for every 1,890 Muslims living in Europe.³⁰

The figure may seem surprising, given the widespread assumption that Muslim places of worship are few in number. That may still be true for some countries exposed to more recent immigration phenomena, but it is not true in terms of the European average. A previous piece of comparative research (Maréchal et al 2003), based on 2001 data, had already yielded rates that were not substantially dissimilar. A smaller percentage of one mosque for every 3,000 Muslims was the result of the initial estimate proposed in the mid-1990s (Dassetto 1996). This, however, could not take into account the great organizational effort that characterized Islamic communities in the 1990s and early years of the 21st century, which can be viewed as the years of growth (beginning in the 1970s) and stabilization, at least numerically, of prayer rooms in Europe.

If we compare these figures to the people of Muslim origin who actually practise their religion (about one-third, according to a recent estimate; see Dassetto, Ferrari and Maréchal 2007), the number of Muslims per mosque is of course significantly lower. Therefore, there is no problem of a lack of places of worship. As many researchers note, indeed, in many countries there is currently a phase of consolidation and stabilization as regards the number of mosques, and possibly of investment in their internal structures and enlargement of their spaces and functions.

If anything, it is possible that the criterion chosen by almost all researchers, ourselves included, in an attempt to comprehensively map all Muslim places of worship is too broad in including temporary ones that are for general but rather irregular use. This is a criterion that would probably not be adopted if we were assessing a structured majority religion, for which we would only count recognized and stable places of worship. This point needs to be duly considered by researchers studying these issues, who in truth are not numerous.

The number of places of worship is, however, an important point to consider. One could advance the hypothesis that there is a causal relationship with the number of conflicts surrounding mosques in Europe. But this number is not in itself quantifiable, because in most cases threats and intimidation are not even reported to the police. What we know is what comes to the attention of the media and enters the political debate.

³⁰ By comparison, in the United States there are between 4 and 6 million Muslims, who are able to use more than 1,200 mosques (this figure, present in various sources, was authoritatively stated in President Obama's speech in Cairo on 4 June 2009). Taking as a reference the higher figure for Muslims, which is also the most widespread, there is one mosque for every 5,000 Muslims; if we take the lower figure, there is one for every 3,333 Muslims. The variability is enormous, depending on the state, ranging from a single mosque in Alaska and in Hawaii, to 250 for California and 147 for the state of New York, the only ones to reach three figures.

In fact, one cannot say with certainty that there is a problem of non-guaranteed religious freedom for Muslims in Europe. The problems that arise and are discussed below are of a qualitative, not a quantitative, nature. They are no less important for that; indeed, they are highly relevant and significant. Still, it is correct to place them within a proper quantitative dimension.

1.4 The presence of Islamic places of worship in Europe: some national cases

Before dealing with the analysis of cases and issues of conflict, it is worth reviewing briefly the historical context in which contemporary conflicts arise, including, for completeness, countries which were not investigated in our empirical research.³¹

France

France is the country with the largest Islamic presence in Europe, estimated at about 5.5 million people, or 8 per cent of the population. In addition, France is among the European countries with the longest history of relations with its own internal Islam, dating from the dawn of the colonial period. The approximately 2,100 Islamic places of worship in the country bear witness to a strong presence, albeit proportionally lower than in other countries – the figure is similar to that of other religions and shows the weight of the secular and republican ideology in the life of the country. Until a few years ago there were, at most, a couple of dozen mosques built *ad hoc* (there were only eight in early 2000),³² and researchers could not help but notice the contrast between the strong Muslim presence and its moderate visibility and profile. Today, however, this disproportion is less evident than in the past.

The weight of republican ideology has made itself felt in terms of legislation, for example in the law that prevents the display of ostentatious religious symbols, in particular the *hijab*, in state schools, but the attitude towards mosques seems highly pragmatic, with practices and outcomes that give quite the opposite impression. State intervention has been considerable, starting with the creation of the Paris mosque in 1926. It continued when, addressing the matter of Islamic immigrants, the first mosques were set up in the foyers of Sonacotra accommodation (an organization that builds housing for migrant workers); starting in 1975 and continuing through the decade that followed, 80 per cent of foyers were equipped with a prayer hall, following a plan aimed at ensuring social peace

³¹ Apart from the references given above, it should be understood that for all these countries extensive reference was made to data produced by our own research updated to June 2009.

³² See the chapter entitled Relations and Negotiations: Issues and Debates on Islam in Maréchal, Allievi, Dassetto and Nielsen 2003.

at low cost (Maussen 2009). Such intervention continues to this day with numerous instances of institutional pressure exerted at local level but with national support, as in the case of the Lyons mosque, inaugurated in 1994 (Battegay 1995); the Evry mosque (de Galembert 1997); the Strasbourg mosque (Frégosi 1997); and even earlier the Mantes-la-Jolie mosque (de Galembert 2005).

The strange case of Marseilles – for a long time the most visibly 'Islamic' part of France, but lacking a real mosque, despite several promises made since the First World War (Renard 1999) – is perhaps approaching a solution today (Maussen 2009). Many cities have also opted for a pragmatic approach to the restructuring and expansion of premises. Nevertheless, conflicts have occurred since the 1980s, though rarely with such sensational effect as when the mayor used bulldozers to destroy the mosque in Charvieu-Chavagneux (Cesari 1997) and a referendum was called for at Libercourt in 1999 (de Galembert 2005). But even before these events there were conflicts in Roubaix, Rennes, Romans-sur-Isère and Sevran (Kepel 1991). And more recently there were incidents at Belley (a mosque set alight in 2001 when a stolen car crashed into it); Châlons-en-Champagne in 2002 (Molotov cocktails); Perpignan (a parcel bomb, not signed for, exploded at the post office from which it was sent); and Escaudain (more Molotovs). There were others as well, often not reported (Ternisien 2002) and probably attributable, as elsewhere, to an '11 September effect'. Regarding attendance at mosques, we can cite IFOP (Institut français d'opinion publique) polls, which show a significant trend over two decades: 16 per cent of Muslims attended mosques in 1989, the same figure as in 1994, rising to 20 per cent in 2001 and 23 per cent in 2007. It is significant to note that for the older group, aged 55 and over, the increase went from 39 to 41 per cent, while the figures for young people under the age of 25 rose from 7 to 20 per cent.

Germany

Germany comes second behind France in the ranking of European countries for the number of Muslims (3.2–3.4 million), but the proportion in relation to the overall population is considerably lower, at about 3 per cent. The absolute number of mosques, however, is the highest in Europe (at least 2,600). The ratio between the number of mosques and the number of Muslims is the highest in Europe (if we exclude Bosnia), and their presence is significant and highly visible. Germany is also a country with a significant number of purpose-built mosques; given the number currently being built, it is destined shortly to become the European country with the highest number of purpose-built mosques – except of course for Bosnia and Greece, whose *ad hoc* mosques are 'historic' and serve the indigenous

Islamic population and not immigrants.³³ Greater acceptance of purpose-built mosques in the country is not recent and has been more characteristic of Germany than France since the beginning of the spread of Islamic places of worship (de Galembert 1994). The first ones in fact date back to the late 1950s, with the Omar Mosque in Hamburg-Stellingen (1957), the Nur mosque in Frankfurt-Sachsenhausen (1959), the Imam Ali in Hamburg (1961), the Bilal in Aachen (1964) and the Freimann in Munich (1973). The larger mosques are more recent: the Yavuz Sultan Selim in Mannheim-Jungbusch (1995), the Şehitlik in Berlin-Neukölln (2004), and the Fatih in Bremen-Gröpelingen (1999). We can therefore speak, in the German case at least, of a substantial openness in the public arena to explicit and visible Islamic signs (Goldberg 2002), though for a long period at the start, and right through to near the end of the 1990s (with the exceptions mentioned above), this chiefly involved small, often invisible and impromptu mosques.

The Islamic presence in the country is characterized by the numerical prevalence of Turkish citizens and by Turkish state intervention in the funding of mosques and imams through the DITIB (Diyaret İşleri Türk İslam Birliği), a sort of ministry of religious affairs, and by a form of internal competition with other social actors, such as the IGMG, the Milli Görüş movement, the Alevites, and others. Even in Germany, the history of places of worship goes back to before the period of immigration, including the mosque in Wilmersdorff, built in 1924, and the Ahmadiyya mosque in Berlin (1927), a kind of miniature Taj Mahal (Jonker 2005).³⁴ Before that, most obviously, there was the mosque in Berlin (1866), whose patronage was assumed by the Ottoman sultan and which celebrated the strong trading relations between the Ottoman empire and the Hanseatic cities (Nielsen 1992). And the story goes right through to the early examples of the mosque set up in a railway wagon for use by Muslims building the railways, and a mosque in a foundry which used its chimney as a minaret with a spiral staircase.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is another country in which the public sphere was very open to the spread of prayer halls and the construction of mosques, including high-visibility projects. The percentage of mosques is significant when we take into

³³ For the German situation, see among others Spuler-Stegemann 2002. On the question of mosques, see Leggewie, Joost and Rech 2002 and Beinhauer-Köhler and Leggewie 2009, promoted by the Herbert Quandt-Stiftung.

³⁴ It is interesting to note that the mosques of the Ahmadiyya, a group considered heterodox and non-Islamic by most Muslims, were often the first ever to be built in various countries of Europe: a clear effect of the persecution that the Ahmadiyya suffer in their countries of origin. This was also the case in Denmark in 1967, with the first mosque built *ad hoc* in the country, in Sweden with the mosque in Gothenburg in 1975, in the Netherlands and elsewhere, a sign that in Europe the Ahmadiyya find the freedom of worship denied them in Muslim countries.

account that the estimated 2.4 million Muslims have over 1,000 mosques (between 850 and 1,500 is the estimate – here we stick to a prudent figure). Many mosques are also purpose-built, especially in the large ethnic communities around the country. There are 116 mosques in Birmingham, of which 10 are purpose-built, for a total of 140,000 Muslims; 44 in Bradford, of which six are purpose-built, for the city's 75,000 Muslims; 31 in Manchester, of which five are purpose-built, for 125,000 Muslims; 25 in Leicester, of which five (20 per cent) are purpose-built, for 31,000 Muslims; and ten in Cardiff, two purpose-built (also 20 per cent), for the city's 11,000 Muslims. As we can see, in these cases the number of mosques is twice the European average, with almost one mosque for every 1,000 Muslims. In the UK, with a strong spatial concentration of Muslims, the situation has attracted the attention of urban geographers as much as the social scientists (sociologists and anthropologists) who are more frequently involved in these types of study. One can also frequently find Islamic prayer rooms and other forms of religious facility in a wide range of places: airports, shopping centres, meeting places of various kinds (notably the Millennium Dome in Greenwich, now the O2), football stadiums (the first was Ewood Park, the home of Blackburn Rovers, an example taken up by others), and even motorway service stations (the first was on the M6).

It seems likely that the strong emphasis on multiculturalism in the English-speaking world (something that has never been called into question, unlike in the Netherlands, for example) and a marked tendency towards the protection of rights, even if necessary through appropriate affirmative action, have contributed to creating a climate conducive to the presence and visibility of Islam (just like any other religious community). Prominence has certainly been increased by the presence and activism of Muslims (the vast majority of whom are British citizens) in politics, a situation which has no parallel, for example, in France, even though most Muslims there are French citizens. Currently there are four Muslim MPs and nine members of the House of Lords, as well as many Muslim municipal councillors and mayors. In terms of the visibility and institutionalization of Islam, including the issue of places of worship, the United Kingdom may be the most advanced nation in Europe.

Netherlands

In the Netherlands there are now about 432 mosques for 1 million Muslims, close to the European average despite the country's image as being particularly open to (or according to some, invaded by) mosques. It should be stressed that it is not so much the quantity that is significant, but the fact that mosques have long enjoyed various forms of grants and loans on the basis of the Dutch system of 'pillars', or have otherwise been taken into account during land-use planning.

Purpose-built mosques numbered two in the 1950s, and the same number were built in each of the following three decades; the number grew to 13 in the 1990s and 20 in the very first years of the 21st century, giving a total today of about 100 purpose-built mosques.

The spread of mosques has followed a fairly well-defined process, beginning with a careful assessment, especially of the needs of Muslims from former colonies, with state subsidies for the construction of the first mosques (the first two Moluccan mosques in 1984 and 1990, for example). In reality, however, already in the 1970s the need to establish prayer halls for migrant workers had been acknowledged. This included those in the municipalities of Rotterdam and Amsterdam (not, however, in the case of Utrecht), which were granted direct financing, so putting places of worship on the same level as other facilities for immigrants, such as language courses or medical care (Maussen 2009). The number of mosques really took off in the 1990s, with the number of prayer halls going from 100 to 300, while purpose-built mosques rose in number from 10 to 40 (there are now a hundred or so, almost 25 per cent of the total, the highest percentage in Europe with the exception of Bosnia). The political climate has changed following 11 September 2001, and more so after the 2004 murder of Theo van Gogh, the Hirsi Ali case, and the success of Islamophobic parties: the ephemeral success of Pim Fortuyn's List, so tragically curtailed, and the recent success (in June 2009) of Geert Wilders' party (like van Gogh and *Submission*, the author of a controversial anti-Islamic film, *Fitna*). Despite the current crisis and the rethinking of policies now in progress, the Netherlands remains a country remarkably open to a variety of places of worship, including those for Muslims.

Belgium

In Belgium 330 mosques for barely half a million Muslims constitute a substantial number compared to the situation in the nearby Netherlands, where there are not even 50 per cent more mosques but there are twice as many Muslims. In spite of this, Belgium gets less attention in the media as a result of a pragmatic policy administered at a local level. After Austria, which renewed its acquaintance with Islam as part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, Belgium was the first European country (in 1974) to put Islam, at least formally, on an equal footing with other recognized religious denominations, while the granting of the east pavilion of the Parc du Cinquantenaire for use as a mosque dates back to 1969 (Dassetto and Bastenier 1984). The date of 1974 is no coincidence: other countries formally recognized Islam in those same years (the granting of land for the great mosque in Rome also dates back to 1974), often following direct contacts with Saudi Arabia and precisely in the years following the oil crisis of 1973. The dates of the building

of Islamic centres in other European capitals were also determined by external events. The growth of Islamic places of worship in Belgium has been constant since the 1970s, and, if anything, has now stabilized after a period in the 1990s and the early years of the 21st century when Turks (as well as non-Arab Africans and Asians) caught up with the level of organization demonstrated by mosques opened up by immigrants from the Maghreb region. Yet even today in Belgium there are seven or eight cases of conflict currently taking place.

Austria

The situation in Austria shows a quantitative presence somewhat below that of Belgium – about 390–400,000 Muslims and some 200 mosques, a percentage rather higher than the European average. The recognition of Islam dates back to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Austro-Hungarian empire (1908), which led, in 1912, to the first law of recognition of Muslims, which was later sanctioned by further laws. But even before this, an imam was established for the army (1891), and a prayer hall for the Bosnian infantry regiment had been prepared before the First World War. Since 1982 it has been possible to have access to lessons in the Islamic religion in public schools, financed by the state. But subsequently, in particular from the 1990s onwards, there has been progressive political opposition to the building of mosques, and this has gradually created a gap between the level of legal recognition of Muslims and their socio-economic and political recognition. The situation, however, varies considerably from region to region. For example, in Vienna, where roughly 35 per cent of the country's Muslims live, the situation seems more favourable than it is in regions governed by the parties most directly involved in anti-Islamic campaigns (it is curious, nevertheless, that the Carinthia of the late Jörg Haider is one of the regions with the lowest percentage of Muslims in all Austria). Approximately one-third of Muslims are of Turkish origin, while the second-largest component comes from the former Yugoslavia (primarily Bosnia-Herzegovina, though there are also Muslim refugees from Serbia-Montenegro, Macedonia and Croatia); the Arab component is low.

Spain

The countries of the Mediterranean have witnessed more recent migration, starting from the 1970s and reaching significant numbers from the following decade onwards. Spain has a little under 1 million Muslims and 454 mosques, of which 14 are purpose-built. If we exclude mosques from the Andalusian period, the first mosques built with the support of the state are those dating from the Spanish protectorate in northern Morocco (1912–56), examples of which are the main mosques in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on Moroccan territory.

The first real monumental mosque in the country has an unusual origin, having been built in 1981 in Marbella on the Costa del Sol, using Saudi capital, in order to provide a worthy place of prayer for members of the royal family and their large entourage when on holiday at the noted seaside resort. Spain was one of the first countries in Europe – well before countries with a longer and more rooted history of Muslim immigration – to sign a cooperation agreement (*Acuerdo*) with Islam, in 1992, allowing for the recognition of Islam in a country that has a concordat-type set of regulations governing the state's relations with the Catholic Church. So far, however, many aspects of the *Acuerdo* have not been developed or are not yet operational.

Among the most important Islamic centres is the Abu Bakr mosque in Madrid, inaugurated in 1983; this was financed with capital from a range of Arab countries and is the headquarters of some important Spanish Muslim associations and federations. The other major Islamic centre of the capital, the Omar ibn al-Jattab mosque (better known as the M-30 mosque, after the highway that passes close by), was funded by Saudi capital and opened in 1992 in the presence of the Spanish monarchs and representatives of the Catholic Church. Other important centres are the mosque and study centre located on an Andalusian farm in La Puebla de Don Fabrique (Granada), opened in 2001; the Great Mosque of Granada, in the Arab quarter of Albaicin linked to the Murabitun convert movement, inaugurated in 2003; and the new Islamic Centre in Malaga, which opened in 2007. All were largely funded using Arab capital. Over the last 15 years about 60 conflicts relating to neighbourhood mosques have taken place in various cities of Spain.

Italy

In Italy there are an estimated 1.3 million Muslims and about 660 prayer halls. Of these, only three are mosques in the truest sense: that of Catania, the oldest one (1980), now no longer in use and managed 'privately' by a Sicilian citizen who obtained financial resources from Libya in a period in which the region was the focus of various Libyan interests; that of Milan Segrate, built in 1988, which is one of most influential in the organization of Italian Islam; and the large Italian Islamic Cultural Centre in Rome, officially inaugurated in 1995 in the presence of the head of state and senior authorities of the Vatican, and linked (like many other Islamic centres established in European capitals) to the Saudi Muslim World League (*Rabita al-alam al-islami*) (Allievi and Dassetto 1993; Allievi 2003). One of the few mosques currently under construction, at ColleVal d'Elsa in Tuscany, is at the centre of considerable controversy. Others are on the drawing board in several large cities. Many mosques are also present in small and medium-sized cities and in

rural areas. In total there were about 100 mosques in Italy in the early 1990s, 350 in 2001, and over 660 today. But there is a strong bias, both geographical and political. The Islamic presence is particularly opposed in northern Italy, where there is a political party (*Lega Nord*, the Northern League) which has made the struggle against Islam an important and highly visible part of its policy (Allievi 2003). This party represents about 10 per cent of the electorate nationally, according to elections held in June 2009, but it has much higher percentages in many areas in the north and has gained majority support in many cities. Since the League is also a member of the present government and controls, among other areas, the ministry of the interior, the polarization of the conflict with Islam has been particularly marked, especially on the question of mosques. This does not preclude, however, the presence of Muslim prayer halls, which, in any case, are more numerous in the north than the south, because of the larger immigrant presence in these regions and their higher level of organization. This is one of the important factors that explain the low visibility of Italian Islam, in a significantly hostile cultural climate, to which the campaigns of journalists Oriana Fallaci and Egyptian Magdi Cristiano Allam,³⁵ who recently converted to Catholicism, have contributed greatly.

Greece

Like Italy, Spain and Portugal, Greece finds itself in an unusual situation today, being a country that accepts immigrants, particularly from nearby Albania and other Muslim countries.³⁶ It has an important Turkish-speaking Muslim minority, especially in western Thrace, which is fully incorporated in the institutional framework of the country, despite suffering forms of discrimination from the Greek Orthodox majority (Dalègre 1997). This historical presence in western Thrace is crucial to understanding the peculiar Islamic landscape of Greece. There are many mosques in proportion to the total Muslim population: almost one for every 600–700 Muslims. The 120,000 inhabitants of Thrace make up about half the Islamic population of Greece (or a little less, depending on the estimates

³⁵ The three well-received books by Fallaci, which have each sold about 1 million copies, are Fallaci 2001, 2004a and 2004b. Since 2001 Magdi Allam (now named Cristiano following his baptism, administered by Pope Benedict XVI at Easter 2008, in front of a global TV audience) has written various anti-Islamic and autobiographical booklets at a rate of at least one a year, all with great success. Both authors have often taken issue with the Islam of the mosques. Magdi Allam was the first within the ranks of the Catholic UDC party to be elected to the European Parliament, in June 2009, but as a representative of a party which he founded himself: *Protagonisti per l'Europa Cristiana* (Protagonists for a Christian Europe). One would assume that he will seek to put forward his ideas in this context, finding, with the new equilibrium that has emerged across Europe following the 2009 European elections, ears that are more attentive and open to him than in the past. An analysis of the watchwords of this *Kulturkampf* can be found in Allievi 2006.

³⁶ Albania is a multi-religious country with a strong Islamic component and is an official member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. It is emerging from a particularly long and consistent period of atheism, which has significantly reduced the practice of religion by Albanians, although it has been in recovery in recent years.

of Muslim numbers, which are made difficult by a large presence of illegal immigrants); they have 301 of the nearly 400 mosques in the country, which are mostly *ad hoc* constructions located in two districts of western Thrace, Xanthi and Komotini (these districts are largely made up of small villages, a fact which also explains the significant number of mosques). Almost all the mosques were purpose-built, before the onset of Islamic immigration. There are around 60 prayer halls in Athens, which, however, remains – as a result of opposition and in spite of promises to build one during the 2004 Olympics – the only European capital not to have a mosque (Anagnostou and Gropas 2009).

Scandinavia and the Baltic States

Jumping from the extreme south of Europe to the extreme north, in Scandinavia we find a very different situation. In **Sweden**, the Islamic presence is estimated at 350–400,000 people, constituting 3.8–4.4 per cent of the population. The prayer halls number fewer than 50, but six mosques were purpose-built: a significant percentage, which shows the remarkable openness, generally, to religious pluralism, both Christian and non-Christian, from as early as the 18th century. The total number, however, is small, and in some ways reflects the national trait of religious non-fervour for all denominations, including Lutheranism, which is dominant in the country. The first purpose-built mosque in the country was the Ahmadiyya in Gothenburg, inaugurated in 1976, but already by the end of the Second World War a group of Tatar Muslims who had arrived in the country had opened the first Islamic congregation in 1949 in Stockholm. Other *ad hoc* mosques can be found in Stockholm (two), Malmö, Uppsala and Trollhättan (Shiite). The last of these was also the first to suffer an attack and a fire in 1993, which forced it to reopen in the following year (two other fires have occurred, at the Malmö Islamic Centre in 2003 and in a prayer room at Strömsund in 2008). The prayer halls are mostly in Stockholm (around 20), Gothenburg (15–20) and Malmö (10–15).

Elsewhere in Scandinavia, twice as many prayer halls are located in **Denmark**, where the number of Muslims is half that of Sweden (though almost the same in percentage terms). The first purpose-built mosque is also called the Ahmadiyya and dates back to 1967. In **Norway**, some 120,000 Muslims have about 120 prayer halls, with about 40 in and around Oslo, where the only three purpose-built mosques in the country, belonging to the community of Pakistani origin, can be found. **Finland** has a small Tatar community which arrived from Russia at the beginning of the 20th century; this enjoys full recognition of its rights and possesses five mosques, including the only purpose-built mosques among the 30 to 40 that exist in the country. In the Baltic States, a curiosity is presented by three wooden mosques, built in **Latvia** at the turn of the 20th century, which are

among the 'oldest' in Europe. The central mosque in Vilnius was destroyed by the Soviets in the 1960s.

Bosnia

The last case we examine, Bosnia, is an atypical case, having been a part of Europe under Ottoman influence with a historical Islamic presence that is not linked to contemporary immigration. The Islamic population within its current boundaries represents the largest religious confession: about 40 per cent of the inhabitants are 'ethnic' Muslims, although, as with other religions, many consider themselves to be atheists or agnostics as a result of the history of secularization under socialist Yugoslavia. It is, therefore, an interesting (albeit historically tragic) benchmark. Within Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethnic and religious divisions overlap in many respects, which means, for example, that on a political level there are no properly 'Islamic' parties, although there are several that represent the interests of Muslims, Bosnians or those generally termed 'patriotic'. The most active opponents of Islam are, of course, the Croatian and Serbian nationalist parties. In the period between the recognition of Bosnia's independence in April 1992 (following that of Slovenia, Croatia and later Macedonia, and at the same time as the Serbian attack on Sarajevo) and the signing of the Dayton Agreement (December 1995), the tragic war in the Balkans had a great impact on places of worship, which were systematically destroyed as symbols of the cultural presence of the 'other'. As far as mosques are concerned, this process had the following effects: of the 1,370 or so mosques³⁷ and 333 *masjids*³⁸ existing before 1992, 584 (43 per cent) and 111 (33 per cent) respectively were destroyed, and 417 (30 per cent) and 78 (23 per cent) were damaged. Overall, approximately 72 per cent of mosques and 56 per cent of *masjids* in Bosnia-Herzegovina were totally destroyed or severely damaged during the war of 1992–5.

The process of rebuilding and reconstruction has progressed very well, with about 70 per cent of mosques and *masjids* having been renovated or rebuilt. Today there is a strong impetus for the construction of new mosques and Islamic centres (which did not previously exist in Bosnia) thanks to initiatives from foreign donors, mainly Saudi Arabia, through the VSK (Supreme Committee for donations to the Muslims of Bosnia). Over the years this body has spent \$450 million in humanitarian aid, including construction of religious buildings; all of these were handed over to the ICBH, the official representative body of the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, apart from the major Islamic centres in Sarajevo and Mostar, which have remained under the supervision of the Kingdom

³⁷ The term means, in this case, all purpose-built buildings.

³⁸ This term means prayer halls without a minaret, even if purpose-built.

of Saudi Arabia. This strong foreign presence is justified by humanitarian aid, which is greatly needed in Bosnia for the reconstruction of its infrastructure, but it has brought with it significant discussion and an element of controversy. It has had a great impact in some local contexts, as in the case of the King Fahd mosque in Sarajevo, and not only because of architectural issues. In these mosques there has always been gender separation, but at a far more discreet level than in the new buildings, in which it is strongly emphasized, with separate entrances and even different floors. This is alien to local tradition and could have an influence on vernacular mosques. In fact the country is experiencing an aesthetic manipulation of its religious monuments, which serve as testimonies of nationality and thus as markers of national and transnational identities (Akšamija 2008).

2 Elements of conflict

2.1 Conflict: a definition

The word 'conflict' evokes contrast, opposition, confrontation. Derived from the Latin *conflictum*, past participle of *confligere*, 'to fight', its meaning clearly relates to war. The word 'controversy', which we have sometimes used as a synonym or as a weaker form, possibly representing only verbal conflict, evokes the same kind of image: it comes from the Latin *contra* and *versus*, past participle of *vertere*, 'to turn', giving an underlying meaning of 'turn against'.

Sociological literature on conflict has a long tradition, particularly from Weber and from Simmel onwards, in which its necessity and in many ways its inevitability are the subject of extensive theorizing. Thus conflict is seen as a social necessity, one of the ways used by society (which is inherently conflictual) to bring its inherent diversities to the surface, perhaps at the expense of one antagonist or the other, of one opinion or the other. The methods used to resolve conflicts may be very different, ranging from absolute negation of the other (which amounts to erasing its existence, needs and requirements; uprooting or eradicating it) to various forms of civil debate. Intermediate techniques include confrontation between the 'parties' (the parties representing one or other position or interest). This leads inevitably to an unstable situation, which – in the case of representative democracy and the electoral mechanism – has to be resolved with as little damage as possible to all the parties involved and to society as a whole. Justice itself, from this point of view, can be interpreted as a form of conflict and not merely as a possible solution. Conflict mediation is one form of this process that is increasingly common in social contexts (the family, school, welfare), in

which justice is itself a means (for example, legal proceedings for separations). Conflict is thus one of the constituent dimensions of social life, and in this sense represents part of its physiology rather than its pathology.

Thus, in this respect, conflict becomes inevitable, and often intractable, a condition of human life: 'the view that all conflicts and problems should be there, on purpose, to be resolved is a prejudice of mummified pedants' (Simmel 1918). However, from a social point of view, it is obvious why resolving conflict is desirable, to say the least: conflict is expensive, consumes energy, polarizes opinions, drains resources, and can sometimes destructure individuals or whole groups, dragging them towards antisocial or self-destructive actions.

In general terms, conflict is a type of social interaction in which those involved experience a supposed or real diversity or incompatibility, which itself becomes an instrument of conflict. It presupposes the presence of actors capable of acting intentionally to achieve their goals and of interpreting their own actions. It represents a fundamental dimension in the definition of the situation, and therefore the dimension of perception: conflict may not have a real basis, and yet may be real in its consequences, as the Thomas theorem shows.

These assumptions will also come in useful when interpreting the specific form of conflict that we are analysing here. In this case it takes the form of the various active expressions of rejection given by a range of social actors in relation to the presence of Islamic places of worship, or their specific form, in a local context and culture.

This kind of conflict produces collective phenomena of recognition and mutual exclusion within a set of shared preconstituted assumptions, mostly of a highly abstract nature, the mere repetition of which takes on the status of a shared empirical truth. In this way are formed the classic 'us/them' dynamics characterizing these types of collective phenomena: different and specific when compared to the alter-ego dynamics taking place in the life of the individual.

In the pages below we will first examine elements external to the conflict, then the actors involved and the social dynamics that they trigger. Finally we will try to learn some lessons from empirical cases.

2.2 Symbolism and territory

Mosques – like any form of construction that is proposed in an area where previously it was not present – constitute a form of symbolic ownership of the land. At the same time, resistance to them becomes a very concrete and material sign of dominance and power over the territory. It is clear, therefore, that the conflict surrounding mosques is, above all, a genuine conflict of power. Several different variables come into play in this sphere: the actors deemed to be legitimate, their

strength, the resistance of social actors already present (their 'culture', as it is often called³⁹), and their respective forms of legitimization and expression of their own beliefs.

A first observation is self-evident: not all buildings, even those that are new in form and function, produce the same kinds of conflict. Rarely does a public or commercial building produce such forms of protest. A new hospital, bank, supermarket or multiplex cinema may be the subject of criticism, but this is rarely expressed in cultural terms. Assessments can be made regarding the appropriateness of its placement, compared to the interests that it may damage (eg a supermarket with reference to the small shops in the surrounding area); or its size and shape (a large building in the context of small-scale housing, a high-rise building in an area of low-rise development); or, again, its aesthetic qualities. But, although frequent, such conflicts rarely induce an identity reflex (and an 'us/them' dynamic) similar to those found with regard to mosques. This dynamic may manifest itself (for example, in a district of new residents in a town, or when people come from cities into rural areas), but only occasionally do such situations produce reflexes of collective identity. Mosques, on the other hand, produce them almost invariably, in mild or radical form, throughout almost all of Europe, at least at this moment in history. In contrast, churches of confessions other than the dominant one in a given country, or synagogues or temples of other religions, do not produce the same type of reaction and rejection (although it would be wrong to say that historically this has not happened in the past). In this sense the 'mosque issue' is real in Europe today.

Some forms of conflict pertaining to mosques could actually be interpreted using the tools of ethology and sociobiology, rather than those of anthropology and sociology, still less those of urban planning. Examples include forms of imprinting on an area, such as the spreading of pig urine, or the placing of pigs' heads or blood in the area where a mosque is due to be built. Cases of this kind have occurred widely, from Sweden to Italy, and are in themselves a phenomenon worthy of study. In the 'No mosques' campaign in Linz, Austria, organized by the Freedom Party of Austria (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, or FPÖ) in collaboration with the neo-Nazi National People's Party (NVP), members of the latter celebrated New Year's Eve 2007 by raising pigs' heads on spikes planted in the ground where the construction of a mosque had been planned.⁴⁰ Pigs' intestines and pieces of pork were launched against the wall of a youth centre for immigrants near the office of the building contractor of the Essalam mosque in Rotterdam. In

³⁹ And not by chance. 'Culture' is linked to 'cult', and both derive from the Latin *colere*, 'to cultivate': the patient job that allows fruits to be produced from the ground.

⁴⁰ Photos are still visible on the NVP site at www.nvp.at/schweine_moschee.

2008 a town councillor in Padua, Italy, a member of the Northern League, joined fellow party members for a stroll with a pig in front of TV cameras, on land where the erection of a mosque had been planned.⁴¹ Earlier, in 2001, the Northern League had sprinkled 'Padanian hog urine' on the site where a mosque was to have been built in the city of Lodi. In addition, one of its leaders and a member of the government, Roberto Calderoli, proposed a 'pig day' to protest against the mosque.⁴² Northern League activists have repeatedly and ostentatiously eaten sausages in front of places of Islamic worship, and militants of *Forza Nuova*, a neo-fascist group, have organized public roast-pork eat-ins at their anti-Islamic and anti-mosque protests. In Sweden pig blood was thrown at the wall of a mosque, and in Malmö a live pig was released into the prayer room of the Islamic centre, while the entrance to the complex was desecrated with chopped-off pigs' heads.⁴³ This case was clearly an expression of contempt, and it is worth mentioning because of the use of primitive proprietary dynamics, of privatization, passing through the logic of sacralization and desacralization of space. If we were discussing relations between animals, we would say it was simply an appropriation of space by means of unpleasant or aggressive signs and smells – claims of exclusivity to the territory and an assertion of aggressive competitiveness towards other possible contenders. On the more general question of mosques, one should note the spread of a vocabulary that refers to contamination, pollution and precautionary measures (used explicitly, with reference to mosques, by various anti-Islamic groups, including the Northern League), as well as the return of the categories of purity and contagion in cultural and political debate. Further reflection is needed here, recalling the historical precedents and allowing the concerns this raises to emerge.

Returning to the symbolism attached to space, it is a fact that architecture is a particularly assertive form of expression, as it is highly visible and therefore

⁴¹ The event can be seen in a documentary that describes the full history of failure to build a mosque in Padua (Dal Lago and Dall'Osto 2009).

⁴² In 2006 Calderoli was forced to resign during the Danish cartoon affair for wearing on TV one of the offending cartoons emblazoned on his T-shirt; he was reappointed as a minister in the following (and current) Berlusconi government.

⁴³ The pig is noted as a *haram* food for Muslims, as it is also for Jews. But it is odd that an animal that after all is not very well regarded even by the natives, to the extent that its name is an insult in all European languages, should be upgraded to a symbol of anti-Islamic protest, ironically almost classifying the protestors themselves. What is more, it is an ineffective symbol of desacralization, since it has no effect on Muslims themselves. At the screening of the documentary mentioned in note 41, the imam of the Islamic community of Padua, who had never witnessed these scenes but only read and commented on them in the media, merely laughed throughout the scene of the alleged desecration. On the other hand, the insult is occasionally used, in a mirror fashion, by Muslim leaders in respect of certain practices considered western and depraved. In the famous television interview granted in 2001, the Moroccan imam of Rotterdam El Moumni, referring to homosexuals, claimed that Europeans were 'worse than pigs'. From a vehement protest against this kind of mentality, expressed in articles, books and speeches, came the great success of Pim Fortuyn and his political movement.

easily shaped to fit in with ideological logic. It has always fuelled discussion. The architectural logic and use of monuments by totalitarian regimes (Nazi, fascist and Soviet, for example) and by fundamentalists (destruction of the religious symbols of others, the last resounding example of which was the Bamyan Buddhas in Afghanistan) is a never-ending story, which over history has involved hundreds of churches and mosques. In secular terms, there is an ideological dimension, albeit less explicit and pronounced, in the progressive replacement in many city centres of symbols of religious or civic power (town halls and cathedrals) with symbols of economic and financial power (banks and shops) or with places of entertainment (cinemas, theatres and bars). Certain forms of planning that require radical intervention in terms of urban redevelopment have a similar ideological dimension.

With regard to mosques, many different factors come into play. From the Islamic side, we should emphasize the role of the great Islamic centres, especially in capital cities, in the definition of symbolic space. Their presence constitutes a contractualized form of 'visibilization', and it is no coincidence that behind many of them a form of pressure and power is exerted, for example by Saudi Arabia, directly or through the Muslim World League (*Rabita al-alam al-islami*). Influence of this kind increased following the oil crisis of 1973, with the gradual acquisition of strength and power by the oil-producing states, and the parallel need to maintain good relations with them by oil-consuming countries, such as those in Europe.⁴⁴ However, other factors may play a part and it is no accident, for instance, that the inauguration of the great mosque in Rome in 1995 – the first mosque in the capital of Christendom – represented a near-realization of the famous *hadith*, which states that first Constantinople will open to Islam, then Rome. The fact was widely quoted at the time and enjoyed exceptional media coverage in Arab countries.

The function of being ostentatious is clearly apparent elsewhere. For example, in Britain we can think of mosques in Bradford and Birmingham that are placed on high ground or in highly visible sites; or the project, which has attracted much criticism, to create a 'mega-mosque' in the London borough of Newham; or the construction of a mosque in the Arab quarter of Albaicin in Granada – a return to the glorious times of Muslim Andalusia, with all its associations; or the small mosque, perfectly useless as there are no Muslims, but crucially located in Gibraltar (the Arabic *Jabal al-Tariq*) on the strip of European land closest to the Muslim coastline, at the point in Europe from which it is easier than anywhere else to look to Islam and hope for its 'return'. Finally, there is a variety of projects,

⁴⁴ This dynamic can be seen in Belgium's recognition of Islam as one of its state religions in 1974, as well as in the granting of permits for Islamic centres in various European capitals, including Rome itself.

often oversized compared to the need they address and not always economically sustainable by their respective community, in almost every European country, from Germany and France to the Netherlands and Italy. Even opponents of the announced and not-yet-built mosque in Athens reasoned that it would have been the first thing that a visitor would see from the plane when arriving in Greece, with its location close to the airport. Visibility is part of the whole in a logic of institutionalization, acceptance and even symbolic integration. The day that such visibility no longer raises any problems will be the day that the integration of Islam in the European public arena is complete.

In Europe, with the exception of Islamic centres in some capital cities and a few others, there is often the symmetrical and contrary logic of 'peripheralization' and marginalization in the suburbs, in degraded areas, or close to areas that are themselves degraded. Examples include encampments of nomads (Padua); municipal recycling centres and dumping grounds (Correggio); abandoned and disused industrial areas (hundreds if not thousands of cases across Europe); and even polluted and contaminated sites (Newham). Conversely, for instance at Bastogne (Belgium) and at Rotterdam (in the case of the Essalam mosque), conflict was caused by the 'presumption' of building the mosque in the centre of town in a residential area (although with rather few Muslim inhabitants).

Sometimes, in contrast, we can observe a sort of visibility paradox, as in the Spanish case. It is not the very visible mosques or the large Islamic centres (such as the Abu Bakr mosque and the so-called M-30 mosque, taking its name from the highway in Madrid that passes close by) that create problems, not least because greater care is taken to avoid sources of conflict and to provide explanations. Rather, the problems come with the small neighbourhood mosques (there are several examples of this kind in Catalonia). We should, however, recognize that historical factors play a large part here. The great mosques belong to an earlier stage, before the great explosion of conflicts surrounding Islam that characterized Europe during the 1990s and even more so after 2001.

A rationale that is often used implicitly by the authorities, and is more often adopted independently by Muslims themselves, aims not so much to solve the problem of visibility and its consequences in terms of predictable conflict but rather to avoid having to face these issues. This is the principle of 'architectural mimicry', which proposes that a mosque is fine as long as it is not too recognizable as such. We will tackle the symbolism of conflicts over minarets more explicitly later, but this tendency can be seen in countless cases of conflict and can lead to decisions to build in a style not too dissimilar to a nearby church, such as the Munich case (de Galembert 1998), or simply to delete the domes, minarets and crescent moons. Another approach is to adopt a 'modern' style of construc-

tion, outside the usual architectural orientalism found in the nostalgia mosques (the so-called *heimweemoskee* in the Dutch debate) so dear to earlier generations, who brought to their adoptive countries the styles of construction typical of their country of origin (eg the round double minaret on the sides of the dome found in Turkish mosques or the square minaret favoured by Moroccans). Still others go strongly in the direction of architectural futurism, a style advocated in particular by second-generation architects (in this regard we should note that architects responsible for 'nostalgia' projects are often natives, who have simply chosen to interpret in this manner desires that their clients have not always clearly expressed). Most often, however, architectural mimicry is manifested not in the construction of a mosque but in the adaptation of existing buildings, where a few modifications may be made to the interior, but none or almost none to the exterior, other than purely functional changes, to the point that sometimes even a visible sign or plaque is absent.

The role of architecture may be important to the acceptance or rejection of the presence of a building. On the one hand, even non-Islamic orientalism has a strong tradition in European architecture. The vice-chairman of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, Salomon Korn, ignited a major controversy with an article in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, in which he pointed out that many synagogues in Germany were built in a 'neo-Islamic' style, including those in Leipzig (1885), Berlin (1866), Nuremberg (1874), Kaiserslautern (1886) and Pforzheim (1893), and that symbols of this architecture should not be considered foreign.⁴⁵ And in Germany many buildings in an Islamic style have been erected purely for aesthetic purposes and designed to perform completely different functions. These range from royal residences to cigarette factories, such as those in Dresden (Beinhauer-Köhler and Leggewie 2009). On the other hand, the tendency to move towards a more western and less Ottoman architectural style, as happened in Cologne, requires that a delicate compromise is reached with the more traditional members of the Islamic community who, when projects lean towards nostalgia, are even more inclined to muster up the resources required (as witnessed in the case of Bad Vöslau in Austria).

A double change is implicit in the projects proposed by architects, especially those of the second generation, but also by non-Muslim Europeans, in search of a new and potentially fruitful market. The first is of a broadly architectural type. In 2003 two students (one a Dutchman of Turkish extraction, the other a Dutch Moroccan – already a sign of innovation, overcoming ethnic and aesthetic barriers), operating under the collective name of Memar, produced

⁴⁵ Similar considerations apply to synagogues, temples and Masonic civic buildings constructed in the style of mosques in the United States (Khalidi 1998).

an alternative scheme for the Essalam mosque in Rotterdam (Maussen 2009): a highly futuristic design with lots of glass, without dome and minaret, which won awards and sparked debate, but clearly had no connection with a potential client. A discussion of architectural styles for mosques in non-Islamic environments is beginning to take place, and there have already been examples, especially in North America.⁴⁶ There is a clear western European, and often secular, expectation for these centres which often (and this is a second change) have different names, not religiously based, such as cultural centres, multipurpose centres and meeting places: attractive, accessible symbols of multiculturalism and openness – not what we might expect from a place of worship of any religious confession.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the dominant functions are also different: often cultural or recreational rather than religious, and architecturally not at all neutral in the message being conveyed. There may, for example, be no separation between men and women – a change that presupposes internal cultural development and not simply an architectural choice; a change that answers more to certain currents of opinion, often secular, in European countries, than to the genuine needs of religious communities (not just Islamic, in the case in point).

These projects, however, attract one major criticism: namely, that the architecture of origin has become a caricature of itself, a 'Disney-like architecture' which reproduces stereotypes and low-quality copies that lack the originality of traditional mosques; and these tend to physically alienate the younger generations, who are more distant from the country of origin, which is no longer theirs. Indeed, the expensive and monumental pastiches with a Saudi feel, such as the King Fahd mosque in Sarajevo and the Mostar Islamic centre, have been compared to alien starships landing from space – not a totally groundless criticism, although the same could be said of much contemporary monumental architecture.

In fact, there is probably a 'before' and an 'after' even in the transposition of this neo-orientalist architecture: a 'before' and an 'after' symbolized in October 2001 by an episode in Rotterdam, when the mayor, inaugurating the Mevlana mosque, spoke in enthusiastic terms of the 'spatial integration of Muslims'. Only two years later, in 2003, the same mayor, opening a major Moroccan mosque with a similar footprint, spoke of a 'lack of respect for our culture' and the risk of 'exotic attraction and architectural kitsch' (Maussen 2009). Between the two dates, in the aftermath of 9/11, lies an entire political-cultural turnaround in the relationship

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⁴⁶ Haider 1990. We would stress, in this connection, the role played by the Aga Khan Awards for Architecture.

⁴⁷ Conversely, the same caution in calling them cultural centres, not religious buildings, is required of local government in order to get projects approved more easily in the eyes of the resident population, or to circumvent specific town planning provisions.

with Islam as a whole, not just with mosques – a turnaround which the Netherlands has experienced more rapidly and more radically than other states.

2.3 Battles over the minaret

Today there is almost no conflict surrounding mosques in Europe that does not include, either primarily or marginally, the question of the minaret, its height, or its very existence. The minaret appears to have become a symbol *par excellence* of the conflict surrounding Islam, or rather of its visibility in the public eye – even more than the *hijab*, for example (Hüttermann 2006). The politics of identity, as manifested in connection with mosques, has ended up confining itself in a repertoire of forms, and paradoxically the minaret has ultimately become ‘a structural metonym of Muslim identity’ – in spite of the fact that there are mosques in Muslim countries with no minaret and that this feature does not belong to the original history of Islam (Avcioglu 2007).

It is not inappropriate to recall here that the minaret, like skyscrapers and the Tower of Babel, is a symbol that rises into the sky, a symbol of power, size and strength. Even without making too much of its obviously phallic aspect – a symbol of domination, which is not alien even to the ethological perspective that we have already introduced – it can be demonstrated historically that towers have always been a sign of power and domination. It is no coincidence that in the long history of medieval Italian municipalities, the victory of a family or a city over another resulted in the destruction of the towers of the defeated family or city. The broken towers found in many cities are still there to testify to this, and even during the war in the former Yugoslavia there was a race to destroy minarets and church towers, in order to establish dominance.⁴⁸ The same degree of competition can still be seen in the present-day race between large companies or between big cities, in particular the new economic and financial powerhouses, to build the highest skyscraper in the world as a visible symbol of power.

Disputes about minarets, therefore, are also, perhaps especially, conflicts of power; they are attempts by Muslims to introduce a symbol with high visibility and with an ostentatious function – at least they are interpreted as such by

⁴⁸ A notable example is the ancient mosque of Ustikolina, in Bosnia. Already set on fire in 1941 by Chetniks from Montenegro, during an assault in which its minaret survived, it was completely destroyed by Chetniks in 1992: its minaret was mined and its remains taken to a dumping ground and covered with garbage. Having waited six years after the end of the war for a government initiative to reconstruct it, the inhabitants took it upon themselves to rebuild a new mosque and minaret on the same site, doubling (illegally) its height from 30 to 60 metres; its symbolic function was obvious, marking the revitalization of a traumatized community and giving a clear signal of territorial dominance. No different, and yet more ostentatious, was the behaviour of the Croats of Mostar, who doubled the tower of the destroyed Franciscan church and built on top of a hill an enormous cross that was visible even at night.

the local population.⁴⁹ As a consequence, a sort of marked 'political visibility' is achieved, which may also include other symbols. In Brescia, for example, the local administration had reservations about the dome and the palm trees in the garden, although eventually its decision concerned only the minaret, which had to stay at the level of the roof ridge of the farm buildings at the site chosen by local Muslims to build their new mosque – a lower height than that allowed for chimneys on private homes (Alberti 2008). Interpretation, indeed, plays a major role. Often for Muslims it is more a question of nostalgia, of doing things as they would 'at home', because, after all, 'a mosque should look like a mosque', as an Islamic exponent in Rotterdam succinctly put it (Maussen 2009). But for non-Muslim residents, it is often a matter of being invaded, almost as if a foreign body had been forced upon them. And the issue does not stop at architecture (where concern is often justified): the residents of all cities have tolerated without any reaction all sorts of foreign bodies, architecturally speaking – residential or administrative buildings, shopping malls or leisure facilities, convention centres or sports infrastructures, churches of the majority confession, even the temples of other religious minorities. Yet the minaret has, or is perceived as having, another meaning: it is an element pointing to Islamic exceptionalism, as already mentioned. This is so much so that, in many cases, the tower has had to be cut down to a height below that of the local cathedral (Cologne's is expected to have a height of 55 metres, compared to the 60 metres of the nearby bell-tower) or of the nearest church (in Pforzheim it was only allowed if it were lower than the local church),⁵⁰ and sometimes the tower has had to be cancelled completely.⁵¹

Often – and this is something that should be stressed, as it shows the extent to which the minaret has a nostalgic function rather than a fundamental identifying purpose – cancellation takes place without any particular reaction from the Muslim community involved. In Rome height limitations had already been agreed to in the planning phase; in Los Bermejales the minaret was reduced by half, without protest; and in Thrace, there is an agreement that the height of minarets is limited to 7.5 metres, though often this is not adhered to. In Driebergen,

⁴⁹ Frequently, in the Dutch and German political debate, for example, when a proposed mosque is announced, anti-Islamic cartoons appear showing mosques and giant Ottoman-style minarets, towering over the landscape and the skyline of the cities involved. A journalist, commenting on a 44-metre minaret of the Kocatepe mosque, compared it to a missile that had just left the factory, saying threateningly to the inhabitants: 'Be careful, we are coming.'

⁵⁰ Even in secular France, IFOP polls show that nearly half of French people want minarets that are lower than church steeples (46 per cent in 1994).

⁵¹ As in Bastogne, Belgium, where until then the Turkish community had remained silent and discreet, but then submitted a proposed mosque with a minaret of 15 metres and later, despite the refusal of the previous administration, another of over 18 metres, with a sort of naive enthusiasm for the Ottoman style. It should be noted that the petition circulated among the citizens of the area was against the minaret and not against the mosque itself; it included the fear that in the future it might host a singing *muezzin*.

in the Netherlands, the minaret of the Moroccan mosque was removed following negotiations with the municipality, at which point the minaret was also taken away from the Turkish mosque, which was being handled by the same town council. This happened even though the leadership of the mosque feared that the decision would lead to protests from the rank and file, as occurred in the case of the right of veto exercised by bishops in Greece, one of whom authorized a 16-metre minaret in the locality of Peleketi, which was then reduced to 12 metres after protests by the local community.⁵² Then there is the case of Telfs in the Tyrol, where the tower was reduced from 20 to 15 metres. And there are many other cases. Sometimes the Muslim community has been content with drawing a minaret on the entrance door, as in the case of the *hinterhofmoschee* at Merkez in Frankfurt and many other non-purpose-built mosques.

In some countries the minaret issue has triggered anti-Islamic legislation. In 2008 Carinthia, one of the Austrian regions with the lowest Islamic presence, was the first to approve (along with Vorarlberg, a region that has a higher percentage of Muslims, nearly double the national average) a law banning minarets. Requests for copies of these regional laws then came from other regions of Austria, from the German-speaking regions of Switzerland (where a referendum on the issue was expected to take place by 2009), and from certain German *Länder* eager to protect the basic collective values of society. Yet it was also in Austria, in 1979, that the Islamic centre of Vienna was inaugurated with its minaret; at Bad Vöslau the inauguration of a mosque with a minaret is planned for the end of 2009; and in Saalfelden, near Salzburg, a minaret has been planned in reduced form. Here, indeed, the project has not encountered opposition, partly because it is located in an industrial area with low population density, which means that it is essentially out of view of people living in residential areas.⁵³

There remains the possibility of incorporating minarets into the existing architecture and the local environment. At Lille in France, the architecture of the two minarets only vaguely resembles real minarets, and a translucent material was used (Ternisien 2002). The construction of the mosque is fully integrated with neighbouring buildings, and the two minarets, small in any case, are reminiscent of the bell towers of a nearby church. A similar approach was taken in Antwerp.

⁵² There are also those who take matters into their own hands. In 1996 at Kimmeria near Xanthi, in an area with a large Islamic population, the archbishop of Damaskinos secured the withdrawal of the planned construction of a mosque, placing himself at the head of a protest demonstration, after discovering that the planned minaret, 18 metres high, would have been higher than the local bell tower (Dalègre 2001).

⁵³ It is significant to note that these anti-minaret laws could quite easily be bypassed, or could place the legislature itself in a contradictory position: if, for example, designers of mosques with a sense of irony designed minarets in the exact form of the nearest Baroque bell tower, in homage to local architectural tradition, or horizontal minarets, perhaps, positioned next to the mosque as a playground.

2.4 The question of the *adhan* (call to prayer)

The *adhan*, or call to prayer, is of course related to the issue of minarets but also affects another important symbolic aspect: that of the 'acoustic space', a form of symbolic communication, which also has its traditions and its forms of dominance. Again, without referring in the strictest sense to ethology, let us just recall its significance in determining relationships, including relationships of power, in the animal world.

The *adhan* is clearly not a disruptive matter, certainly much less so than the mosque itself. It is no coincidence, as we have seen, that in many cases the Muslim communities themselves feel able to forego the minaret without major problems (or to refrain from requesting it, knowing it would create problems), implicitly renouncing all claims to the outdoors call to prayer. In any case, the call to prayer makes sense in an Islamic context, as it relates to a religious duty, but it makes much less sense in a non-Islamic context in which it has no practical significance. Nevertheless, its symbolic value remains unchanged and is perhaps even stronger – as a declaration of existence in the public space, and a recognition thereof, so to speak.

The *adhan* therefore remains largely a ritual practice that is repeated inside the mosque. Of the countries that have undergone Islamic immigration, only the Netherlands has given official recognition to the *adhan* by voting in 1987 for a law that allowed it (the only votes against came from the three small Calvinist parties), essentially granting it a similar status to the sound of church bells. However, the way in which it is carried out, the permitted volume and the number of times (it is not normally allowed for all five daily prayers) is pragmatically regulated by the local authority. In Amsterdam, for example, as in many other places, it is only allowed on a Friday, and in all cases there is a decibel limit that must not be exceeded (Rath, Groenendijk, Penninx and Meyer 1999). People have accepted, or rather suffered, progressive encroachment by noise and the passing of noise thresholds without ever responding, starting with the noise produced by factories and city traffic. But – as in the case of architecture and minarets – when people are faced with a sound that represents another culture, then a reaction rapidly occurs.

The prohibition of the *adhan* outdoors is therefore common to many countries, even if the reasons given for banning it are not always entirely clear or explicit. In the United Kingdom the call to prayer is often permitted subject to restrictions, and much depends on whether it is performed inside or outside an ethnic neighbourhood. For example, in the case of the East London mosque, a very busy district with a strong ethnic character, the decision to grant permission produced protests, among others for reasons of noise – not a credible reason given the context; but thanks to the support of the local Anglican church, it is allowed

twice a day (Eade 1996). In Germany, too, performing the *adhan* is somehow considered a constitutional right and thus worthy of protection. Some documents speak clearly of equal treatment with the sound of bells. A document drawn up by the Federal Office for Foreigners (*Bunderausländerbeauftragte*) in 1997, and another by the German Federation of Cities and Municipalities (*Deutscher Städte und Gemeindebund*), recommended equal treatment on this issue. However, the use of loudspeakers is permitted only if it is essential for the practice of religion. One might say, therefore, that constitutional protection applies to the *adhan* but not to the loudspeakers, and the fact that the issue is not yet resolved is demonstrated by the much-debated dispute in Duisburg in 1997–8.⁵⁴ In countries such as France and Belgium, the request to be able to hear the *adhan* is not even made so as not to create controversy and cause a nuisance. In Austria the *adhan* only takes place at the Islamic centre in Vienna, on Fridays, as in other Islamic centres in major European capitals. In Norway, too, permission is granted once a week, on Fridays, with a limit of 60 decibels. On the other hand, in areas with a large population of Muslims and a long Islamic tradition, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is generally allowed and practised.

Compared with the place of prayer itself, then, clearly the call to prayer is generally less central and less important, and there is less demand and less pressure to have it. It is surrendered fairly easily, and is often not even requested or planned for, as happens among second-generation architects and associations, for example. On the other hand, the *adhan* is often considered to be even more invasive of the public space than the mosque itself, and the construction of the latter is only rarely followed by the granting of the *adhan*. If the principles of religious liberty underpinning European constitutions make it less easy to say no to mosques, refusal to allow the *adhan* is frequent.

2.5 Cemeteries and specific burial areas for Muslims

We do not deal with the question of cemeteries in detail or give specific examples, as they did not feature in the objectives of the project. We will limit ourselves to the observation that the dynamics are often very similar to those relating to mosques.

Muslims from older generations have a tendency, which sometimes persists among subsequent generations, to want the burial of their dead in the country of origin, either because it is still considered the land to which they would like to return, or because they know that there will be a family there able to take care of the matter, or simply because it is considered to be Islamic land. Conversely, the request for specific burial places within existing cemeteries, or in their own

⁵⁴ Some exponents of evangelical churches have declared that the call to prayer is a call against Christianity, developing a broad interpretation of the text of the *adhan* which is not borne out by the text itself.

cemeteries, corresponds to what we might call a form of post-mortem integration: an acceptance that the land of immigration is their home, a permanent home, and, more generally, the home of Islam (*dar al-Islam*).

The question of cemeteries has sometimes produced conflicts and forms of refusal very similar to those created by mosques. Indeed, in some ways they can be even more unpleasant, since, even without invoking principles of religious toleration, there arises a simple question of human *pietas* which has existed throughout human history and across cultures.⁵⁵ It is significant that the acceptance of Muslim cemeteries has sometimes come about as a result of traumatic events that have aroused strong public emotions. For example, in Brussels such acceptance followed the killing of a Turkish boy in 1996 and a Moroccan girl in 1997 – cases that were highly visible in the media – after immigrant families had expressed their sorrow at having to return to their country of origin with the bodies of their children (Lambert 2000).

In some cases there are problems related to the specific forms of Islamic burial and their compatibility with the rules regulating police mortuaries in different countries, but where such problems exist and are addressed, they are easily resolved on a pragmatic basis, with reciprocal concessions or with straightforward adaptation to local customs. In practice the most widely discussed issues are: the lateral position of the deceased person, with eyes turned towards Mecca, and hence the design of the cemetery or area provided for burial; the presence or absence of a coffin (which, however, is now accepted in all cases by Muslims); the duration of the burial; and the speed with which burial follows death. Often a critical factor is the presence in local government of anti-Islamic political groups, whose approach to an Islamic cemetery may not be an explicit refusal, but takes the form of a bureaucratic slowdown, a request for further clarification, and other forms of 'bureaucratic bullying'.

⁵⁵ One thinks of the biblical episode of the death of Sarah, wife of Abraham, who died in Canaan, in a foreign land, and was offered the best sepulchre available (Genesis 23).

3 Players on the move in the public arena

3.1 Mosques as a visible dimension

Mosques represent a way for Islam to exit the private sphere and to officially enter the public sphere, in which it becomes qualified as an interlocutor with society and institutions. Moreover, mosques and prayer halls all provide evidence of specific dynamics, linked to the dynamics of immigration, and these have many facets. First, mosques are often the only form of association in a territory. Sometimes they show a higher level of religious practice in emigration contexts (Metcalf 1996). Mosques are a good barometer of the level of organization of the various ethnic and religious communities. They are also an element of growth – often set within conflictual dynamics – of the Islamic leadership, or sometimes a demonstration of its immaturity: the clashes between competing leaders have often impeded and sometimes even prevented the establishment of mosques, notwithstanding the occasional goodwill shown by some municipalities. Sometimes the demand for a mosque ends up being only or primarily intended to lend visibility to those who promoted it. Finally, mosques are a factor that measures the ability of Islam to grasp the opportunities presented by the new context, and to transform it and give it an Islamic slant.

It is interesting to note, from a European perspective, that even some obviously non-Islamic local authorities are beginning to view the presence of mosques as a sign of cultural openness and 'globalization'. In Rotterdam and other Dutch cities, new mosques have begun to be used as attractive tourist spots and as evocative images (Maussen 2009). In Barcelona in 1994 the chairman of the tourism consortium stated that the city needed a casino and a mosque to

attract more visitors (Moreras 2000). Athens also raised the issue of a mosque in connection with the Olympic Games (Dokos and Antoniou 2002), although in practice nothing was done at the time. In other big cities, an announcement that the city should have a large mosque recurs cyclically; such statements are not necessarily followed up by actions and decisions (such was the case of Milan, for example), but are made in order to demonstrate that the city concerned is on the same level as other major European cities.

It must be stressed, however, that the situation is different for small local neighbourhood mosques, those that in the French debate are called *mosquées de proximité*, and for large mosques, *mosquées cathédrales*, which play a symbolic, cultural and even diplomatic role, visited by important foreign guests, trade delegations, institutional representatives and ambassadors. They may actually offer an open and hospitable image of a city – a symbol of integration and openness of the local context to global horizons, including opportunities to promote cultural activities, exhibitions, debates, interfaith meetings and collective ceremonies. They can play a symbolic and 'exemplary' role: providing internal guidance within Muslim communities; hosting the signing of symbolic acts; accommodating meetings between representatives of various groups and associations; holding training courses for imams; and so forth. Mosques may also become the subject of architectural competitions, conferences, exhibitions and art events.⁵⁶

The dimension of the public space, or public arena, and the presence of mosques within it are therefore key points in the analysis and interpretation of the conflicts that have affected them. Several issues deserve at least to be mentioned, including associations and their strength and organizational capacity (the capacity of Islamic associations to organize themselves); forms of interaction and networks (relationships with other social, religious and political associations and institutions); ways of raising the visibility of the issue (the role of the media and their use by various authors); and, finally, institutional channels (relationships with local, regional and national authorities, their disposition and the influence of a range of political actors on their decision-making).

The aspects outlined above are the main ones in which conflicts surrounding mosques in Europe are manifested. We will deal with them by analysing in detail the different social actors that enter the fray in the public arena, bearing in mind, as a premise, that we are almost never dealing simply with local actors. Today, in a context of globalization, availability and dissemination of information without or beyond borders, and transnational immigration trends, we can say that there is no longer anything that is strictly local. In any situation, as is shown by the

⁵⁶ For example, the design of the 'wearable mosque', presented on several occasions, described in Akšamija 2005.

way the same set of dynamics, symbols and slogans crop up time and again, it is the global dimension that influences and acts on the local dimension, producing that well-known phenomenon which, with a choice of terminology that adds little in terms of content, is usually called 'glocal'. Here we analyse the various actors involved.

3.2 Islamic actors and intra-Muslim dynamics

A first problem arises in defining the status of Muslim actors. This status indeed overlaps with the condition of the immigrant and, in most countries, the condition of the non-citizen. The notable exceptions to this are the majority of Muslims in the United Kingdom, France and (partly) Belgium; to a lesser extent, Scandinavian countries, particularly with regard to the second generation that was born in the country; and, of course, Bosnia and Muslims living in Thrace. It follows that Muslims are often considered to be (already at the level of principles and citizenship) not only recent players, but also incomplete rights holders, or at least not on a par with the natives and their religions. They may even be considered illegitimate and invasive, and therefore people who can be treated differently, discretionally and perhaps – in the absence of protection and a shared constitutional frame of reference – even in a discriminatory manner.

Even when principles are not involved because equal treatment is guaranteed by the constitution or by law, the relatively recent arrival of Muslims means that certain rules are not yet applicable to them, that regulations are not being willingly implemented, or simply that an understandable but problematic bureaucratic inertia still prevails, based more on cultural and social aspects (and of course on political choices) than strictly legislative ones. That there is an obvious delay in taking into account, often grudgingly, the religious needs of Muslims, even when these are legitimate and recognized, can be seen in many, perhaps nearly all, cases: in the specific legislation of many countries, including that covering mosques, from the Spanish *Acuerdo* to the Belgian laws on the teaching of religion, the recognition of Islamic schools in the United Kingdom, and the French laws on the *hijab*. This also has obvious consequences on a cultural level, with significant implications of both a religious and a political nature, and is seriously hampering the widespread acceptance of Islam as a fully legitimate co-tenant within the religious landscape and institutions of a range of countries. Such dilatoriness also encourages the tendency to consider Islam to be a case of exceptionalism. In Italy, for example, with regard to mosques, it has led the Northern League to blatantly propose a draft law imposing a moratorium on mosques that in effect means an indefinite suspension, neither principled nor legitimate, of the religious rights of Muslim minorities. But it must be added that these delays

and difficulties also have a purely practical explanation: time is an important and greatly underestimated factor in cultural and social dynamics.

The inevitable dynamics of intra-Muslim conflict reflect the diversity within the Islamic world itself: Sunnis and Shiites; the groups considered as herodoxies, such as the Ahmadiyya and the Alevites; the *tariqat* and Sufi brotherhoods, along with the various ethnic, linguistic, religious and political sub-groupings. Then there are the specific characteristics of transnational Islamic movements, which tend to found their own mosques, and sometimes there are tensions between Muslim immigrants and converts. An interesting case is Bosnia, where the organizational strength and financial clout of Arab donors has led to conflicts with local Muslims. Doctrinal conflicts between local Muslims of the Hanafi tradition and the Vehabije (Wahabites) and their proselytizing, which in fact, through Koranic schools, training abroad and personal economic incentives (according to rumours for which, however, there is no empirical evidence), have created a sphere of influence that ultimately reaches out well beyond the architectural design of mosques, touching also codes of conduct (eg the introduction of the *hijab* and even the *niqab*, alien to local traditions; traditional robes and long beards for men; stricter separation between the sexes). Sometimes these clashes have become physical, and in some cases the Vehabije have also appropriated mosques in a physical sense, by sleeping in them. At Grnje Petrovice, the Wahabites were evicted after the local Muslims reclaimed their mosque. And in Rotterdam the leadership of the Essalam mosque won a court order in 2007 to prevent its critics from entering.

More often the conflict is between large and small organizations that are competing for the leadership and possible the monopoly of the institutional representation of Islam. The French case is typical, with a conflict between 'loyalists' linked to the Paris mosque and other Islamic associations and independent Islamic actors (for example, in the case of the mosque in Marseilles). In Spain the quarrel is between the various associations representing Islam that signed the *Acuerdo* of 1992. In Italy the main conflict is between a small organization called 'Coreis', who are converts of a Sufi tendency (they are exclusively Italian, with no ties to the world of immigration, a good intellectual level, and excellent contacts within the political system and the media), and the main federation of associations, UCOII, the *Unione delle Comunità ed organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia*, which controls a large number of mosques.⁵⁷ In all these cases and others, the game of manipulation carried out by politicians is quite evident: they choose their 'own' Muslim body of reference and support them at the expense of others, who

⁵⁷ In almost every mosque project in which the UCOII is involved (in Bologna, Genoa, Milan and elsewhere), Coreis comes forward to delegitimize it – almost parasitizing it and presenting itself as an alternative and replacement.

are often more representative but considered less docile and controllable. This represents a level of intervention in the internal affairs of a religious confession that has illustrious historical precedents in Europe (emperors used to convene the councils and oversee them), but that today has no parallel. In no other religion is the level of involvement and interference in its internal affairs comparable to that which is taking place in the case of Islam. Once again, it is a sign of the exceptionalism that affects practices relating to relations with the Islamic religion and sometimes their legislative foundations.⁵⁸

The issue of funding is often an element of conflict of prime importance. The design of a mosque or even the purchase of a prayer room calls for a large amount of resources. Where there are large organizations and federations behind the enterprise (for example, the DITIB and the Turkish IGMG, or even some important local *waqf* enjoying cordial relations with external donors), there are fewer problems concerning guarantees for property loans and generally ensuring continuity of funding for the operation, its management, the salary of the imam, assistants and the like. The people who are able to construct relationships with the outside are holders of a position, and at the same time managers with important responsibilities. Often, the organizational level is still modest, and much of the collection and management of cash are based on relationships of trust between individuals. All this leads to the occurrence of internal conflicts, prompted by a lack of confidence in those holding financial responsibility; more or less explicit accusations of embezzlement are levelled against them, and in some cases complaints are brought to the press and even to the authorities. When the money comes from the state or from municipalities, lenders demand to have a person of trust, even though this person often may not inspire much confidence in the community itself. Here again, we might mention the French case, in Marseilles, Montpellier and Strasbourg, where there were splits between 'loyalists' and those we might call 'localists', people of trust within the local community (Ternisien 2002).

There have been cases, however, where shortage of funds has forced local institutions to promote or act as guarantor for mosque projects. In Lleida in Spain it was proposed that the community, which was going through a financial crisis, should equip itself with a prefabricated building, not included in the initial project, and they were encouraged to go some way in the direction originally

⁵⁸ The French case was probably the most striking and paradoxical, given the logic of strict separation between state and religious confessions, which should, in theory at least, characterize Republican ideology and practice. But we find examples in many other situations where local or national governments try to choose their 'good' or 'non-aligned' Muslims. The same attitude is to be seen in a number of countries (Germany, the Netherlands, less strongly in Belgium and elsewhere) concerning Turkish populations, where the governmental DITIB is preferred to the IGMG, which is independent from the Turkish state (these two large federations control Turkish Islam; the first is related to the Government Office for Religious Affairs, the second to the opposition which, at the time, brought to power the moderate Islamist party *Refah Partisi*).

envisaged. In Munich-Sendlingen, by contrast, despite the support of the mayor and the institutions, the mosque was not built, officially because of a lack of funds, but unofficially because, given the demands for sermons in German and the need to engage in interfaith dialogue, the mosque was seen by Muslims as being too 'open'. The insistence on producing from above an agreement between groups and associations is unpopular and does not generally lead to lasting results. If, however, the lender is external (the Muslim World League or *Rabita*, individual donors from the Gulf, or countries directly involved in managing and controlling their diasporas, such as Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia), divisions between supporters and opponents of the respective regimes are the first to emerge. The case of Malmö testifies instead to the dangers of over-ambition, though it is not the only such case. Conceived in the 1970s as a project for the largest Islamic centre in Europe, it was reduced to more modest proportions after funding had initially been requested from both Saudi Arabia's *Rabita* and the Libyan *Da'wa Islamiyya*. The two rival organizations were not informed of the other's involvement, however, with the result that part of the funding and support was withdrawn (Alwall 1998).

When the mosque is planned by a specific religious group (*Tabligh* or *Barelwi*, for example), the mechanism is clearer, and the problem in this case, if at all, is the relationship with the local community, into which a structure that does not belong to the same group seeks to insert itself. Finally, often there is conflict due to the problem of representation in relations with institutions, where the various Islamic centres in a city may wish to seek primacy at the expense of others (planning the construction of a purpose-built mosque in an area where there are only prayer halls). Unavoidably, the mosque project takes on an even more representative role and status, and ends up as a sort of unasked-for representation of the needs of other communities.

An increasingly important intra-Muslim dynamic is the confrontation between generations. Conflicts may relate partly to the aesthetic aspects of a new mosque, where disagreement may centre on traditional elements, but mainly to its role and relationship with their countries of origin. Young people, not just young designers, seem less concerned with the presence or absence of the minaret, which for them is not part of their Islamic landscape, since they were born or have grown up in Europe. At Bad Vöslau, for example, there was no problem giving up the minaret. In Marseilles young imams have founded the CAMM (*Collectif des associations musulmanes*) to counter the CIME (*Conseil des imams de Marseilles et des environs*), which is run by the older and 'quieter' residents, who focus exclusively on religious issues. The conflict between these two groups has long prevented the development of the mosque project in Marseilles, even though it enjoys majority support among the local population following decades

of discussions. Often different, too, is the way the mosque is considered: its functions (more closed or more open to citizens), for instance, and the allocation of space (for cultural activities, library, meeting rooms open to a non-Muslim public, etc). In the case of the Kocatepe mosque in Rotterdam, younger leaders have become active, tending to favour a multicultural model. With the new management committee run by representatives of the previous generation, the emphasis has returned to the classical Turkish religious infrastructure, resulting in a significant deterioration in relations with residents (Maussen 2009).

In terms of conflict dynamics, an important role is played by so-called 'free riders', who are often secular Muslims. Sometimes they side with opponents of the mosque, sometimes they put themselves forward or are proposed by local powers-that-be as alternative leaders or members of groups managing the mosques. This is a practice that would easily be proved nonsensical if it were applied to the majority confession of a country: it would be unthinkable, for instance, for a political power to seek to impose a secular intellectual, journalist, critic, entrepreneur or non-practising agnostic professor to the management body of a local church. Yet it happens in some local Muslim contexts and is strongly supported by both the media and politicians. Such people may include rich businessmen or people with family connections, possibly with rich donors from the countries of origin. Often they produce mega-architectural designs which are much talked about but which bypass the 'real' Muslim community and rarely come to pass. Examples include the rich halal meat businessman in Marseilles who planned a mega-mosque with minarets 50 metres high, hammam steam baths, a cinema, fountains, restaurants and housing covering an area of 12 hectares (the local imam said he simply wanted a place to pray in, not a museum); and the Islamic University of Casamassima, near Bari in Italy, which was designed and built by a hotelier-entrepreneur and convert, the self-proclaimed Sufi Emir of Bari, who spent a fortune of his own money before the project failed and he had been overwhelmed by debt. Smaller but similar is the project presented for Arnhem – a small-scale Taj Mahal, with six minarets, swimming pool, Islamic slaughterhouse and playground. Such dreams abound in Europe, to the joy of architects and to the disappointment of Muslims. These cases are a demonstration that the silent majority is far less listened to than the noisy minority – although this is not specific to Islam.

There are, however, positive intra-Muslim dynamics, eg where groups of Muslims from the same country come together to find larger and more dignified premises (such as the Essalam mosque in Rotterdam), or where opposition to Muslims as immigrants has been overcome by placing converts (and hence native citizens) among their leaders or as spokesmen. A case in point was at

Montreuil-sous-Bois in Paris, and there have been several examples in Italy (Imarraïne 1999).

3.3 Intra- and inter-ethnic division

A typical case of intra-ethnic conflict is found among the Muslims of Turkish origin in Germany. In this instance, they are torn between obedience to the Diyanet government institution (DITIB), the Milli Görüs (IGMG) militancy, considered Islamist, and the third federation VIKZ (*Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren*), linked to the Suleymanci movement. Then there are the Nurcu groups and the Alevites, not to mention the religious extremism of the Kaplanci and the Grey Wolves, and the ethnic-political-linguistic division with the Kurds. While the Turkish case is the best known because of its numerical relevance and complexity, there are many similar situations that show the level of pluralism in many Islamic communities in Europe, which also has a significant effect on the distribution and probably the actual number of mosques.⁵⁹ Forms of linguistic diversity, religious and ethnic dissension, political separation (particularly of pro- and anti-government groups in their respective countries, but in general with the importing of divisions that already exist in the various states, and, sometimes, a few more, the 'religious market' being much freer than in their countries of origin, and through which they are able to exert influence, with important feedback effects⁶⁰) are played out in Europe and find a fertile ground for growth.

The Moroccan case also shows such divisions. But more generally, for most Arab countries (though not only for them), Europe, and more generally the diaspora, are opportunities to make known their political-religious identity, which may be prohibited, illegal or otherwise suppressed in their countries of origin. Each has found a way to get his own mosque. Much the same applies to transnational organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the various Salafist and neo-Salafist movements, piety and Sufi movements, and so forth.

Rivalry may also occur between ethnic groups, not just within them. Forms of competition among Moroccan and Turkish associations in the Netherlands are well publicized. One example was the two major mosque projects planned for Rotterdam in 1975 and discussed in the following years, which could not be

⁵⁹ But it also has negative side effects, when the Federal logic imposes itself on that of the location in question. The case of Bastogne in Belgium shows that the intervention of DITIB has created a greater distance between the local population and the Turkish Islamic community, which was previously perceived as less alien.

⁶⁰ On this issue many cases might be cited: the Kurdish nationalist identity, for example, which in many ways was invented in Germany and other countries inhabited by the diaspora; the strengthening of the Ahmadiyya, blocked and repressed in their home countries; and the training of managers and the transfer of funds from Germany to Turkey, which were so important in the development of *Refah Partisi*, which became the most significant and in some respects the most surprising political-religious element in Turkey. For examples, see Allievi and Nielsen 2003.

completed because of conflicts and divisions both among the Turks and between Turks and Moroccans, with each community preferring small neighbourhood mosques.

There may also be different ways of acting in the public arena, even in similar contexts. In many Italian cities, for example, the increased visibility of Arabic Islam can be compared with the lower profile adopted by the Pakistani community or by communities from Africa such as the Senegalese.⁶¹ Similar examples, perhaps with the roles reversed, can be found elsewhere. In Germany, for instance, it is the Turkish community that demonstrates its propensity for visibility and its ability to express itself more forcefully. In the UK the dominant communities are more visible, mostly Indo-Pakistani in ethnic neighbourhoods and Arab in some areas of London.

Belonging to an ethnic community is not just a first-generation phenomenon, as was rather naively assumed about the supposedly inevitable integration of young people, especially in French-speaking parts of the world. In reality these processes entail very long periods of inertia, involving – albeit to a lesser extent – the second generation, and even the third, as can be clearly seen in Belgium, or among the Turkish population in Germany, where rates of endogamy and use of the language of origin are sometimes surprisingly high. This phenomenon appears to be getting stronger, as a result of satellite transnationalism, the availability of satellite TV from countries of origin, the internet, and more frequent trips to one's parents' country of origin.⁶²

Sometimes the intervention of local authorities causes intra-ethnic conflicts, which require representatives from each community. In Roubaix in France, tension increased with the inclusion of a group of Algerian *rapatriées* as partners, alongside other Muslims, in planning for a new mosque. In Genoa and elsewhere in Italy, however, mosques have been obliged to move in the opposite direction and to dissociate themselves from their federation membership, in this case the UCOII, which is not trusted by the state.

Nevertheless, there are also forms of inter-ethnic cooperation, sometimes because the groups concerned come under the umbrella of a single Sufi movement. This occurred in the Netherlands, for example, between the Pakistani and Surinamese communities, which are both *Barelwi*.

⁶¹ In Brescia, for example, the Arab community has adopted a policy of visibility for its mosque, including the exterior, while the Pakistani community has chosen a low profile for its mosque plans, aiming for as little visibility as possible.

⁶² In this I refer to the chapter on the media that I wrote for Maréchal, Allievi, Dassetto and Nielsen 2003, and Allievi and Nielsen 2003, already cited.

3.4 Social actors: citizens

Conflicts concerning mosques always involve people in the surrounding areas, either directly (public protests, demonstrations, collection of signatures, petitions, local committees) or indirectly (political groups and the media, acting or professing to act on behalf of local citizens).

Citizens' reasons for protesting can be attributed to the following:

- 'real' or supposedly real reasons, such as: a fall in the value of property; fear of increased traffic; parking problems; loss of peace and quiet; fear of increased crime and greater numbers of unwelcome persons; fear of violence, incidents and Islamic fundamentalism; fear of invasion of public spaces (courtyards, pavements, parks, playgrounds) on Fridays and other Islamic holidays; other social priorities in the area;
- 'cultural' reasons: foreignness of Islam to 'our' culture; defence of women's rights; reciprocity; 'non-integrability' and/or incompatibility of Islam with western/ European/Christian values.

While reasons of the first kind may be (but are often not) empirically based, and as such may be constructed discursively, those of the second kind serve only to justify a *Kulturkampf* whose objective is no longer the mosque as such – which becomes a symbol to be targeted – but Islam itself, as a different and foreign religion, 'alien' and incompatible with democracy, the West, liberalism, Christianity or 'our traditions', according to the context.

Of course, the two sets of reasons often overlap and reinforce each other. A recent piece of empirical research (Allievi 2009) placed the issue of the possible building of a mosque in an abandoned public building on the agenda of a 'guided conflictuality group' (a kind of focus group, but uneven in its makeup, including Muslims holding different positions as well as non-Muslims of various cultural and political persuasions). The group was unaware that the issue would be raised in order that their immediate reactions could be assessed. The research showed very clearly how the dynamics that are thus created mix the two type of issues without distinction, but that there is a greater willingness, which extends beyond the political divide, to address the concrete ones. It is therefore useful to keep the two sets conceptually separate, because one can give an empirical answer at a local level to the first set of issues, while the second set requires more time and goodwill to solve the profound problems of acceptance and reciprocal understanding – where these are truly at stake and where the group actually seeks to solve them (both conditions are not always met in practice).

First of all, the fact is that opposition to Islam has been growing stronger as a result of the traumatic events of recent years, including (among others): 9/11

and domestic events in various countries, such as the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London; the assassination of Theo van Gogh; the Danish cartoons affair; the turmoil related to the *hijab*; and debates on the issues of gender and paternal authoritarianism (forced marriages, sensational cases of honour killings, etc). All this has certainly had an influence on the debate, but probably does not fully explain it. It cannot be excluded a priori that opposition to Islam is also the result of a thoughtful evaluation of the effects of cohabitation – with Islam in general and mosques in particular – in different countries. When, however, citizens have chosen to act independently, through more or less spontaneous committees, they have done so merely to address the specific case affecting them – not the question of mosques in general; and they have mobilized not only through the collection of signatures and petitions,⁶³ but also by organizing sit-ins and protest demonstrations, putting banners on balconies, etc.

All this has led local authorities to seek to engage citizens, often according them (and the authorities themselves) an unusual and abnormal role – one that involves interfering with the free internal organizational activities of associations. In fact, in cases of conflict involving Islam, both people and the authorities feel entitled to interfere heavily in the internal affairs of Muslim communities, taking positions not only on urban planning and architectural issues (eg location and the presence or absence of external signs such as minarets), but also on organizational aspects (type of board, language, modes of prayer or the call to prayer, separate entrances and facilities for women, etc).

One cause of conflict, always mentioned and assumed though never really verified, is the decline in home property values. This is another ground applied selectively only to Islam. The issue is normally raised only in exceptional cases of pollution or disturbance in neighbourhoods, but not (except in the case of mosques) in relation to religious meeting places. Moreover, this reasoning can be used by residents in their claims addressed to the public administration, as occurred in Driebergen in the Netherlands, where residents requested compensation for the alleged loss in value of buildings. In this way citizen pressure may be used by municipal authorities as a threat or a preventive measure – as a means to convince Muslims not to ask for too much in terms of visibility and space. In the Spanish city of Mataró, protests began with an alleged decline in the market value of houses, an increase in crime, and claims of other social priorities in

⁶³ Petitions sometimes begin life as local ones but become national, especially if taken up by Islamophobic political actors. The collection of signatures organized by the British National Party against the so-called Newham mega-mosque (a local case, therefore) reached 255,000 signatures at a national level on its website. In the United Kingdom, however, the collection of signatures in favour of mosques is also starting. Such initiatives are of course possible and effective if the Muslims are also citizens, and thus in full possession of their political rights, with their own power to influence, especially where they are strongly concentrated.

the area. Signatures were collected, and the mosque ended up being located on the periphery of the city, no longer within the urban context, as is the practice in Catalonia. This kind of argument is raised with great frequency, sometimes in run-down areas where it is not remotely justifiable and where other factors are responsible for the decline in property values.

Genuine fears of increased traffic and parking problems are matters of a practical and technical nature that do not require explanation or analysis in cultural terms. Such concerns should be addressed during the planning phase.

More difficult to address is the fear of increased crime, which in reality is related not to the presence of mosques, which typically issue ethical messages encouraging observance of the law, but to the economic activity that can be created around mosques, such as halal butchers, phone centres and late-opening ethnic shops. Though this does not necessarily produce greater uncertainty (indeed, the contrary may well be demonstrated empirically), it certainly changes the appearance and usage of a neighbourhood. In some Dutch cases, the point of departure was a totally idealized collective representation of the neighbourhood 'as it once was' and of its community life. This nostalgic representation (a mirror image of the 'mosque nostalgia' of first-generation immigrants) helps in the construction of a victim's viewpoint, much used in these conflicts: 'we locals, long-term residents, are being thrown out of our own neighbourhood'; and it is understood that the new 'invaders' are not 'of our ilk': they are 'others', foreigners who have different values. In one case there were complaints about the risk of not being able to walk dogs any more because of the respect due to the mosque (dogs are considered unclean in Islam). Distorted representations of deviant sexual behaviour have also been invoked. In Rotterdam, during an evening information meeting for residents on a proposed mosque, the fear was even raised that someone would climb the minaret to watch women sunbathing in the internal part of a nearby apartment complex (Maussen 2009).

Another issue, often totally unrealistic, is the alleged existence of other social needs in the district. It may be claimed that public green space is being reduced, or that there is loss of space for parking or for other purposes, even when it is not true, as in the case of Sarajevo and many others. In some situations, the conflict concerns a school or some other public building that the locals wanted for another social purpose. In the Dutch city of Deventer, conflict over the reuse of an old neighbourhood swimming pool arose between a kindergarten, which was supported by local people, and a mosque, supported by the municipality; the case ended in 2003 with the inauguration of the mosque (Landman and

Wessels 2005).⁶⁴ In Padua in Italy, the argument was that it would be fairer to allocate space for a nursery for local inhabitants – in a neighbourhood where, except for a Roma camp, there were no residents, let alone children, because the area was devoted to industrial and tertiary-sector use. In any case it is clear that these arguments, which are very widespread, are not based on real problems but are rhetorical, designed to exploit the idea of victimhood to suggest that it is unfair to take spaces from long-term residents and grant them to newcomers, who are perceived as invaders. After all, it is always possible to claim that something more should be done for the elderly, the sick, children, families, sports, culture, social services or health.

There are, however, cases in which local residents have supported mosques. The best-known case is that of Cologne, a city in which 12 per cent of the population is Muslim, where two out of three people are said to be in favour of a mosque planned in an area where the Muslim population is 35 per cent. In this case the public authority and the mayor himself have supported the project to such an extent that ordinary citizens – from hoteliers to taxi-drivers – boycotted a conference against the Islamization of Europe launched in 2008 by a number of Islamophobic and xenophobic movements of the extreme right.

In the event of a conflict, it is very likely that opinions on practical reasons against a mosque intertwine with 'non-local' cultural motives focusing on Islam as such, especially when so-called 'political entrepreneurs of Islamophobia' take part and there is an increase in the role and influence of the media. It is interesting to note, however, that in northern Europe, where it is easier to lobby the authorities with personal letters and emails and at meetings, and where it is more usual to talk to residents about the decisions that affect them, it is more likely that protests are immediate and direct and occur at the level of ordinary citizens, possibly organized into committees. At this level, there is no need, and the need is not felt, for action by political entrepreneurs of Islamophobia, who distort the reasons for the protest, to act as a catalyst to put the spotlight on the argument. Again, such fears are always attributable locally to various rumours: fundamentalist activism, individual cases of gender oppression, links with extremism, political persecution of Christians in countries of origin, etc. Thus the question of reciprocity is becoming a popular topic (a survey by the Allensbach Institute in 2006 showed that 56 per cent of Germans were in favour of a ban on the building of mosques,

⁶⁴ A special case of disagreement over different uses took place in 1986 in the Dutch city of Zwolle, where a Surinamese mosque was housed in an unused public school, which the city council had made available as a headquarters to a homosexual association. Muslims called for its expulsion, thereby opening a conflict on possible forms of discrimination among minorities. For practical reasons, the conflict was resolved by giving the two groups two different headquarters (Jansen 1992). It is probable, after the Pim Fortuyn case and statements by certain Dutch imams on homosexuality which have created national controversy, that the solution today would have been different.

as there is discrimination against churches in Muslim countries). Fear of fundamentalism, as well as anti-Islamic racism, can turn into fear of becoming accidental victims of an attack by or against Muslims; the impression of being on the defensive, or at least feeling on the defensive, is very widespread.

3.5 Political, bureaucratic and judicial actors

As we have seen, political actors play a key role. Among them we can identify:

- the political-bureaucratic actors responsible for the red tape relating to mosques (local government and related bodies);
- local political parties;
- external political parties;
- the various levels of justice (sentences and rulings of administrative courts) that can interfere with political decisions and the progress of events.

In the local context various factors are involved. First of all, national events play a part, including legislative and political changes and attitudes towards Islam. An important element locally is the existence of a cooperative approach to Islam or, alternatively, a conflictual one. The pragmatic attitude noted in the case of Belgium, where local authorities have the power to decide, or the sympathetic and understanding behaviour of many municipalities in the Netherlands, which was characteristic of the 1980s and 1990s, have clearly allowed a more dynamic and peaceful management of the files on mosques. The Ethnic Minority Policy drafted in Rotterdam, for example, based on the principle of 'integration with retention of cultural identity' in which both discrimination and assimilation are avoided, is a point of reference that has long marked local policy on mosques.

There have been other cases in which cities have pushed for the construction of mosques. In Marseilles in 1989, the new mayor supported a major *mosquée cathédrale* project. In Västerås, the site – originally a Pentecostal church which had been turned into a theatre – was the first case in Sweden of a church being transformed into a mosque. It was offered by the local authorities, practically without any political opposition, for a price of about \$200,000, which was paid in 1994; according to some estimates, a realistic price for the rather rundown premises would have been about half that figure (Alwall 1998). In Bobigny in Paris, the authorities decided in 2003 in favour of a major project costing €5 million, which is still blocked because of the inability of the Islamic association to manage the project. In Turin in recent years the city has provided spaces for religious communities, with an implicit emphasis on Islam, even though tenders are open to all.

More often today, however – and there are countless examples – it is the opposite policy that prevails: the municipality raises difficulties and obstacles rather than acting as a promoter of Islamic places of worship. In Athens, Muslims are considering an appeal to the European Court of Human Rights if, by 2009, there is no progress in their application to obtain a mosque, a project that dates back to 1971; it received a significant boost in 2000, in the run-up to the 2004 Olympics, but despite the fact that it has been authorized by law, the project is still up in the air, partly as a result of strong opposition from the local Orthodox church. Particularly significant is the Italian situation, especially in the north of the country where the Northern League is active and has waged a long-term anti-Islamic campaign which has gradually gained in importance in its policies opposing mosques. Situations of serious conflict are beginning to emerge in Spain, where at Premià de Mar, after a conflict (the first of its kind in Catalonia) that lasted from 2002 to 2004, the final outcome was failure to build the mosque. Elsewhere, as in Bastogne in Belgium, the local authorities may declare themselves 'agnostic', neither for nor against the mosque or the minaret, but they tend to follow the lead of the mobilized population, in accordance with the well-known saying of the 19th-century French politician Alexandre-Auguste Ledru-Rollin: '*Puisque je suis leur chef, il faut bien que je les suive . . .*' ('Since I am their leader, it would be better if I follow them . . .').

Policies may also take shape as part of an exchange in an election game. Such was the case in the Netherlands in 1986, when a commitment to work on the issue of mosques was offered in return for the imams getting Turkish communities to vote in the municipal elections, the first in which the vote for non-citizens was introduced at a local level. Political exchanges have also taken place in Belgium: at Schaerbeek, where 13 mosques were regularized just before the local elections (Manço and Kanmaz 2005), and in Wallonia, where 44 mosques were recognized by the socialists a few weeks before the federal elections of 2007. Such deals are also typical of English ethnic neighbourhoods, such as Bradford, with its 44 mosques for 75,000 Pakistanis (McLoughlin 2005), and some neighbourhoods of Birmingham or London, where the bulk of the local population is of Indo-Pakistani origin, but the fact that they are citizens and can vote means that conflicts are resolved, usually without too much difficulty – a sign that where there is a Muslim vote, it can make its presence felt and assist in negotiating cultural and religious space. But such attitudes – the products of social and political contingencies that have their own history and trends – are subject to whim and therefore reversible. So it is in the Netherlands, where there is probably a pre- and post-Pim Fortuyn situation; in the United Kingdom, before and after the attacks of 7 July 2005; in

Denmark, before and after the Danish cartoons affair; and perhaps for everyone, before and after 11 September 2001.

When negotiating with Islamic communities, many municipalities set, or impose, conditions that may be questionable. Products of the exceptionalism that has already been noted, these range from a certain institutional *droit de regard* to the inclusion in the community council of other national communities (in the French case, *harkis* and *rapatriées* from Algeria), or simply of individuals trusted by the municipality. Quite often the consequences have been negative. Such practices produce forms of instrumentalization that in various local environments, and in some countries even at a national level, have created the 'trusted Muslims' of the various political parties, who are often not very representative of the communities from which they come or are not supported by them. This can also lead to a discharge of responsibility, and in any case shows the complexity of the dynamics and the actors involved in the game: as one Islamic leader said in connection with the case of a French mosque, 'those who have the power do not have the will and those who have the will do not have the power.'

One problem may relate to having to choose between factions (or encouraging federations of associations) as counterparts. States and local authorities often prefer to support institutional stakeholders, who are perhaps politically close to the embassies of their countries and who speak the same institutional-bureaucratic language. But if the aim is to involve Muslim interlocutors, this strategy may prove counterproductive; it could prove more useful to accept the representatives present on the ground, especially if these are elected by the community.

In other situations, the obstacle may be of a bureaucratic nature, based on technicalities that are not always easy to understand, but knowledge of which is itself part of the process of integration and maturation of Islamic associationism. An example is the case of the Mevlana mosque in Kreuzberg, in which the project proposed a mosque and a number of businesses in the same place to permit its financing, in line with widespread Islamic traditions. The project, however, was unthinkable in the face of local building regulations (Jonker 2005). Or contrasts may arise from a particular way of looking at things. At a certain point, the plans for the Essalam mosque in Rotterdam involved the sponsor building a fountain in front of the mosque as a gift to local residents. For the local administration, the issue was 'Who pays for its maintenance?' What for some was a gift was for others an extra cost.

However, on many occasions technicalities are only a bureaucratic smoke-screen for opposition that is entirely political but does not have the courage to declare itself as such. This very often takes the form of 'selective enforcement'

of rules that already exist but which are only highlighted when dealing with mosques and Muslims. This is especially true in Mediterranean countries, and particularly in Italy, where existing security or fire safety standards are applied selectively only to mosques (the only buildings monitored), but not to other buildings that clearly do not conform to the regulations, including places of worship of the majority religion, public buildings such as schools, and private businesses. The clear aim of this practice is to close down the mosques, as has been publicly declared in various municipalities in the centre-north controlled by the Northern League. In other situations progress is obstructed by 'bureaucratic obstinacy', which is used mainly to gain time and put off decisions until a more propitious moment – usually just after an election, in order to leave an unpopular problem for the following local administration.

Cases involving mosques may lead actors to adopt new positions that are unusual and not necessarily tied up with their ideological views or principles. In many cases the use of tactics at a local level may play an important role. Thus it was that the Christian CDH party in Bastogne, after losing power in 2006, sought to make up ground by mobilizing anti-Islamic sentiment. In some cases, on the other hand, efforts have been made to turn an anti-mosque movement into a local political party, though only with moderate success. At Premià de Mar in Spain, the opponents of the mosque were able to elect a councillor in 2003, but they lost the seat later. In fact the logic of these and many other contemporary political and social movements is essentially based on a single issue, so they are destined to disintegrate once the aim has been achieved or the period of mobilization is over. Such movements tend to be reactive in nature, typical of the so-called NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) syndrome, and to engage in intense but short-lived mobilization. The typical NIMBY attitude is not necessarily against something – it may even be in favour of it in abstract terms – so long as it is distant and out of sight. This often concerns activities that may be considered useful, such as waste recycling and composting, the siting of power stations, large shopping malls, places of entertainment or sports facilities that draw crowds, high-impact communication routes such as roads, motorways and high-speed rail links, and so forth. For this reason it is difficult to turn such opposition, which is not tied to real issues, into a lasting consensus. This is something that anti-Islamic parties, whose role we will analyse below, can consistently do better.

Repositioning of other kinds may also occur. If, for example, it is an extremist right-wing movement that mobilizes against a mosque (eg the *Plataforma por Catalunya* in the case of Premià de Mar), other parties may take an opposite stance purely for the sake of resisting the particular political actor involved. This has been seen in various local situations in northern Italy, where the strongly

anti-Muslim attitude of the Northern League has led *Rifondazione Comunista*, a largely non-religious and strongly anti-Catholic party, to adopt a position in support of mosques and the religious rights of immigrants.

The role of external political parties is played out through two main variables: bills and laws adopted at a national level, and more generally the approaches to the issue of Islam that are adopted nationally and which have obvious consequences at a local level; and, even more often, the intervention of political entrepreneurs of Islamophobia, who decide to act even in contexts in which they are not directly present. These two variables may overlap, if anti-Islamic parties form part of the government.

The state can intervene in two main ways: through general guidelines or through direct interference in local affairs. An example of the first is the recent attempt by the French government to introduce, through foundations, forms of central funding of places of Islamic worship. The official line is that this is to prevent funding from dubious sources and to improve the management of resources, but in practice the purpose is to implement a very heavy form of control and interference in the internal affairs of Islam. The bill, presented by the then interior minister Dominique de Villepin, was passed. Ironically, it was the secretary general of the UOIF (*Union des organisations islamiques de France*) who reminded the ministry of the French principle of secularism (Maussen 2009). However, in 2005 the UOIF also signed the declaration of intent, and in the meantime – and not by chance – Dalil Boubaker, rector of the Paris mosque, was appointed by the state as its referent and trusted man among the leaders of this body. This may possibly play an important role – even if it still remains unclear exactly how – in the future funding of Islamic worship in France. In Austria, too, first in Carinthia and then in Vorarlberg, anti-minaret laws were approved that actually require the intervention of the regional government at local level. The law establishes that in residential areas busy places such as mosques, cinemas and nightclubs require a special permit, and that if there is a need to protect the image of the landscape, the national government may decree that the local government is obliged to request an opinion from the state. The governor of Vorarlberg stated clearly that the law was an anti-minaret, if not an anti-mosque, law, minarets and mosques being ‘symbols of Islamic fundamentalism’ that had to be rejected.

It is clear that not only the adoption of specific regulations on mosques and minarets but also the promotion of certain attitudes towards Islam have significant consequences at the local level. If we consider the case of Italy, we see that the Northern League, which has been engaged in a violent campaign against Islam for many years, can now use its control of the government ministry of interior to issue guidelines which are clearly political even if they have no legal validity:

favouring referenda, for instance, in the case of requests for the construction of Islamic places of worship, or proposing moratoria on them. At a local level there is no obligation to accept such guidelines, as they are not legislation, but it is clear that in municipalities where the Northern League party is in local government they are promoted and supported. The same applies with regard to the recognition of some Islamic groups and associations but not others. Such decisions, made at a national level, ultimately have effects that cascade down to the local level. Such is the case, for example, with the UCOII in Italy, or the IGMG in Belgium, to which the DITIB is often preferred. It is also the case in Germany and the Netherlands, or again in France, where bodies monitored by the Paris mosque are preferred to the UOIF and other local bodies.

The effects of national influences at a local level have been visible for some time, particularly in the case of parties with roots at the local level, as in the case of Carinthia, or in Italy, with the Northern League. In a few cases, in cities governed by these parties (eg Varese and Alessandria), forms of political instrumentalization have been created around prayer halls and the way they are operated. The campaign also had an impact on small local settings and towns, for instance in the Veneto province and in the case of the mosque in Col San Martino, a locality in the municipality of Farra di Soligo, near Treviso. The mayor of Farra, the leader of a civic list running on the issue of the country's Catholic identity, decided to close the local mosque in January 1999, in the middle of Ramadan. As had happened in the past in the larger cities of Alessandria and Varese, both controlled by the League, the municipal decree related to a breach of planning and sanitation regulations. But as in many other European countries, the real motivation lay elsewhere. Among the Islamic actors, both the UCOII, the largest Islamic association in Italy, and the Moroccan Embassy, the main Islamic presence in the country, intervened. A compromise, entrusted to a Catholic charity aiding immigrants, *Migrantes*, led to a temporary suspension of the order (Guolo 1999). A more striking case took place in September 2000, when in Lodi, near Milan, a fierce and controversial anti-Islamic campaign was provoked by the decision of the mayor of the (Catholic) Popular Party to grant land owned by the city, for a symbolic rent, for the construction of a building to be used as a mosque. This campaign, too, was conducted by the Northern League (Allievi 2003), and in addition to offensive slogans, it included one of the most distasteful episodes, the sprinkling over the land of 'Padanian pig urine' (Padania is the name given by the League to the northern regions of Italy), the celebration of 'atonement' masses, and the launch of an across-the-board anti-Islamic campaign, which still continues and has spread to other cities.

In another town governed by the Northern League (Rovato, in the province of Brescia), the campaign reached a point where the mayor responded to the banning of non-Muslims from entering mosques in certain Islamic countries (a fact that the mayor had discovered during a summer holiday in a Muslim country) by signing an obviously illegal order that forbade non-Christians from approaching within 15 metres of the walls of local churches. This controversy had broader repercussions than it would have done had it represented no more than the extreme position of the Northern League, because it happened at the same time that influential secular and Catholic voices were speaking out against the danger of a Muslim cultural invasion. Activists of the League also printed and put up stickers at the entrance to certain cities with the words *comune deislamizzato* ('de-islamized municipality'), in imitation of 'official' signs, seen in some locations following the recent efforts of environmentalists and anti-nuclear campaigners, that read: 'de-nuclearized municipality' (Guolo 2000). Today, the epicentre of these campaigns is the Veneto region. Here, the absolute ban on places of worship in Treviso has become known internationally, with Muslims forced to pray outdoors or in car parks, or to accept the humiliation of a proposed 'itinerant mosque'. In addition, they are continually and very explicitly insulted by the mayor of the city, a League member and well-known anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic agitator.

The intervention of so-called 'political entrepreneurs of Islamophobia' is gradually becoming more pervasive and widespread, and, as the European elections of 2009 have shown, they are tending to become stronger. At a local level these parties often take advantage of conflict to put down roots for the movement. These include, in no particular order, the Vlaams Belang in Flanders, Belgium; the French National Front active in Roubaix and elsewhere; and the British National Party (BNP), which has capitalized successfully on the case of the mosque in Stoke-on-Trent to obtain two councillors in 2003 and nine in 2008, while in the meantime the Labour Party has collapsed, for reasons that have little to do with mosques. The Austrian FPÖ has distinguished itself with a campaign against mosques and minarets in Vienna, although there are no concrete plans to build any places of worship, and has thus entered into competition with Haider's BZÖ, founded in 2005; competition between the two on the ban on mosques, in Styria and elsewhere, allowed the two parties to double their votes in the 2008 elections. At Traun, again at the initiative of the FPÖ, the campaign reached a point where a mosque built without the necessary permits was demolished; at the time of the announced demolition, it was occupied by a hundred or so Muslims and demolished a fortnight later under police protection. In the Netherlands, in addition to the *Mosknee* ('No to Mosques') campaign run by the Livable Rotterdam party,

the NNP (New National Party) organized a protest march against the mosque at Essalam at the time of the assassination of Theo van Gogh. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the Serb and Croat nationalist parties play the role of political entrepreneurs of Islamophobia, together with their newspapers (*Oslobodenje*, *Dani*, *Start*, *Slobodna Bosnia*) and a section of the post-communist and non-religious parties. These initiatives are not only symbolic. In Freistadt, Austria, in 2006, the opposition to a mosque in the city centre, though having no dome or minaret, led to the mobilization of local political parties (not just the FPÖ, but also the ÖVP). During a public debate organized by the mayor, the population sought and obtained the shifting of the mosque, and Muslims were forced to sell their piece of land and to buy another in the suburbs.

The anti-Islamic parties are strongly connected at a European level. In fact one can speak of an *internazionale* of Islamophobia: the Vlaams Belang, the FPÖ, the BNP, the Northern League and many others participate in conferences and events 'against the Islamization of Europe' in Brussels, Cologne and elsewhere. Their slogans and methods are also similar: the call to the West in danger (*sof abendland*), the defence of Christianity in Europe, the systematic use of stereotypes and anti-Islamic prejudices, references to 'our' identity, to 'our' roots, or simply to 'our' city.⁶⁵ Flyers, stickers, posters and facsimiles of banners can be downloaded from their websites on the internet, a medium that allows anonymity and therefore the use of very hard and aggressive language.

These campaigns are not simply rhetorical exercises, without consequences. During the affair of the mosque in Bludenz, the first mosque with a minaret in Vorarlberg, on the night of 1 January 2008 an arsonist struck the Turkish consulate in Bregenz, the capital of the region. The attack on the Shiite mosque in Trollhättan in 1993 was carried out by members of the *Ny Demokrati* movement.⁶⁶ Geert Wilders, Dutch MP and author of the short documentary *Fitna*, calls mosques 'palaces of hatred' (*haatpaleizen*), and his electoral success is rising steadily. Arson attacks were recorded in countries ranging from Italy to Sweden. France and the United Kingdom have seen a series of anti-Muslim attacks as well, both after 9/11 and at the time of 'hot' debate on Islam, albeit of a more local nature (and only a minority of which are reported to the authorities). The same forces are sponsors of referenda, or threatened referenda, when local governments open themselves for consultation on mosque projects, activating a very strong

⁶⁵ *'Ist unser Essen'* ('It's OUR Essen') and similar slogans could be read on the placards held up at protests against mosques in different cities.

⁶⁶ Significantly, however, this event led to greater public sympathy for the Muslims under attack in Bosnia. When the mosque was reopened in August 1994, speeches were made by Jewish and Christian representatives, as well as by the civic authorities (Alwall 1998).

blackmail mechanism, even when it remains potential only: threats that these forces would not make in other contexts or against other religious groups.

The role of anti-Islamic movements, even when they come from outside, therefore ends up having effects in internal local contexts too. Indeed, it is the conflict that draws attention from outside: once aware of a case of conflict, the Islamophobic movements move into the territory, bringing their own slogans and their own means of struggle, which are generally more visible than citizen initiatives. Thus the focus of the conflict shifts from local issues of a practical nature to ideological and 'civilization' issues, making resolution of the conflict itself more difficult. Indeed, resolution of conflict is not their goal, as they are outsiders who do not belong to the place where the conflict takes place.⁶⁷ They play a role as amplifiers of the conflict, and also as obstacles to its solution. This is further complicated where the political entrepreneur of Islamophobia is also a local actor, as in the case of the Northern League in Italy; this can produce marked territorial differences in the level of conflict, as well as in the way the conflict is managed. This phenomenon may also have nothing to do with the actual presence of Muslims: Carinthia, where Haider was governor, has a percentage of Muslims that is among the lowest in Austria, a fact recalling the 'anti-Semitism without Jews' found in some eastern European countries.

A variable occurring at local level, but not controllable by it, is that of administrative law and legal remedies in court. Indeed, the law acts as a guarantor, a role that is much less dependent on political decisions and on changes in the political context and dominant ideology towards Islam. Therefore recourse to the law is becoming more frequent: on the part both of Islamic groups, against possible rejections, and of groups of citizens or the political opposition (or even other levels of government), against any concessions or permits for the construction or renovation of buildings to be used as mosques. The case of Los Bermejales in Spain is significant in this regard. In 2004 the Islamic community linked to the Murabitun group of converts reached agreement with the municipality on a project to build a large mosque, and in 2006 it rented land that was owned by the municipality. In the same year a group of citizens appealed to the administrative court, obtaining a suspension of construction work. Then, during the 2007 election campaign, the mayor promised not to proceed with construction of the mosque if re-elected. Nine months after the elections, however, the court ruled in favour of the rights of the Muslims, and at that point the town council and the mayor sought a new site in another neighbourhood. However, the appeal continued on its course, and at the end of 2007 the High Court of Justice of Andalusia

⁶⁷ At Bastogne, for example, two non-local parties became involved: the Nation (a movement close to the French National Front) and Belgique et Chrétienté, which was founded by a former spokesman for the Belgian FN.

decreed that it was not in fact possible to build a mosque in the original location. The new planned site had the same kind of urban planning status, and in light of the court's decision could not be the site of a religious building. At the end of 2008 the municipality decided not to grant any municipal land for the mosque, and after five years the situation is still unresolved.

On other occasions intervention may be of another type. In 2003 the French town of Montpellier awarded a grant for the construction of first one mosque, then a second, calling them 'multifunctional halls'. In 2006 the administrative court cancelled the grant on the basis of the ban on the funding of religious associations. Similar rulings have been made in Marseilles and in Padua, and there are many other cases in which municipalities have granted leases on land for 99 years at a notional or symbolic rent, only to be forced to renege on these contracts and to offer more acceptable terms of rent.

3.6 Other religious actors

Europe's religious landscape is undergoing significant changes, and trends are not easy to define.⁶⁸ Among the main long-term factors that have produced this change are clearly the processes of secularization (which cannot be seen simply, or simplistically, as a loss of religion in people's lives, but as a loss of the meaning of religion for society as a whole) and the privatization of religion. A third trend, however – a product of the above but with its own autonomous dynamics – stands out from the others and is easily verifiable and measurable. This is the tendency towards the religious pluralization of European countries due to the inherent tendencies of the societies themselves; and this is a process (leaving immigration aside) which is greatly reinforced and made visible by the presence of 'immigrant' religions.⁶⁹

The presence of an increasing number of immigrants in Europe is not just a matter of quantity, but has various social, economic and cultural consequences. Different quantitative levels in a range of indicators do not only produce a change in quantity but together create new problems, new forms of relationship. In short, they produce a qualitative change – nothing less than a new type of society, quite different from the model of the nation-state as we know it, and its founding

⁶⁸ Certainly neither *L'eclissi del sacro nella civiltà industriale* (*The Eclipse of the Sacred in Industrial Societies*) nor *La revanche de Dieu* (*The Revenge of God*), to quote two important books in the sociology of religion (Acquaviva 1961 and Kepel 1991), which were published 30 years apart and propose two opposite interpretations, are happening. Probably both are true, but on different levels, and need to be explained together with other phenomena within a wider frame, not a mono-directional one.

⁶⁹ The mechanisms of pluralization and their effects, including the specificities of Europe, have been extensively analysed by sociologists of religion, from Peter Berger onwards. The bibliography of specific references is extensive but not directly related to the presence of Islam, so we have chosen to omit them here.

principles. And this model, not by chance, is now showing clear signs of crisis. Think of the very elements of the state: a people, a territory, an order – all three, for one reason or another, currently in crisis and under pressure, suffering a loss of capacity to define themselves and therefore a loss of effectiveness. And all this has been said without mentioning that other element, implicit but very real in our understanding of society (and well known to those who belong to religious minorities); an element which adds to the other three: a religion.

This pluralization due to the presence of immigrants is not culturally or religiously neutral. Immigrants do not come 'naked' – they bring their baggage, including their world views, traditions, beliefs, practices, sets of values, moral systems, images and symbols. And sooner or later they feel the need to refer to this baggage as an essential core of their identity, often for identification purposes, sometimes only as a means of opposition. Religion, and especially religion lived *collectively* and in a *community*, has its own space and its own role in the construction of the individual and collective identities of significant groups of immigrants, all the more so when there is the issue of religious transmission to subsequent generations.

Islam, as the second religion or as the largest minority religion in almost all countries of Europe, is a part of this rapidly changing landscape. And mosques represent the main element of visibility.

The issue of Islam and mosques thus represents one of the areas where the relationship of religions to each other, and relations between them and the secular and lay context, manifest themselves.⁷⁰ In this triangular dynamic (secularism, more or less supported by the state; the dominant religion; and religious minorities) Islam can represent for churches, at one and the same time, both an 'ally and a rival, poor but a competitor'. In a period of secularization and religious indifference, Islam can become a valuable ally while remaining a rival (de Galember 1994). This may show up some ambiguities in interfaith relations. These depend very much on the legal and institutional framework and on how it incorporates or relates to religions, but such relations do not necessarily weaken the main interlocutor, as is suggested by the prevailing interpretation of the 'apocalypitics' within the various religions, who see dialogue as a form of surrender (literature on the subject, and precisely on the relationship with Islam, is considerable and easily accessible, although little makes it to the cultured register of dialogue – ie it exists but is not quoted).

Sometimes dialogue can indeed strengthen the majority communities, and religions in general: as was noted in the French case, supporting the

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⁷⁰ For a further insight into the relationship between Islam and European churches, see the chapter on 'Relations between religions' in Maréchal, Allievi, Dassetto and Nielsen 2003.

inclusion of Islam can put the issue of religion back on the agenda and can end up favouring the Catholic Church – or in any case the dominant church – in a role of real and symbolic mediation vis-à-vis the state (de Galembert 1994). This role is sometimes reinforced by research carried out by national or local governments on forms of semi-institutional inter-religious cooperation, of which we can find many examples, from the local to the European institutional level. In these cases, the 'advice' of the dominant churches often becomes necessary and required for a possible 'inclusion' of Islam. In 2007, in Genoa, Archbishop Bagnasco and Chief Rabbi Momigliano attended the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the mayor and the Islamic community, linked to the proposed new mosque in the city, making themselves guarantors both of the relationship with Islam and of the maintenance of social peace in their respective communities.⁷¹ Sometimes bodies of inter-religious dialogue are used for this purpose, often promoted at the initiative of the dominant Christian interlocutor. It is evident that this type of body offers some form of legitimacy and recognition to the interlocutors, and allows forms of negotiation that would otherwise prove difficult.

Analysis not only of empirical cases but also of the more general behaviour of religious actors shows, however, that a historical cycle has ended. First, there is no longer a move on the part of religious communities towards these new 'co-tenants', who are also competitors in the marketplace for religious goods. Secondly, there is a maturing and consolidation of certain trends.

For a long time the dominant Christian churches have maintained a sort of primacy over politics, which began at the dawn of the Islamic presence in Europe, and during this time they have played a very important mediating role. The result, ironically enough, given the secular nature of the state and the separation of the two spheres, was that the Muslim interlocutors were taken more seriously by the states or by the public authorities when they were in some way 'presented' by the churches. Today, this primacy appears to be increasingly called into question as a result of the maturation and growing autonomy of Islamic communities on the one hand and certain changes in the contents of theological thought and pastoral indications with reference to Islam on the other. Finally, a different attitude can be seen on the part of the states, which have taken responsibility, directly and without mediation, for the 'Islamic question'.

Forms of cooperation between majority Christian churches and Islam have taken place in all countries. In the Netherlands, for example, there has been strong lobbying on the part of Catholics and Protestants in favour of Muslims, at least throughout the 1980s. Sociological literature on Islam in various countries

⁷¹ The problem is all the deeper for Catholics, because the anti-Islamic and anti-mosque movements often use the argument of the defence of Europe's Christian roots, even in contrast to the Catholic Church (and elsewhere the Protestant churches), which they consider too yielding.

lists dozens of examples of this kind, specifically concerning help in the finding of sites for and financing of mosques, or even in the granting of spaces, perhaps only temporarily, for the purpose of Muslim worship.⁷² It is well known that the construction of the great mosque on Monte Antenne in Rome was only possible after a silent but clear endorsement from the Vatican of the granting of the land by the municipality. Cases of direct hosting in church structures are numerous, at least until the first half of the 1990s. Today there are still a few remaining examples,⁷³ but recent cases are rare. Finally, for a long time there have been no objections to the use of former (deconsecrated) churches as mosques; the United Kingdom has several,⁷⁴ to which one can add two more in Sweden, among others.⁷⁵

So, while roughly until the mid-1990s a fundamentally dialogical and open attitude prevailed, even with regard to the specific question of places of worship and mosques, today there is a pluralization of positions and much more evident conflict, including internal conflict. Just as in the political arena, we have moved from a prevalence of politically correct language and silent grumbling on the part of dissidents to a marked polarization of positions, where the strongest voices (and the ones most likely to be picked up by the media) are often the contrary ones. In fact the churches – not to mention secular positions, Muslim communities themselves, and other religious minorities – are now far more divided in the conflicting views they represent. In Germany, in a document published in September 2008, the Catholic bishops restated their support for the construction of mosques, but condemned the tendency of some Islamic groups to make claims of power or to call for revenge, as well their tendency to act aggressively on matters concerning the visibility of mosques. Some bishops, including the cardinal of Cologne (where a conflict over a proposed mosque is ongoing, as mentioned above), expressed their views in much harsher terms.

In Austria, a similar diversification is also evident. In 1998, in Innsbruck, it was possible to build a mosque with a minaret near a premises run by Caritas and with the consent of the diocese; today, by contrast, although a Catholic priest of Bludenz claims that there are no obstacles, the bishop of Feldkirch has spoken out, saying that a mosque with a minaret would be ‘a provocation’ and a threat to social peace. The bishops of St Polten and Graz expressed similar views, thereby

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⁷² At Bochum Muslims prayed for some time at the KSG, the Catholic student community; in Padua at a missionary centre; and in dozens of places in all European countries at local churches or at reception centres operated by religious personnel or by organizations such as Caritas.

⁷³ To give one example, in Montpellier, the headquarters of at-Touba mosque were let by the bishop for a nominal rent and are situated in a former chapel in the Dominican convent (Ternisien 2002).

⁷⁴ The York Road mosque in Bradford, for example, is an old Anglican church, which was granted to the Muslims as the result of a long friendship between the imam and the local vicar.

⁷⁵ These do not only include Christian sites: the Brick Lane mosque in London is an ancient synagogue that became a Huguenot church and the mosque in Toulouse Mirail was a martial arts *dojo*.

forcing the president of the Austrian Bishops' Conference, Cardinal Schönborn, to remind them of the Austrian constitution and to point out that in Vienna there had been a mosque with minaret for some time; and provoking a reaction from 11 prominent Catholic figures who, in an open letter, argued that the threat was not Muslims but rather the political groups that were mobilizing against Islam and exploiting hostility towards Islam for their own purposes. Equally, among Protestants, while the pastor of Bad Vöslau is an advocate of the minaret, other sectors have adopted critical anti-Islamic tones. Perhaps the most striking case of opposition to mosques in the Christian arena is to be found in the Orthodox church in Greece and its role in obstructing the mosque in Athens. Although it gave its generic approval in 2002, in practice it boycotted all proposals and became directly involved at the head of citizen demonstrations, which included the erection of a large white cross on a hill at Paiania, the possible site of the mosque, and betrayed xenophobic overtones. And all this transpired in spite of the government's promise to build a large Orthodox church in the same area.⁷⁶

In order to analyse these trends, it may prove useful to investigate a specific case. In Italy today a three-way split is highly visible in ecclesiastical positions (Allievi 2009). The first level is that of the Vatican, in which two positions occur. On the one hand, long-term trends and an openness to dialogue, with a very strong emphasis on the rights of Christian minorities in Islamic countries, has led to a position of openness towards places of worship, so as to strengthen the protection of Christian ones; this position has traditionally been endorsed by the Pontifical Council for Inter-religious Dialogue and research bodies such as the Pontifical Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies (PISAI). On the other hand, the position of the top echelons is less easy to keep track of because it is subject to contingencies and chance events. The last two popes have shown clear differences in style: the prophetic slant and pedagogical gestures of Pope John Paul II on his travels to Islamic countries and with the meetings in Assisi contrasted with the professorial coldness and more doctrinally closed attitude of Benedict XVI, shown at Regensburg in 2006 and through the controversy surrounding relativism. However, it is also true that in official meetings and dealings with Islam (such as the document of the 138 Muslim leaders, *A common word*, and the Vatican response; the first Catholic–Muslim forum held in Rome in November 2008; and the pope's visit to Turkey in 2006), we can see more continuity than contrast. In fact, what is happening is that, at present, a supporter of one or other position, either the dialogical or the conflictual position, can find legitimacy in the words of the pope – something that was less easy in the previous pontificate.

⁷⁶ This form of 'exchange' or deal is found in many other situations, even in small cities and in countries with a tradition of official secularism and non-intervention (and therefore no funding), such as France.

A second level is that of the Italian Bishops' Conference and the higher hierarchy of the church, which is also shared by some religious orders and their publications, such as the Jesuit *Civiltà cattolica*. At this level, which is often not directly involved in the relationship with Islam or in contact with it, positions of closure are more prevalent, or at least more visible today; these include concrete stances against mosques and minarets, and support for schools of thought that are more openly opposed to Islam. It is in these quarters that the belief has spread, supported mainly by Catholic representatives from Islamic countries, that sites which become places of Islamic worship, even temporary ones, are claimed by Muslims forever as *dar al-Islam*. This assumption has sparked widespread fears, even in secular settings, and has been politically exploited by anti-Islamic movements, in spite of the fact that it is contradicted empirically by the fact that hundreds of mosques throughout Europe have changed use without any proprietary claims being advanced by Muslims and that there has never been a single specific case in which this view has been expressed by Muslims. Yet this has not prevented the belief being generally shared in church circles and parroted in the restatement of positions through articles and speeches, to the extent that it is now one key to understanding the caution that is today more visible in the attitude towards the opening of new mosques. At this level the voices of the more open and less fearful bishops are today less easily heard than in the past: they are there but much quieter.

A third level is that of the churches at the grass roots: Catholic movements and parish priests who deal with Muslims and Islam on a daily basis on their home turf. Here, obviously, both positions coexist. There have been extreme cases of anti-Islamic activity on sites where the building of a mosque is planned, as in Lodi (Allievi 2003; Saint-Blancat and Schmidt di Friedberg 2005).⁷⁷ But a long-term trend of collaboration prevails, albeit, at this stage, one based more on deeds than on words.⁷⁸ Today visibility is generally the prerogative of the more closed positions.

Similar observations can also be made with regard to other minority denominations. Jews, in particular, enjoyed a long initial phase of 'sympathetic' relations with Islam and with their need for symbolic visibility, including places of worship. In principle, discrimination against Muslims closely mirrored that suffered by Jews in other situations; and in practice, campaigns against the veil

⁷⁷ Although in this case it was a schismatic priest belonging to the Lefebvrian fraternity; elsewhere, however, even Catholic priests have rallied in support of groups on the extreme right.

⁷⁸ Several surveys in European countries (in France by the IFOP) show that those most opposed to the building of mosques are non-practising Catholics (and elsewhere Protestants), while practising ones, who share a kind of 'religious grammar' with Muslims, which includes the idea of collective prayer and a place to practise it, are less negative about it.

or halal slaughter threatened to affect rights acquired by Jews themselves, who employ the same kind of butchery practices and symbolic outer clothing (the *kippah*, for example). There was a danger that these rights would again be called into question, and in France this has actually happened in public schools. There have also been displays of solidarity, often courageous, from Jewish religious leaders, not unlike those of other religious communities. More recently, however, partly as a result of the exacerbation of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and its consequences in Europe, there has been a climate of worsening conflict between minorities. Complaints about anti-Jewish positions in some Muslim circles have been accompanied by increasingly outrageous acts against individuals and Jewish religious symbols (eg synagogues and cemeteries), while anti-Islamic positions have become widespread in certain Jewish circles and among Jewish intellectuals. Having said this, however, on the question of places of worship, favourable positions still outweigh negative ones.

It is worth stressing, finally, that mosques are often, in themselves and as a consequence of their very existence, places of local inter-religious dialogue. This has been demonstrated on many occasions, more often in small- and medium-sized towns than in large ones, where presence in the same area and even sharing of the same symbolic space may be used as grounds for personal encounters between the religious leaders of different communities. This, in turn, has created opportunities for meetings between the faithful, for planning joint initiatives, and for demonstrating solidarity and mutual support, especially in times of difficulty, suffering, pain or death. Examples include solidarity with people in difficulty, joint actions against injustice (perhaps in the country of origin), situations of real conflict, and, if necessary, defence of the rights of a community against the civil authorities.

In fact, at this point in time, mosques and prayer halls are part of the shared and communal religious landscape, particularly in densely populated districts and peripheral areas of the larger cities, but even in small towns it is not unusual to find in the same area, and perhaps even on the same street, an Islamic prayer room, a Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses, industrial buildings converted into a Pentecostal church, and an Orthodox church belonging to immigrants from Romania or Moldova. All, indeed, are part of the same market – the new competing religious offerings, being purveyed particularly in down-at-heel neighbourhoods. Then again, it comes as no surprise to see a new mosque opposite a Russian Orthodox church, as one might in Frankfurt (Beinhauer-Köhler and Leggewie 2009); just as it is not unusual, even in the remotest village in Sicily, where seasonal farm labourers find work, to see a mosque a short distance from a Kingdom Hall. Like other offerings, both are elements of a new 'offer' or bargain

that majority religious churches and institutions in the country concerned find difficult to match.

3.7 Perception and 'mediatization'

Even more than the reality of ongoing social processes, their 'success' and the direction they take depend on how they are perceived. This is of fundamental importance in relation to policies regarding Islam, and specifically the controversy surrounding mosques, as these phenomena *depend* to a large extent on the manner in which they are perceived (for further insights on this topic, see Allievi 2003 and 2005b).

The media, therefore, are now more important than ever before, both because of the role they play and as a result of globalization processes, of which they are a cause, an effect and an accelerator. They are no longer there merely to inform, but actually to build our cognitive worlds. In this case, for example, they do so by providing the framework for an interpretation of Islamic–western relations and fundamental definitions of the terms under examination.

The world of media visibility is the world *in* which and *through* which Islam itself is seen; it exists, to a degree, in as much as it is perceived and made visible. One of the most frequent modes for the 'visibilization' of Islam is that of extreme cases, which we can consider in a certain sense as hermeneutical accidents, or mistakes in using interpretative codes and relative representations. There have been different *affairs*, such as the Rushdie case, the *hijab* question in France and elsewhere, the murder of Theo van Gogh, the publication of the Danish cartoons, and various cases of terrorism, including non-European acts such as 9/11 and the various activities of al-Qaeda around the world. There have also been various events related to the role of mosques in the preaching of anti-western, anti-Jewish and anti-Christian sentiment or of essentially fundamentalist views; the issue of recruitment for terrorist or para-terrorist organizations (the bombers responsible for the 7/7 outrage in London and Mohamed Atta, for instance, were active in the mosques in the areas in which they lived); the messages conveyed during the Friday *qutba* about women's issues or the West; or questions related to the training of imams and their knowledge of the language, culture, and political and social situation of the countries in which they live. The logic behind these exceptional cases is what is contributing to a certain image of Islam (conflictual, for example), and this is also reflected in the perception of the phenomenon as a whole, and the reception given to the social actors who embody it, even indirectly, when it comes to the question of mosques.

The backdrop to this type of understanding is a situation of growing Islamophobia, relayed in talks and speeches about Islam in the public arena.

Islamophobia has itself become a key to the reading of empirical phenomena related to the question of Islam's presence in Europe,⁷⁹ and is also often mentioned in discussion of the conflicts surrounding mosques. Here we do not intend either to accept or to reject this key to its reading, but we simply seek to highlight some of its weaknesses.

The first is the linguistic inappropriateness of the term 'Islamophobia': not so much of 'phobia' (ie fear), but of the selection of Islam as the enemy of choice and scapegoat, to explain a number of phenomena that do not necessarily have much to do with it, and as leverage to raise issues of identity and to create reactive slogans around which to build consensus for much broader ideological battles. In terms of values and morals, not calling it by its real name does not justify any form of instrumentalization, but it is in any case something different from a targeted phobia. This is why, on many occasions, we prefer to speak of anti-Islamic forces and slogans, employing the expression 'political entrepreneurs of Islamophobia', because in this case there is a clear and direct instrumentalization of the fear of Islam for political purposes (which does not diminish the fear itself or resolve the problem – quite the opposite, in fact, as we have seen, for these political forces have everything to gain from the fact that the conflict continues or is exacerbated). The second weakness is that the term has entered into a 'politically correct' vocabulary, which sometimes may itself become part of the problem to be solved, as it is likely to be misleading in the definition of the problem and thus in the measures needed to solve it, and which large currents of opinion are critical of today. The third reason is that the word actually reflects quite well a certain sense of victimhood that is widespread in Islamic communities, so that the problem inevitably becomes the fault of someone else. Now, without seeking in any way to justify anti-Islamic views or preconceptions – views that we have, in any case, exposed and stigmatized throughout this work – it is clear that the direction taken by interpretations of Islam in Europe is also affected by the behaviour of Islamic communities and their leadership, imams and other mosque leaders included, in transmitting or making understood their speeches regarding the world in which they live.⁸⁰

Entering into greater detail, it is clear that conflict exists in the public arena – beyond the strictly local context and neighbourhood relations – to the extent to which it is taken up by the media. Today we are undoubtedly in a new

⁷⁹ Runnymede Trust 1997, Geissier 2003, Deltombe 2005, Massari 2006, EUMC 2006.

⁸⁰ Only by way of example, we mention a Dutch case in which all the complex activities of mediation put in place by the local Christian communities to reach an understanding between local residents and Muslims – measures that would have allowed the acceptance of the mosque – were threatened with failure after the discovery that in the self-same mosque brochures with a strongly anti-Christian content were circulating.

phase, in which conflicts set in peripheral and even marginal areas may come to national attention, especially after manipulation on the part of political entrepreneurs of Islamophobia. In this sense the media and anti-Islamic political forces have a common interest in raising the conflict in a logic of mutual reflection, both in its evolution and in its outcomes. Indeed, conflicts that up until the 1990s would not have had any visibility certainly have no problem attracting attention today, especially when external political entrepreneurs of Islamophobia are active. A statement to this effect is sufficient to activate the mechanism. And these declarations directed towards the media play a key role in defining public opinion and the discursive strategies of the game's players, who are forced to find a place within the initial logic proposed by the actors who were the first to intervene in the public arena.

Local media incidents, such as the arrest of Muslims on suspicion of terrorism in a given city, can become tools to push for the closing or the non-opening of a mosque (as has happened in Lleida and in several Italian cities). The media's role has been decisive in bringing about the suspension and even the expulsion of imams who are accused of being 'hate preachers' in television programmes or in the press. And this has sometimes happened even though their words have been falsely or poorly translated in order to 'package' the 'expected' conflictual imagery, for which the activity of the media is, in a certain sense, preparatory.

The media can also be – indeed are – used by the political entrepreneurs of Islamophobia not through concerted and instrumental efforts but simply as a result of their shared interest in emphasizing news related to the anticipated conflict. Anti-Islamic militants, and sometimes Islamic leaders themselves, package the news, leaving the media merely to broadcast it.

Controversies surrounding mosques also show up the need for expertise in dealing with the media within Islamic communities, which are often unable to defend their case and generally to communicate in a professional manner. In the case of the Tablighi mega-mosque in East London, for example, this led to the recruitment of an outside public relations expert, and in other cases to the appointment of a media relations officer with some of the necessary skills, often a convert with the required language skills and communications know-how (Allievi 1998).

3.8 Intellectual legitimization

On the subject of mosques, the media and politics need fundamental support: intellectual legitimization, which is offered by a number of key players in the debate, operating in the public arena in which they have a substantial monopoly – intellectuals, artists, journalists, academics and orientalists. It is often through

the opinions and stances of such people, frequently expressed in general terms about Islam, that political forces have been able to strengthen their anti-mosque campaigns.

Celebrities with major reputations in their own countries have contributed to an intellectual legitimacy that was missing in cultural battles that were initially fought more on the strength of a visceral refusal, than a rational one. At the same time, by adopting positions these people have significantly strengthened their reputation and visibility, thus creating a vicious circle that offers a temptation which is difficult to resist.

Such is or was probably the case with Hans-Peter Raddatz, Udo Ulfkotte and Ralph Giordano in Germany; Paul Scheffer, Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands; the sensational case of Oriana Fallaci in Italy,⁸¹ and many other intellectuals, writers, teachers and journalists. The form of the controversy may also be indirect, as, for example, in France, where the debate was against mosques as a mean of *répli identitaire*, and in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, where the fight was against communalism and multiculturalism.

Sometimes anti-Islamic intellectuals first emerge at a local level at times of conflict. Such was the case of the mosque in Bad Vöslau, where a secondary character from the local university, historian Otmar Rychlik, intervened and added anti-Islamic arguments of a general nature to a specific battle against the mosque, thus providing, wittingly or unwittingly, direct intellectual legitimacy to the battle against the mosque itself. In another case it was a group of artists that mobilized '*gegen Moscheezunami*' ('against the mosque tsunami'). Mosques were also accused of creating a 'state within a state', a 'parallel society', a world apart, and a tool for 'self-ghettoizing'. The substance of these allegations, however, focused not so much on the mosques themselves as on Islam as such. As Ralph Giordano stated with regard to the conflict surrounding the mosque in Cologne: 'the problem is not the mosque, but Islam.' As a result supporting arguments have tended not to be on the specifics but on the general picture. From this point of view, essentialist positions drawn from orientalist studies and from the politological interpretation of the 'clash of civilizations' clearly become the arguments of reference. These, however, have little to do with mosques in a strict sense, or with what happens in and around them.

⁸¹ The books of her anti-Islamic trilogy have sold a million copies each, which, for the Italian publishing market, is an unprecedented event. The views expressed in these books – viscerally and vulgarly anti-Islamic already at the level of their language – have become the starting point and content of 'agenda setting' that has determined the legitimacy of the existing *leghista* anti-Islamic campaign, enlarging it to embrace the entire centre-right and, given the iconic feminist status of the author, even the left. Indeed, Italian policy on Islamic issues has been transformed in recent years by these positions. For a comment on them, see Allievi 2006.

Often, distinguished personalities from the Muslim world itself emerge in the anti-mosque controversy. Notable examples are Magdi Allam in Italy, who sensationally converted to Catholicism, taking the name of Cristiano, and is now a member of the European Parliament, elected in a Catholic list; and Ayaan Hirsi Ali in the Netherlands, who moved from the socialist to the conservative party and then temporarily took up a position in a right-wing US think-tank. But many other are active at the local or national level. They generally represent some sort of international mutual help group, whose members support each other, as banners and icons for the rejection of Islam and as its victims. The fact that some have been subjected to threats and protected by the police has in fact strengthened them, through a mechanism that has nothing to do with content, their influence or their authoritativeness. No wonder, then, that mosque leaders take a very dim view of these stakeholders, who are called upon to hold conferences and consultations in cities where there is a conflict, in order to legitimize the anti-mosque positions.

4 Lessons from the conflicts

4.1 The ways in which conflicts develop

Some important factors emerge clearly from an analysis of empirical cases and relevant literature. The first is the existence of the conflicts themselves. There is no country in which they have not occurred, albeit with differences in their form and frequency.⁸²

The second point is the often resigned acceptance of conflicts. To cite a case where the overall level of acceptance of Islam and the status of Muslims is fairly good, in Sweden 41 Islamic congregations said they had received threats and 33 reported suffering attacks in the form of relatively serious arson attempts and vandalism, while most said that they did not report them to the police. This probably means that in Europe the number of acts against Islam, which in themselves show the existence of a conflict in progress, is greatly underestimated. Only major events and incidents publicized in the media come to the attention of the public. This is also due to the relatively weak levels of self-organization of Islamic communities which (with the exception of the United Kingdom and perhaps a few other countries) can be considered comparable to Jewish communities, for example, in their respective countries, in their ability to bring acts of anti-Semitism to the attention of the public. This data shows the existence of a serious potential danger that is created not by the Islamic community but by movements of opinion and groups of activists mobilizing against them.

⁸² Exceptions can be found only in a few specific situations, smaller in size and with a smaller percentage of Muslims, such as in Portugal and some Nordic countries.

The third point is the form and role of conflicts. Everything points to the fact that conflicts surrounding Islam are not what they appear to be and that agendas are not openly declared. But this very fact explains the need for the conflict itself, which becomes the way (or one of the ways) through which the real issue – the presence of Islam rather than that of mosques, the content rather than the symbol that represents it – is introduced, discussed and brought to the surface. This suggests that there are not many other ways available to bring the debate out into the public arena: that the conflict is an extraordinary way of addressing an issue that is itself ordinary. It is useful in this connection to emphasize that the practical problems and territorially limited social conflicts associated with local mosques are, as we have seen, easily transformed into problems of principle and into symbolic conflicts unrelated to territoriality. The speed and ease with which the transformation occurs indicates the need to find ways of discussing the latter that do not involve the former.

The conflicts analysed show fairly obvious common traits: the vocabulary, or 'grammar of the protest', as well as that of the reactions, is reduced to a rather small range, as we showed in the previous chapter by analysing the actors involved. They are based on a limited set of shared meanings within associative networks that are often of limited duration.

The *modus operandi* of these conflicts is on the one hand that of the 'NIMBY identity', ie theoretical acceptance of the principle but not of the place; and, on the other hand, that of 'reactive identities' (Allievi 2007): identities that are the way they are in reaction and in opposition to another identity – whether this other identity is real or, more often, only an imaginary, culturally constructed one – and hence that reject the principle itself, at least initially.

The characteristics of such identities, therefore, are temporariness, typical of the NIMBY identity, and over-determination or over-semanticization of cultural elements, typical of reactive identities. A prominent example in Europe today are those who, since the arrival of Muslims, have been rediscovering their Christian roots, at a political and intellectual level, in opposition to the new arrivals. Even among Muslims, however, we find people who are locked up in forms and places of self-ghettoization, or who are rediscovering (or believe that they are rediscovering, but are in reality reinventing) their roots, expressed since their arrival in Europe through ways of dressing (for instance) that they had perhaps stopped practising in their countries of origin. Even the use of self-definition, by both Muslims and natives, in terms of 'community', which we find so often in debates about mosques – the neighbourhood community and citizens opposed to the Islamic community – is part of this process. It is as if these communities were indeed such, as if there were only *one* of them, valid for everyone, and as if all

the members of the supposed community actually belonged to it or recognized it. Reactive identities produce conflicts, especially conflicts surrounding symbols, and particularly religious symbols, because they are well placed to be instrumentalized and used like a flag, around which consensus can gather, a consensus that under other circumstances would show itself to be entirely fictitious; and this is a process that greatly affects the non-religious public on both sides. In fact, it is often those who are less secure in their religious identity,⁸³ or more fearful of losing it, who get most worked up and 'work up' the issue of symbols, introducing into the debate a use of symbols that is not so much religious and spiritual, but rather ethnic, or even tribal.

The protest against the mosque thus expresses a sort of 'militant particularism', which is set at the junction between the local and the global: 'glocal', to use a term that measures the relationship between these dimensions, which we might also term the 'horizontal (geographical)' and the 'vertical (cultural, or symbolic geography)' dimensions. Topics that are weak at a local, empirical or practical level rely on broader and seemingly solid ideological arguments and flags to shore themselves up. Arguments that are inconsistent or virtually irrelevant locally can use a global interpretative frame in order to support a local issue and conflict. It is not so much 'think globally, act locally', the mantra beloved of ecologists, who tend to relate global and general causes to the local level; but rather 'define globally to act locally', where the appeal to the general and the global does not have any real relationship of cause and effect with local action, but serves only to legitimize it.

As we have seen, in the setting-off and development of this mechanism, political, media and cultural (and religious) fear-mongers, exploiting xenophobia and Islamophobia, play a decisive role. Furthermore, they have a specific interest not in solving the conflict, but in bringing it to the surface and keeping it 'on the boil', because they can profit directly from the situation.⁸⁴

4.2 Current trends

Are the conflicts surrounding mosques increasing, decreasing or stable? It is not easy to answer this question unequivocally, even if we sound out the opinions of

⁸³ In several countries, opinion polls on Muslims and mosques show that it is often non-practising individuals, and not the most active members of various religious communities, who are the most hostile. Such, for instance, were the findings of various IFOP polls produced in France.

⁸⁴ The Padua case was almost farcical. The municipality had offered land to the Islamic community; the Northern League had announced that it would seek a referendum against the decision. At this point the ruling coalition changed its decision, and in the end the Muslim community decided, following an escalation of controversy and costs, to buy a building from a private individual. Nevertheless, the League carried out its own referendum against the 'municipal mosque' a few days before the local elections (June 2009), in order to exploit opposition to the project for election purposes, incidentally without success: the mayor was reconfirmed in his post.

scholars and interested parties, namely Muslim leaders. We need then to begin to distinguish between structural situations of conflict, simple 'episodes of passing conflict', and critical moments, which can lead to various and contrasting situations. Then, finally, there are reactions to mosques themselves, such as acts of vandalism, which may be entirely outside the scope of a real conflict and come to be regarded as no more than attacks on symbols.

In fact, there are different trends in different countries. The differences are not too easy to keep track of in countries that are in a more or less mature phase of immigrant integration – countries of old and new immigration (basically, the countries of central-northern and southern Europe); or where there is a Muslim presence that is more or less recent in time. Things are a little more complex in these cases.

Compared with the previous decade, France has witnessed a decrease in the number of conflicts, in proportion to the number of mosques, which has increased. Overall, it seems that the mechanism for granting building permits is becoming easier and more routine, with a dozen or more new projects enjoying direct funding from local authorities at least for cultural activities carried out within mosques. Consultations between the elected representatives of different political parties seem easier than in the past, and the political differences affect behaviour at the grass roots rather less. There has also been a change in the forms of struggle employed by the extreme right, which seems less inclined to seek direct conflict with Muslims, and has turned instead to use of the law, for example against the illegal financing of religions; in other words, it has turned against the institutions rather than against Muslims themselves. The impression is thus one of a certain normalization of the Islamic presence, even from a religious and cultural point of view: taking disputes to court can indeed be interpreted as a form of normalization of the conflict and as a sign of its integration in the institutional landscape.

In the United Kingdom, there are significant or majority 'ethnic neighbourhoods', especially in big cities, where mosques are obviously welcomed by a local population that enjoys full civil and political rights, and in which conflicts do not seem to be – and indeed have never been – particularly frequent or intense. In addition, the growth phase of mosques appears to have passed, and they are now present in places such as university campuses, airports and train stations, sports stadiums, and even motorway service stations. It is only in connection with high-impact and ostentatious special projects that the number of conflicts seems to have increased. It is largely in smaller and less ethnically uniform towns where organized dissent may appear, nurtured by the growing political entrepreneurs of Islamophobia, such as the British National Party. The two major political

parties have no interest in latching onto such dissent, since both of them aim to capture the Muslim vote themselves.

In Germany over the last decade, the issue of mosques has become intense and much debated; it is also easily 'mediatized'. The level of suspicion about mosques, which are by now present in the country in large numbers, seems to be increasing, as is the number of open conflicts. The latter may be due to increasing numbers of building applications and to an increase in the number of mosques, so the phenomenon is in part physiological.

In the Netherlands the number of conflicts was probably higher during the 1990s, and still more so during the 1980s, but they were essentially local conflicts. Today, conflicts, though perhaps not so frequent, have increased in intensity as a result of the changed political climate of the country, specifically on the issue of Islam. An openly hostile approach to the Islamic presence has now become part of the political debate, producing new and successful political entrepreneurs of Islamophobia, both at local and national level. Thus the conflicts surrounding mosques have become polarized and politicized, and therefore much more visible.

In Belgium, a fair degree of pragmatism and skill in managing conflicts at a local level seems to play a useful role in terms of conflict resolution. Having said this, the conflicts that are still unresolved show that forms of 'citizenization' of Muslims are insufficient to 'citize' (so to speak) Islam itself. Formal integration is certainly an important factor, as has also been seen in countries such as France and Great Britain, but it is not enough in itself. Forms of closure or an inability to communicate on the part of the ethnic groups to which the mosques belong also produce identity reactions that are sometimes intense. Here as well, the presence of political entrepreneurs of Islamophobia is a fundamental detonator of conflict. The relatively small number of conflicts, as in Britain, is also due to the fact that many mosques are located within urban areas that have high concentrations of immigrants and are inhabited by a population with a low capacity for negotiation (weak groups, populations of marginalized manual workers in neighbourhoods that have been abandoned or degraded). In such circumstances mosques serve to enhance the image of the neighbourhood and its moral and physical cleanliness, rather than detract from it.

When compared to the situation in the 1990s, the number of conflicts in Austria has shown a sharp upturn, beginning with the case of the mosque in Telfs, in Tyrol, in 2006. This has much to do with the existence of very active political entrepreneurs of Islamophobia, who are able to steer the agenda on the issue even within the main parties. But it is also due to increased activism on the part of Islamic organizations (particularly the ATIB, the Turkish-Islamic Cultural

Association), which are making major efforts to improve, expand or increase the number of buildings, in a political context that is less favourable than in the past.

Although there have been some serious incidents, in Sweden, and more generally in northern Europe, the problem is not so much the rise in the number of conflicts as their intensity. And in this the spread of the debate on Islam in the public arena, including the question of mosques, is a key element.

Conflicts and tensions appear to be increasing in southern Europe, where Muslims do not enjoy citizenship, the majority of immigrants are residents only and do not possess the nationality of the country in which they reside, and there is also a strong presence of irregular and illegal migration. The increase in conflicts is more evident in Italy than in Spain; in the former, the process is very fragile, as political entrepreneurship of Islamophobia is particularly active and represented in the government at both local and national levels. In Greece, hostility seems to be increasing (an 'illegal' mosque was burnt down in Athens in May 2009), though in this country the role of political entrepreneurs of Islamophobia is occupied more by the Orthodox church than by political parties. This is so in spite of the historical Islamic presence in Thrace, which traditionally suffers forms of marginalization, institutional and other; this, too, is often caused by the church, which acts as guardian and sometimes as agitator of the national and religious identity.

Bosnia is a case apart. Before the 1970s it was simply forbidden to consider the issue of the construction of mosques. From then onwards conflicts have increased in number and intensity, compared both with the Yugoslav Socialist period (which ended in 1992) and with the immediate postwar period. The conflict is still insignificant compared with the period of the 1992–5 war, when more than 1,000 mosques were destroyed. In this country conflicts over mosques seem to take the form of a continuation of the civil war during peacetime, although obviously to a degree and in symbolic ways that are incomparable with the previous period.

From what has been said so far, at a European level it seems that we can make generalizations on at least the following points:

- Conflict is less intense and less frequent where Muslims enjoy more rights, including the right to become citizens; and where Islam has a greater level of institutionalization at a national level.
- Conflict is more intense and more frequent where political entrepreneurs of Islamophobia are present. In general their presence is currently increasing, even in areas where they were not active at a national level in the past; at this stage their success seems to be growing.
- The 'T factor' – time – plays an important role. As the processes of integration move forward and one generation succeeds another, Islam

is gradually being perceived as less alien and less of an enemy. However, these processes are going through important reactive phases, and it is by no means a foregone conclusion that longer Muslim presence means less conflict.

It seems, therefore, that we can say that conflicts, at least over a certain period, may increase or make themselves felt even in places where they were not previously present.

It is interesting to note in this context that Muslim leaders generally perceive an increase in conflict involving themselves and involving mosques, even in countries where there are apparently fewer conflicts. This may be due to their greater ability to organize, with the possibility of using study and monitoring instruments; to increased politicization and lobbying skills in support of their own interests; and to a greater sensitivity to Islamophobia issues, which only in recent years has become accepted as a widespread interpreting tool.⁸⁵ It should be borne in mind that this widely perceived sensation contributes to the plans of action and reaction of social actors.

4.3 Best practices?

We do not intend to make recommendations here, unlike many international reports on the issues of immigration and racism. We limit ourselves simply to highlighting some of the most interesting data that has emerged from the research.

The cultural, religious and symbolic factor appears increasingly to have emerged as the catalyst of conflicts over mosques. Attempting to conceal conflict by wrapping it in a pragmatic and technical jargon, in the technicalities of urban planning, or simply in politically correct phraseology, does not help to address the problem or resolve it. Therefore, if conflict touches upon cultural topics of a more general nature, these must be addressed and designated as such. If the emotional and visceral character is intense, attempts to address the debate must be equally intense: viscera and emotions have the role of reaching and bringing out in debate a level that is not reached through rationality but is nonetheless present. In this sense this is also a positive function of conflict that needs to be grasped and named as such, with its own language and its own modalities. One cannot resolve a conflict by calling it something else: neither by dismissing its assumptions, nor by exaggerating its stereotypical categorizations (this is typically the manner in which the opponents of a mosque are immediately seen as racists, and

⁸⁵ In many ways this is the product of legitimization of some research on the topic, from the Islamophobia report which introduced the term in European political debate (Runnymede Trust 1997), to the report of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC 2006), which nevertheless provides hardly any data on mosques.

the people frequenting the mosque as radicals and fundamentalists). The conflict should therefore be tackled, and if possible guided. The skills needed to do this are very rare, and it is worth taking time to discuss this point, as well as proposals for training.⁸⁶ Often it is only through conflict that positions can change and channels evolve: it is neither useful nor appropriate to ignore or underestimate the conflict, because to do so only puts things off, with the risk of accentuating its destructive rather than its positive content.

The changing nature of the actors taking part in the conflict must also be borne in mind, and with it their ability to modify their own intentions and goals in the context of their strategic positioning. In this regard the 'essentialist' aspect within the vision and definition of stakeholders is particularly negative with respect to the possibility of managing the conflict. In the conflicts examined, some stakeholders adopt the most markedly ideological approaches, which are often not rooted in the local dimension; for these, the initial slogans represent the entirety of the discursive dimension. But these actors apart, stakeholders have often changed their minds and positions on one or other aspect of the question, simply by comparing themselves with other stakeholders, including their opponents. Furthermore, the dynamics of conflict resolution itself create a new dynamic relationship between the actors involved, and new forms of institutionalization, at levels that are ever more marked; and this in itself is a form of assimilation and integration.

Finally, the timescales involved in social conflict, which are often long, should be taken into account (some conflicts that we have examined have gone on for a period of over 20 years);⁸⁷ there is a need for pause and consolidation different from the political timetable, which is dictated primarily by elections and therefore more short-term. The lack of medium- and long-term reflection is one of the problematic elements emerging from the analysis of conflicts. It affects our ability to resolve them, and generally makes it difficult to look beyond the current case of conflict that requires resolution and to reflect on the future of our cities and our society and on their greater pluralist dimensions in terms of culture and values.

Among the positive elements in Muslim behaviour which may help to resolve conflict is the quality of its leadership and its knowledge of the lie of the land in cultural and social terms. From this point of view, 'imported' imams and

⁸⁶ For example, cultural mediators may have strong secular leanings and be critical of or hostile towards religious themes and proposals from the respective countries of origin, even if they themselves have arrived through immigration. In certain settings, such mediators are found to be singularly incapable of understanding specificities and religious needs, and are therefore systematically bypassed when they go into action and are not considered reliable interlocutors.

⁸⁷ One case among many is that of Neder-over-Heembek (part of Brussels), which began in 1983 and is still ongoing, even though there was no problem of a cupola or minaret and no external sign to make it visible.

temporary presences, perhaps lacking even a knowledge of the language of the society in which they operate, are the worst placed to understand the dynamics of a conflict of which they – perhaps even without being aware – are a part. A role involving a relationship with society, consciously taken on by persons who are well placed to fill it, can lead to a deeper understanding of the dynamics and of the expectations to which they must respond, and may enable them to contribute ideas for the planning of mosques, their aesthetic impact, etc.

The leadership can also play a decisive role in relating well to municipal authorities, which have the power to decide (along with other stakeholders, ranging from citizens to political and religious actors) to build alliances rather than to operate under the logic of isolation. Also, decisions concerning architectural choices are important in this respect, as is the ability to understand what is best not to ask for so as not to fuel a conflict that may jeopardize the whole project (insisting, for example, on the *adhan* or an ostentatious and highly distinctive minaret). Other positive factors in conflict management include the choice of absolute respect for laws and regulations, silence in the face of provocations, and the ability to explain one's needs in the face not only of criticism but also of the lies of others – and on top of it all, a strong dose of patience, admired as a virtue in Islam, may also be required. Special weeks or the 'open mosque' initiatives which take place in several countries, frequent school visits and the discussions that accompany them, as well as an institutional presence, may be useful ways of involving other social actors and defusing the negative potential built up by other stakeholders.⁸⁸ Such initiatives, however, can achieve nothing in the face of markedly 'ethnic' mosques, closed within their respective communities, which appear alien and which have a cultural, ethnic and linguistic identity that actually contradicts the rules of good integration.

Positive behaviour on the part of local authorities consists primarily of gaining an understanding of the 'real' Muslim stakeholders. Also significant are forms of contact, both institutional and symbolic, such as being present at important times in the Islamic calendar (especially the two major holidays of *aid al-fitr* and *aid al-kabir*). The inauguration of mosques in the presence of important local dignitaries and representatives of government and municipalities (prefect, mayor, etc) and, better still, of the authorities of other religious confessions, especially the majority one(s), can itself be a sign of acceptance and integration, addressed to both the Muslim community and the citizens. During a conflict, on the other hand, there is a need for places to come together and debate and to explain in a reasoned manner the complex factors involved. It is increasingly important for

⁸⁸ In the only conflict so far to have manifested itself in Portugal – already 'old' history, back in 1983 – some young people protested violently against the mosque in Odivelas. An invitation by the Muslims to go into the mosque for a discussion, however, solved the problem without further incident.

individual and institutional figures to act as mediators and possibly guarantors of an agreement between Islamic communities and their cities; the challenge here is to profile and adequately train individuals who can best do such a job and to put them to work in order to prevent rather than solve conflict. Sometimes there may be a need to take on non-local third parties who are able to get the stakeholders to talk to one another when a conflict has reached a self-referencing impasse, as happened in some of the cases analysed. Employment by the administration of direct methods of dialogue, involving both parties, Muslims and residents, is not only a basic rule of good government; it also has a symbolic meaning of practical importance, in that it may set limits that may not be exceeded, for example in the language used when talking with other interlocutors, the manner of accepting criticism and the rejection of discriminatory practices.

A good practice that would be useful in any governance policy would be to begin, before taking any decision, by mapping out the actors and factors at play. Unfortunately it is a practice that is hardly ever followed, or takes place only after the event, when conclusions are being drawn about what actually happened. It should be possible for such a procedure to take into consideration the 'broader' origins and multiple loyalties of any transnational or supralocal actors present, in the ranks both of the Islamic actors and of the political entrepreneurs of Islamophobia. A further step might be to try to reproduce the conflict, so to speak, 'in the laboratory' through methods of discussion among the social actors (focus groups, guided conflictuality groups, role-playing, mutual narratives, etc),⁸⁹ with the aim of bringing out the real content, beyond what has been stated by the actors.

4.4 Conclusions

As we come up to the present day, the problems and conflicts centring on the presence of mosques in Europe appear to be related more to timing and contingencies than to content, more to meta-cultural interpretation than to empirical data. The interpretative framework of overall relations between Islam and the West has certainly had an influence on local circumstances, from the interpretative paradigm of the 'clash of civilizations' to the general political theme of *nemicus/hostis*. The 'Huntingtonization' of conflicts, so to speak; the ever-present difficulty in distinguishing between xenophobia and Islamophobia; the ambiguous love-hate relationship with the West, its values and way of life that characterizes some

⁸⁹ Usually, however, these methods are the result of academic or social research, disconnected from governance at a local level, which rarely draws direct lessons from it. Several examples in different countries can be found in the research entitled 'Europe's Muslim Communities: Security and Integration post-11 September', promoted by Ethnobarometer and conducted in six European countries (UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium and Italy). The methodologically more complex cases, as well as the only published literature, can be found in Carpentier de Changy, Dassetto and Maréchal 2007 and Allievi 2009.

sections of the Islamic presence: all are elements of this relationship as well as a continual reminder of questions and answers surrounding identity and contraposition: *ego versus alter*. The influence of this interpretative frame must be examined without considering it to be inexorable. The interpretative framework itself may change, as shown, for example, in the recent change of policy towards Islam on the part of the Obama administration,⁹⁰ which constitutes a radical interpretative shift, with the explicit and emphasized abandonment of the clash of civilizations paradigm, in favour of a dialogical paradigm that can be assumed to have an effect over time, even on local interpretative paradigms.

At the same time the official interpretation of the 'clash', at present the dominant one, contrasts oddly with the long-term trends of the Islamic presence in Europe: a gradual move towards integration; institutionalization; formalization of what, after all, is not (or is no longer) a single exogenous fact, but an endogenous factor of the European social and cultural panorama of which the new socialized and secularized Muslim generations in Europe are the most obvious sign.

Having said this, today we are still at an intermediate stage in this process: the transition from an Islam in Europe, via an Islam of Europe, to the emergence, still episodic, of a European Islam; the phases and stages of approximation we described at the beginning of this report.

The exceptionalism relating to Islam, which in many cases seems to be more the rule than the exception, therefore appears as a form of uncertainty: not knowing or failing to use the standard categories of interpretation, one has recourse to exceptional instruments. Interference in the internal affairs of Muslims, which we have seen to be a systematic effect, becomes an attraction of *realpolitik* – the effects of which may also be necessary and beneficial at a certain stage – in the absence of shared tools and universal attractions. But both exist, as the progressive institutionalization and judicialization of the conflicts (important indicators) show.

The next step can only be a gradual normalization of the management of religious pluralism, conducted by local, regional and state governments and the European Union itself, with the judiciary and the courts of human rights as a major intervening variable: moving progressively from a perception of the pathology of pluralism, where cultural and religious homogeneity might represent physiology, to a physiological perception of pluralism itself – a phase, however, that will be neither short nor devoid of conflicts and reactions.

In this sense the conflict, which we have measured here in terms of mosques, is broader in its references and its legitimization. It could be more a

⁹⁰ We refer, as its founding moment, to the event, still sensational, of the speech of US president Barack Obama at the University of Cairo, 4 June 2009.

phase than a destiny: a stage, so to speak, that may not yet have reached its peak; a necessary stage through which we must pass, the painful effects of which can be cushioned by adequate governance policies, but not avoided. We should be conscious that, if the conditions are not favourable and the actors are not directed towards a solution, the conflict may be destructive and lead to a failure of the initiative and rejection of stakeholders rather than their recognition, as has happened in different local contexts, especially if the interlocutors are reinforced by strong ideological tenets and specific regulations. If so, the defeat of one of the interlocutors – the weaker and therefore, inevitably, the Muslim minority – becomes a very real possibility.

As a conclusion to our research, we believe we can say that the problem of mosques in Europe is not in itself a problem. There is, however, an Islamic problem, of which mosques have become the symbol and the most visible symptom. But the problem of Islam, in turn, is actually a problem of plurality and of pluralization as a process, which will have an impact on the very concept of the nation-state and its relationship with one or more religions present within its borders. The increase in cultural and religious plurality achieved by European nation-states has now reached a level that will produce a qualitative as well as quantitative change – a situation very different from that imagined by modern constitutions, but also very different from that theorized and analysed by the sociology of religions.

In this sense, the situation of religious plurality is *in itself* a strong element of dynamism, which pushes towards its 'visibilization' in the territory, comparisons of narratives, an explosion of symbolic conflicts, but also their resolution. Here, Islam appears to have become a sort of discursive substitute – psychoanalytically one might speak of a transitional object – that allows for the discussion of profound changes not only *in* but *of* society: changes which Islam has come to symbolize, but of which it is not the origin and in relation to which it is not the 'guilty' party. In this sense the conflict is not between Europe and Islam; it is within Europe itself and its different actors, one of which happens to be Islam or, rather, Muslims. The different means of interpretation in this sense can be considered as forms of an ongoing power struggle *within* Europe, of which Islam is nothing but a pawn, a player or a trigger: the external cause of a chemical reaction that would have occurred in any case.

In this sense, the question of mosques can really be a litmus test for the more general problem of 'Religion and Democracy in Europe', which, appropriately, is the title of the research of which this study is a part.⁹¹

⁹¹ The first results of this research are presented in Motzkin and Fischer 2008.

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Conflicts over Mosques in Europe

Policy issues and trends

Stefano Allievi

The presence of Islam in Europe's public space provokes debate and tension for a host of reasons – historical, cultural, religious, political and social. The most significant and widespread of these debates centres around mosques as they have very powerful symbolic implications. These disputes are not limited to the establishment of places of worship; they also relate to the question of their visibility in European cities, for instance through the building of minarets. Related questions concern the broadcasting of the *adhan*, the call to prayer, and Muslim cemeteries.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Stefano Allievi is Professor of Sociology at the University of Padua. He specializes in migration issues and in sociology of religion and cultural change. He has particularly focused his studies and researches on the presence of Islam in Europe, to which he has dedicated many publications.

Based on new research in several European countries and on detailed national overviews, this report analyses a wide range of conflicts over mosques and proposes an interpretation of such conflicts in a wider frame, in order to understand the reasons why they emerge, how they develop, the role of the different actors involved, and the lessons that can be learned from them in terms of social dynamics and governance.